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Abstrak 
Rangkaian Ad hoc Bergerak (MANETs) adalah rangkaian wayarles yang tertakluk 
kepada serangan yang teruk, seperti serangan lohong hitam. Salah satu matlamat 
dalam penyelidikan ini adalah untuk mencari kaedah mencegah serangan lohong 
hitam tanpa mengurangkan daya pemprosesan rangkaian atau meningkatkan 
penghalaan overhed. Mekanisme penghalaan dalam menggunakan permintaan laluan 
(RREQs; untuk menerokai laluan) dan dihantar laluan (RREPs; untuk menerima 
laluan). Walau bagaimanapun, mekanisme ini adalah terdedah kepada serangan hasad 
nod lohong hitam. Mekanisme ini dibangunkan untuk mencari jalan selamat terdekat 
dan mengurangkan overhed penggunaan maklumat yang terdapat dalam jadual 
penghalaan sebagai input untuk mencadangkan algoritma sifat-inspirasi yang lebih 
kompleks. Kaedah baru dipanggil protokol PGO-DLLA, yang mengubah AODV 
standard dan mengoptimumkan proses penghalaan. Protokol ini mengelakkan 
bergantung semata-mata pada kiraan hop dan nombor urutan destinasi (DSNs) yang 
dieksploitasi oleh nod berhasad jahat dalam protokol piawai AODV. Percubaan oleh 
metrik prestasi nisbah kelewatan dan paket penghantaran End-to-End dibandingkan 
untuk menentukan trafik usaha terbaik. Keputusan menunjukkan peningkatan PGO-
DLLA penghalaan yang dekat singkat dan selamat daripada serangan lohong hitam 
dalam MANET. Di samping itu, keputusan menunjukkan prestasi yang lebih baik 
daripada kerja-kerja yang algoritma yang berkaitan berkenaan dengan semua metrik 
tidak termasuk pemprosesan yang InterNet adalah yang terbaik dalam routing apabila 
masa jeda menjadi lebih daripada 40 saat. PGO-DLLA mampu meningkatkan 
penemuan laluan terhadap serangan lubang hitam dalam AODV. Eksperimen dalam 
tesis ini telah menunjukkan bahawa PGO-DLL dapat mengurangkan kelewatan beban 
routing normal, hujung-ke-akhir, dan kehilangan paket dan mempunyai daya 
pemprosesan dan paket nisbah penghantaran yang baik jika dibandingkan dengan 
protokol AODV standard, protokol BAODV, dan protokol berkaitan semasa yang 
meningkatkan keselamatan routing protokol AODV. 
 
Kata Kunci: Rangkaian Ad hoc Bergerak, Keselamatan Penghalaan, Serangan 
Lohong Hitam, Algoritma Berilhamkan Alam 
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Abstract 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are wireless networks that are subject to severe 
attacks, such as the black hole attack. One of the goals in the research is to find a 
method to prevent black hole attacks without decreasing network throughput or 
increasing routing overhead. The routing mechanism in define uses route requests 
(RREQs; for discovering routes) and route replies (RREPs; for receiving paths). 
However, this mechanism is vulnerable to attacks by malicious black hole nodes. The 
mechanism is developed to find the shortest secure path and to reduce overhead using 
the information that is available in the routing tables as an input to propose a more 
complex nature-inspired algorithm. The new method is called the Daddy Long-Legs 
Algorithm (PGO-DLLA), which modifies the standard AODV and optimizes the 
routing process. This method avoids dependency exclusively on the hop counts and 
destination sequence numbers (DSNs) that are exploited by malicious nodes in the 
standard AODV protocol. The experiment by performance metrics End-to-End delay 
and packet delivery ratio are compared in order to determine the best effort traffic. 
The results showed the PGO-DLLA improvement of the shortest and secure routing 
from black hole attack in MANET. In addition, the results indicate better performance 
than the related works algorithm with respect to all metrics excluding throughput 
which AntNet is best in routing when the pause time be more than 40 seconds. PGO-
DLLA is able to improve the route discovery against the black hole attacks in AODV. 
Experiments in this thesis have shown that PGO-DLLA is able to reduce the 
normalized routing load, end-to-end delay, and packet loss and has a good throughput 
and packet delivery ratio when compared with the standard AODV protocol, BAODV 
protocol, and the current related protocols that enhance the routing security of the 
AODV protocols.  
 
Keywords: Mobile Ad hoc Networks, Routing Security,  Black Hole Attack, Nature-
inspired Algorithms 
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 CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
During times of hardship such as wars or natural environmental disasters such as 
earthquakes, floods, storms, hurricanes, or volcano eruptions, Mobile Ad hoc 
Networks (MANETs) are considered a good alternative to other types of networks. A 
MANET is a wireless network that is capable of functioning without any need for 
base stations or infrastructures.  
A MANET consists of a large number of dynamic nodes that are interconnected 
without any centralized controller; the nodes are always in motion and there is no 
router device (such as in traditional networks). Each node is a point of contact and is 
either an endpoint or a distributed point, depending on the network or routing 
protocol.  
The nodes can be any active electronic devices that are installed in the network and 
that have the ability to forward (send) or receive information over a network channel 
[1]–[3]. In a MANET, routing protocols are used to route the packets of data that are 
moving from source to destination nodes with the nodes working as a router for 
forwarding the data and for discovering the path between the source node and the 
destination node. This requires each node to use a special mechanism, i.e., some 
MANET protocol to forward data packets from hop to hop [2].  
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 MANET protocols are divided into three categories. a) Ad hoc On-demand (reactive), 
b) Table driven, and c) Hybrid routing protocol [2]–[4]. Figure 1.1 shows the 
classification of routing protocols in MANETs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Classification of routing protocols in MANETs 
Ad hoc on-demand (reactive) routing protocols [5], [6] broadcast discovery packets 
only when necessary to identify the route to the destination. The overall idea is to find 
a path between the source and destination nodes.  
Recent protocols such as the Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [5], 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [7], Lightweight Mobile Routing (LMR) [8], 
Associatively Based Routing (ABR) [9], the Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm 
(TORA) [10], and the Dynamic MANET On-demand routing protocol (DYMO) [11] 
are good examples of this type of protocol. 
In table driven (proactive) routing protocols [12]–[14], every node maintains a routing 
table in which the layout of the network and information about all possible 
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destinations is recorded. The routing is achieved by using the routing table 
information which must periodically be updated by each node. Examples of this type 
of protocol include the Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) [15], Optimal 
Link State Routing (OLSR) [16], the Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) [17], and 
Cluster Gateway Switch Routing (CGSR) [18]. 
The hybrid (mixed) routing protocols [19] combine the basic properties of the on-
demand and table driven routing protocols into a single protocol. The Zone Routing 
Protocol (ZRP) [20], Core Extraction Distribution Ad hoc Routing (CEDAR) [21], 
and the Zone-based Hierarchical Link State protocol (ZHLS) [22] are good examples 
of this type of protocol. 
Routing protocols include a mechanism to find a path for data packets to follow from 
the source to the destination node [4]. The protocols used in traditional wired 
networks cannot be directly applied in ad hoc wireless networks, due to the unique 
characteristics of MANETs [23], [24]. The AODV protocol that is studied in this 
thesis is one of the common on-demand protocols used in MANETs.  
According to [25, pp. 70], “the routing plays an important role in the security of the 
entire network”. Along with the benefits of using a MANET, there are also significant 
risks posed by vulnerabilities in and threats to MANET security [26]. MANETs are 
vulnerable to spoofing [25], [27], eavesdropping [28], and Denial of Service (DoS) 
[25], [27], [29], [30], due to the lack of infrastructure.  
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In addition, management messages are not authenticated, the routing control messages 
necessitate encryption, there are weak security practices in the routing protocols, and 
insufficient protection measures are not taken. In general, MANET vulnerabilities can 
be exploited by two types of attack: passive attacks and active attacks [25], [31].  
Passive attacks are a type of eavesdropping over the network. In passive attacks, the 
attackers usually focus on breaching communication privacy or anonymity [32]. In 
contrast, active attacks may modify data, gain authentication, or procure authorization 
by inserting false packets into the network. Active attacks include DoS, routing table 
overflow [28], impersonation [28], [33], and black hole attacks [34].  
A black hole attack is one of the basic type of attack in a MANET, and it is a severe 
attack. Black hole attacks are caused by one or more nodes within the network or in 
the scope of the network’s broadcasting. The nodes conduct the attack by claiming 
that they are on the shortest route to a destination node, in order to intercept packets. 
In these attacks, black hole nodes need to be the first nodes to respond to a route 
request in order to intercept the data packets that are transmitted in the network and 
then keep them.  
One of the common on-demand routing protocols is the AODV protocol. According 
to [26], AODV does not specify any security mechanisms. In the next section, we will 
present the main AODV protocol mechanisms for route discovery. 
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1.1.1 Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol (AODV) 
The reactive AODV routing protocol [5] is an on-demand routing protocol used for 
dynamic wireless networks, where nodes can enter and leave the network at any time. 
The main ideas of the AODV protocol are as follows: 
 the protocol broadcasts a discovery packet only when necessary; 
 the protocol identifies a route through local connectivity management 
neighborhood detection; 
 the protocol has general topology maintenance; 
 the protocol disseminates information about changes in local connectivity to 
those neighboring mobile nodes that are likely to need this information; and  
 the protocol finds the shortest path between the source and destination nodes.  
The AODV routing protocol includes two types of routing processes: route discovery 
and route maintenance. This research focuses on route discovery process in AODV. 
Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 explain the route discovery messages, route request message 
(RREQs), and route reply messages (RREPs) used in AODV. 
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Figure 1.2. The route request message (RREQ) on AODV protocol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. The route reply message (RREP) in the AODV protocol 
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Figure 1.4. The source node forwards packets to the destination node 
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the first to respond to the request and thus intercept and keep the data packets 
transmitted in the network. 
According to [35], a black hole attacker listens to the route requests in a flooding-
based protocol. When the attacker receives a request for a route to the destination 
node, it creates a reply consisting of an extremely short route. If the malicious reply 
reaches the initiating node before the reply from the actual neighboring nodes, a fake 
route is created. 
Once the malicious device has been able to insert itself between the communicating 
nodes, it can do anything with the packets passing between them. It can drop the 
packets passing between them to perform a DoS attack or, alternatively, use its place 
on the route as the first step in a man-in-the-middle attack [36].  
For example, in Figure 1.5, source node S wants to send data packets to destination 
node D and initiates the route discovery process. We assume that node B is a 
malicious node that claims it has a route to the destination whenever it receives route 
request packets, and that it immediately sends a response to node S.  
If the response from node B is the first to reach node S, then node S thinks that the 
route discovery is complete, it ignores all other reply messages, and it begins to send 
data packets to node B. As a result, all packets through the malicious node are 
consumed or lost. 
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Figure 1.5. Black hole attack: (a) single black hole attack and (b) cooperative black 
hole attack with two malicious nodes    
1.2 Problem Statement 
A MANET is a modern, dynamic network that has a dynamic condition for auto 
configuration and maintenance. A MANET has flexibilities that make it a suitable 
type of network for many applications [32]. Many existing routing protocols in 
MANETs, such as AODV, are excellent in terms of performance and efficiency but 
lack security protection and can therefore suffer from several types of attacks [25], 
[37], [38]. AODV creates routes on an on-demand basis and expands the Distance 
Vector (DV) to eliminate loops in the routing table. A DV is very simple routing 
configuration in which it is easier for every node to maintain the distance to each 
destination than in the structure used by the Link-state algorithm, where each node 
maintains a view of the network topology information [39], [40].  
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The simplicity of the DV and the lower delay in connection setup are examples of 
properties of the AODV routing protocol that make it a very common protocol in 
MANETs. On the other hand, AODV is also subject to malicious attacks such as 
black hole attacks [2], [41]–[45]. These attacks have two forms: single and 
cooperative black hole attacks [2], [43], [44].  The route discovery in AODV uses two 
indicators to update information. First, it selects the route with a higher destination 
sequence number (DSN); this indicates the freshness of the route to the destination 
node. Second, the route discovery selects the route with a better metric (number of 
hops to the destination) in the case where the DSNs are equal [6].  
In AODV protocol, when a source node does not find a path to the destination node in 
the routing table, it sends a RREQ to all of its neighboring nodes by flooding. In 
addition, AODV use routing tables to save routing information, which can be a target 
for attackers to read, making this a another gap that can be exploited by black hole 
nodes. In a single or cooperative black hole attack, one or more malicious nodes 
respond to the first RREQ from the source node. It is very easy for a black hole node 
to change the information in the routing table that comes with the RREQ and send an 
RREP with fake information. Unfortunately, because this RREP will have the highest 
DSN value and the smallest hop count, the source node will choose the malicious 
node as the best node to forward a packet. Black hole nodes use their higher priority 
to drop all the packets and thus conduct a type of DoS attack in the network. By 
compromising the information in a routing table and sending fake RREPs to source 
nodes, black hole attackers can also affect the network’s performance - for example, 
by increasing both end-to-end delay and network overhead. 
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A lot of research has focused on securing the routing discovery in AODV. Many 
related work are presented in chapter two, it have proposed several solutions to 
prevent the black hole attack, and more than one of those solutions involves changing 
the routing mechanism in the AODV protocol. However, any change to the original 
route discovery mechanism will not necessarily be useful in all cases, and it may to 
the contrary lead to undesirable results, such as loops in the routing, a slow rate of 
convergence, large control overhead, and unnecessary bandwidth consumption [39], 
[40]. For routing security, the shortest path (least number of hops to the destination) is 
the best path, as it has the lowest probability of containing malicious nodes [46]–[48]. 
None of the existing conventional solutions focus directly on solving cooperative 
black hole attacks during the routing discovery phase in AODV, and most of these 
solutions are not sufficient to prevent the cooperative black hole attacks during the 
routing discovery [49], [50]. 
According to [49], the solutions can be classified into two groups: limited and 
intensive solutions. The limited approaches consume little power is consumed (as 
simple processes are performed) compared to what is needed for the intensive 
approaches (these involve complex processes that consume more power). However, 
while the limited approaches can offer a solution to the single black hole attack 
problem, most of these solutions are not accurate and are inadequate for preventing 
cooperative black hole attacks. In contrast, intensive solutions can be used to increase 
the protocol’s safety and accuracy through an increased ability to prevent cooperative 
black hole attacks. However, there is a problem with using intensive solutions, as they 
consume large amounts of power and time to obtain good performance. This problem 
   
12 
makes the intensive solutions incapable of adapting to environments that have limited 
power and dynamic changes, such as MANETs. 
As a consequence, there is a need for a new solution that focuses mainly on 
preventing black hole attacks in the AODV protocol. The solution must be an 
enhancement of the AODV route discovery mechanism and avoid the consumption of 
network resources and develops a heuristic approach that is useful for finding a 
shortest secure path (namely, a shortest path that is secure). 
1.3 Research Questions 
To address the issues raised in the problem statement section of this chapter, this 
investigation aims to answer the following research questions: 
1. How can be designed an algorithm to prevent a single and cooperative black hole 
attacks on the RREQs and RREPs of the AODV routing mechanism without 
significantly increasing the average end-to-end delay? 
2. How should the proposed algorithm for preventing black hole attacks during the 
routing process in the AODV protocol be implemented? 
3. What are the best measures for evaluating the proposed algorithm for preventing 
black hole attacks in the AODV protocol? 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to design algorithms that can prevent single 
black hole attacks and cooperative black hole attacks in AODV routing protocol. The 
sub objectives of the research are: 
1. To design a new algorithm to prevent black hole attacks in the AODV protocol 
by: 
a. Improving the route discovery (RREQ and RREP) through a heuristic search 
algorithm, to enhance the shortest path technique in the routing mechanism, 
b. Testing the new technique with trusted and malicious environments and 
comparing the results with those for the original AODV, and 
c. Improving the route discovery by using a meta-heuristic algorithm to enhance 
finding the shortest and most secure path to the destination; 
2. To implement the proposed algorithm for preventing black hole attacks and to 
evaluate its performance in the simulated environment; and to evaluate the effect 
of the proposed algorithm in terms of validation based on the simulation results 
and then comparing it with the original AODV.  
1.5 Scope of the Research 
The scope of the research in this thesis involves the design of a new secure AODV 
protocol, specifically for a secure AODV routing protocol. The new protocol provides 
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a solution to the problem of preventing black hole attacks in the AODV route 
discovery. The research focuses on optimize route discovery and security. The 
proposed solution consists of three algorithms that can be used as solutions for the 
single and cooperative black hole attack problem. However, it must be noted that the 
scope of this research is limited to preventing black hole attacks that come from the 
route discovery in the AODV protocol. In order to evaluate the proposed protocol, 
this research uses the network simulator (NS-2) to test each algorithm under the same 
virtual network environment. The performance of the proposed protocol is evaluated 
from the five performance metrics: the packet delivery ratio (PDR), the packet loss 
(PL), the average end-to-end delay (EtoE), the throughput (TH), and the normalized 
routing load (NRL).  
1.6 The Significance of the Research 
This research makes the following contributions: 
1. Evaluate the proposed protocol with respect to preventing a black hole attack 
in terms of a specific set of performance metrics; 
2. A modification standard AODV and proposed a new routing protocol to 
prevent single and cooperative black hole attacks with a heuristic search 
algorithm, a meta-heuristic algorithm, and swarm intelligence; 
3. The new parallel algorithm proposed for optimizing routing, security with a 
new swarm algorithm inspired by a type of spiders found in nature. 
   
15 
1.7 Structure of the Research 
This thesis has six chapters, including this introductory chapter, which presents 
background information about the types of black hole attacks that can occur in 
MANETs.  
Chapter Two has two sections: the first section presents a literature review of related 
studies on preventing black hole attacks with limited computational solutions, while 
the second section focuses on studies on the use of intensive computational solutions 
to prevent black hole attacks.  
Chapter Three presents the methodology used for conducting this research and is 
divided into six main sections. The first section is on the empirical experiments, while 
the second, third, and fourth sections are about creating solutions with artificial 
intelligence algorithms. The fifth section discusses heuristic search algorithms, meta-
heuristic algorithms, and swarm intelligence. The last section of Chapter Three 
discusses the validation process for the experiments. 
 
Chapter Four presents the design and implementation of the proposed algorithms for 
improving the routing security in the AODV protocol.  The first section proposes an 
algorithm that uses heuristic search (A*) [51], [52]. The proposed algorithm is 
capable of improving a route in AODV by using an estimated value to find a shortest 
path between the source and destination nodes. The second proposed hybrid algorithm 
is different from the algorithm proposed in the first section and uses the Floyd-
Warshall algorithm [53] to find a distance between two nodes instead using of 
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estimated distances to discover the shortest secure path. The protocol proposed in this 
chapter can prevent a black hole attack without needing to use cryptography or 
authentication. The algorithm is compared with the original AODV protocol with 
respect to the performance metrics. To improve the local and global search in the 
search algorithm, we propose an algorithm with a new mechanism that works as 
parallel agents to optimize the shortest secure path found in the AODV protocol. 
Finally, all three proposed algorithms are compared with five related proposals. This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of how to develop the proposed algorithms in the 
network simulator (NS-2).  
 
Chapter Five is divided into two parts. The first part is intended to demonstrate the 
performance of AODV in two different environments: regular and hostile 
environments, to examine the optimal setting of the AODV protocol. A regular 
environment is a group of nodes (i.e., computers, notepads, mobile phones, and 
communication devices) that communicate without any attacks. In contrast, a hostile 
environment is a regular environment with one or more malicious nodes (black hole 
nodes). This chapter also studies the important performance metrics with various 
settings of the pause time and different numbers of nodes to predefine an appropriate 
optimal setting for AODV. The study of the current behavior of AODV involves a set 
of simulations (empirical experiments) based on NS-2. In the second part of Chapter 
Five, the results of the proposed protocol performance are analyzed.    
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Finally, Chapter Six presents concluding remarks about the three proposed 
algorithms, including a description of their features, capabilities, and weaknesses. The 
chapter presents some recommendations that can serve as guidelines for further 
research on using artificial intelligence to improve routing security in MANETs. 
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 CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature related to the research field considered in 
the thesis. The review of literature is related to studies in preventing black hole 
attacks in MANETs. Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 discuss the overview of MANET 
security attributes and types of attacks in MANET respectively. The black hole 
attacks are discussed in Section 2.1.4, while Section 2.1.4.3 presents the roles of 
Destination Sequence Number (DSN) and hop count. Section 2.2 displays the 
investigation of the previous techniques that are used to identify and prevent the black 
hole attacks at routing in AODV. Section 2.3 displays the nature-inspired algorithms 
in general, and displays the nature-inspired algorithms for MANET in Section 2.4. 
Finally, the limitation of current work is discussed in Section 2.5.   
2.2 Vulnerability of MANETs 
MANET is a wireless network; it has fundamental characteristics, such as open 
medium, dynamic topology, and constrained capability. According to [26, pp. 478], 
“With the network topology changing dynamically and the lack of a centralized 
network management functionality, these networks tend to be vulnerable to a number 
of attacks”. However, MANETs are vulnerable to attacks such as black hole attacks. 
There are several reasons to make the MANET become vulnerable, as shown in Table 
2.1. 
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Table 2.1 
The reasons which make the vulnerabilities in MANETs. 
 Reason About the reason Examples 
Open medium 
[54], [55] 
MANET consists of a huge 
number of nodes, in which external 
nodes can join at any time. 
Mobile nodes, wireless 
mobile nodes 
The configuration of 
MANETs 
[56] 
 
Capable of communicating with 
others nodes, no infrastructure or 
centralized administration, difficult 
to put a routing security 
mechanism 
Self-configuration, self-
connected by wireless links 
automatically 
The fundamental of 
MANETs 
[57], [58] 
The malicious nodes exploit 
MANET properties in order to 
constrain its capabilities 
Open medium, dynamic 
topology, distributed 
cooperation, unrestricted 
mobility, and connectivity to 
the users 
The nature of nodes 
connections 
[59] 
MANET nodes have an 
interchange of packets using hop-
by-hop for any node out of range. 
The nodes always work as a host 
or router 
Hop-by-hop, host or router 
The MANET 
problems 
[35], [27] 
Some components in MANET 
need to be improved to enhance the 
quality of service (QoS)  
Routing protocols (lack in 
security), power constraint, 
limit of bandwidth, special 
types of attacks such as 
black hole attacks, 
fabrication attacks, flooding 
attacks  
Hard environments 
[60] 
MANET has been designed to 
work in hostile environments, 
some special networks can monitor 
animals, sea, or space 
Battlefields, military 
applications, emergency and 
disaster situations  
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However, only one of the reasons which make the vulnerabilities in MANETs (in 
Table 2.1) may increase the probability of exposure to attacks. Since most security 
solutions in regular networks do not fit with the characteristics of MANET, although 
those characteristics are the reason to make MANET a very famous network. The 
absence of a centralized infrastructure makes it difficult to apply the methods of 
encryption, such as public key cryptography or certification authorities (CA). On the 
other hand, the node's mobility makes the security mechanisms that are applied in the 
stable networks not suitable to work with MANET [34].  
Furthermore, the other basic characteristic of the decentralization of MANET is the 
decision-making, however, this may make it easier for the attacker to penetrate the 
part of the network as the source node. The breakthrough is held responsible for 
taking an important decision in an important moment by methods of deception or 
breach that could lead to network failure or collapse. Another problem such as relying 
on batteries or exhaustible means for energy may be a solution for the attacker to stop 
the work of the network. This problem of power loss or limitations may be caused by 
one of the nodes using the method of attack that leads to the depletion of energy in a 
certain way from a decade of catalytic. This situation lead to a breakdown in 
communication between them and the rest of the nodes in MANET, and stop 
broadcasting and data transmission over the network because the principle work in 
MANET is the multihop. 
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2.2.1 MANET Security 
Security is the combination of specific actions of all the processes, that is used to 
ensure the following requirements: confidentiality, authentication, integrity, non-
repudiation, availability, and access control are achieved [61]. The standard key 
parameter types for networks and the attributes affected by many attacks are shown in 
detail in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 
Security attributes in MANET. 
Type Effects  Details 
Confidentiality  
[62], [63]. 
It is the keeping of the 
information unreadable to 
the unauthorized nodes. 
The modification attacks can affect 
the confidentiality of MANET. 
Authentication 
[64], [65]. 
Prevent unauthorized users 
or nodes. 
In infrastructure-based network, it 
is possible to implement a central 
authority at a point such as a router, 
base station, or access point. 
Integrity [66], 
[67]. 
The protecting of the 
message that is sent during 
transmission. 
The data can be modified or 
deleted by malicious attackers. The 
malicious attackers can also resend 
it, which is known as replay attack. 
Non-
repudiation 
[68], [69]. 
If an entity sends a 
message, the entity cannot 
deny that the message was 
sent by it. 
The entity cannot deny that the 
message was sent by it. The entity 
cannot later deny the message as 
well. 
Availability 
[70], [71]. 
A node should maintain its 
ability to provide all the 
designed services 
regardless of the security 
state of it. 
 
Security criterion is challenged 
mainly during the DoS attacks. 
Access control 
[72], [73]. 
Preventing unauthorized 
nodes from getting access 
to the network. 
Access control is tied to 
authentication attributes. 
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2.2.2 Routing Attacks in MANET 
The routing attacks in MANET are classified into two types depending on its nature: 
passive and active attacks. The passive attacks illegitimately gain over the information 
by listening to traffic in the network without making any damage in the operations of 
routing protocol [35]. Whereas, the active attacks change the flow of data, or 
sometimes they insert fake packet and change its contents [74]. The active attacks are 
severe attacks, and are divided into two types; external and internal attacks [75]. In 
external attacks, some nodes do not belong to the same network with the victim nodes 
as they are the attackers. In contrary, in internal attacks, the attackers share the same 
network with the victim nodes. This attack is done by internal compromised nodes or 
external adversaries in external attacks. The passive and active attacks are shown in 
Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
Figure 2.1. Passive and Active attacks in MANET (Adopted from [76]) 
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2.2.3 The Black Hole Attack 
Black hole attack is a type of Denial of Service attack (DoS), which is a type of active 
attack. In a black hole attack, an attacker reduces the quantity of routing information 
offered to the other nodes by dropping the received routing messages.  
The attack also has the action of making the target node out of reach or fall out of 
communication in the network. The black hole attack in a routing protocol such as 
AODV can appear in two forms; the black hole that is attacked by RREQ, and the 
black hole that is attacked by RREP. 
2.2.3.1 Black hole Attack Caused by RREQ 
This attack forges a RREQ message to form a black hole attack. In the forged RREQ 
message, the attacker pretends to rebroadcast a RREQ message with a non-existent 
node as the source IP address in the IP header. The originating node will update its 
route to go through the non-existent node to the destination node.  
As a result, the route will be broken. The black hole attack can fake the RREQ 
message by increasing the source sequence number by at least one or decreasing the 
hop count between the source node and destination node by the forged RREQ 
message, as shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2. Black hole attack in the AODV routing protocol 
2.2.3.2 Black hole Attack Caused by RREP 
The attacker may create an RREP message to form a black hole as a fake RREP 
message to the originating node. When the originating node receives the fake RREP 
message, it will update its route to the destination node through the non-existent node 
to form a black hole, as shown in Figure 2.2. 
2.2.4 The Roles of DSN and Hop Count 
The AODV routing protocol quotes the use of the sequence number from the DSDV 
routing protocol to supersede stale cached routes and to prevent loops, while the 
discovery procedure is derived from the one adopted in the DSR routing protocol. 
More details about the role of DSN and hop count are explained in the following 
sections. 
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2.2.4.1 Destination Sequence Number (DSN) 
AODV uses a DSN for each route entry in the routing table, as shown in Table 2.3. 
However, the DSN is created by the destination node to be included along with any 
route information it sends to requesting nodes. Using DSN ensures loop freedom, 
whenever an option is assumed between two routes to a destination, a requesting node 
is required to select the one with the greatest DSN [5], [77]. Every Route Table Entry 
(RTE) at each node must contain the latest information available about the sequence 
number for the IP address of the destination node for which the RTE is maintained. If 
a node receives new information about the single path from RREQ, RREP, or RERR 
messages that is regarding the destination, DSN is updated. A destination node 
increments its own sequence number in two situations: 
1. Immediately before a node wants to construct a route discovery, the sequence 
number will be incremented to prevent the conflicts with previously established 
reverse routes to the source of a RREQ. 
2. When a destination node responds to a RREQ and generates a RREP, it will 
update its own sequence number to the maximum of its current sequence 
number and the DSN in the RREQ packet. 
2.2.4.2 Hop Count 
Hop Count is a number of the hops needed to reach the destination node [66], [68]. 
The hop count is a very important field in the routing table that is utilized and 
managed by the AODV protocol when the route needs to update. For example, in the 
situation of the sequence numbers of intermediate nodes are equal, the hop count 
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plays an important role to update the path to the destination node in the routing table, 
where, the source node is decided to select a node with a smaller value of hop count. 
Table 2.3 shows the fields of the routing table in a standard AODV routing protocol. 
Table 2.3 
The Contents of the Routing Table in Standard AODV Routing Protocol [5]. 
The Routing Table 
Destination IP Address 
Destination Sequence Number (DSN) 
Valid Destination Sequence Number flag 
Other state and routing flags (e.g., valid, invalid, repairable, being repaired) 
Network Interface 
Hop Count (number of hops needed to reach destination) 
Next Hop 
List of Precursors 
Lifetime (expiration or deletion time of the route) 
2.3 Prevention Techniques Against Black Hole Attack 
There are two main approaches to solve the black hole attack problem in MANET; 
simple techniques approach and complex techniques approach [49]. In the simple 
techniques, the computations are limited and restricted, and those techniques include 
simple calculations to detect the single black hole nodes. On the other hand, the 
complex approach uses intensive and complex techniques for protecting the routing 
against a single and cooperative black hole attacks. In this chapter, the review of black 
hole attacks is based on the  taxonomy that have been proposed in the literature [49]. 
Figure 2.3 shows the taxonomy of the prevention techniques against the black hole 
attack in MANET. 
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Figure 2.3. The prevention techniques against black hole attack in MANET (Adopted 
from [49]) 
2.3.1 The Computation Restricted Type 
In this section, three main types are displayed; trusted neighboring nodes, cross layer 
cooperation and route redundant, as the following in the Sections 2.3.1.1, 2.3.1.2, 
2.3.1.3, and 2.3.1.4.  
In these solutions, there are three techniques; using feedback, using acknowledge-
based, and using reputation. In the rest of the chapter, several important previous 
solutions to prevent a black hole attack in MANETs will be displayed, as shown in 
Figure 2.3. 
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2.3.1.1 Trusted Neighboring Nodes 
In general, the source node uses a neighboring node to find a route to a destination 
and transmits the packet among the nodes. As a result, the neighboring node takes an 
important role in the routing, in which the same role must be taken in any new 
techniques to prevent AODV from a malicious attack.  
In the trusted neighboring nodes, there are three techniques; using feedback, using 
acknowledge-based, and using reputation. Additionally, some of the important notes 
about these three techniques that are used in [43], [78], [79] as previous solutions to 
prevent a black hole attack in MANETs are displayed in the following Sections i, ii 
and iii. 
i. Feedback 
Many of the detection techniques have been proposed to take advantage of the 
feedback from the intermediate nodes. The source node judges whether a suspected 
node is a normal or malicious node, depending on the information from neighboring 
nodes. 
In [43], the authors have analyzed the black hole attack and propounded that the 
destination sequence number must sufficiently be increased by the attacker node in 
order to convince the source node that the route provided is the optimum.  
Based on the differences between the destination sequence numbers of the received 
RREPs, the authors proposed an approach that has a merit in which the attack can be 
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detected at a low cost without introducing extra routing traffic without modification of 
the existing protocol, albeit false positives is a demerit. 
In [78] proposed a REAct system for detecting malicious nodes. When the destination 
node detects a heavy packet drop, the feedback message will be sent back to the 
source node to trigger the audit procedure.  
Then, the source node will choose an audit node to use a bloom filter to generate 
behavioral proof. The source node also uses a bloom filter to produce behavioral 
proof and compares with the bloom filter that is generated by the audit node. 
However, the behavioral proof that is generated by the bloom filter contains only the 
information of transmitting packets, but not the information of nodes on the 
forwarding path. 
In [79], the authors have assumed that the first RREP received by the source node is 
from the black hole node. A new protocol (IAODV) has been proposed to eliminate 
the first RREP control message that is received by the source node and then accept all 
other replies. However, this method may be inappropriate if there is no attack in the 
network or maybe not be an adequate method if there are many black hole nodes that 
are attacking the routing protocol cooperatively. 
In general, the feedback technique in literature [43], [78], [79], contrary to perform 
well with the single malicious attack, it may not be appropriate in the case of 
collective malicious attacks. The failing to prevent a cooperative black hole attack 
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make these methods are acceptable methods in preventing of the single black hole 
attack, where, it consumes a moderate power.  
ii.  Acknowledge Based 
In [80] proposed a secure on-demand ad hoc routing protocol (ARIADNE) based on 
the DSR protocol [7]. The authors proposed a shared secret key between two nodes, 
and used a message authentication code. The study focused on using message 
authentication code in order to authenticate point-to-point messages between these 
nodes.  
The proposed system compares ARIADNE with the original DSR routing protocol. 
The system performance reached around (41.7%) lower packet overhead compared to 
the optimized DSR, and about the same percentage on all other metrics. However, 
their scope is limited to the highly optimized version of DSR that runs in a trusted 
environment because they did not secure the optimization of DSR in ARIADNE, the 
proposed system. 
 However, this technique suffers from slow speed detection in case of multiple nodes 
of black hole that attack at the same time. This technique needs to consume more 
bandwidth and it is better in single than cooperative black hole attacks. It needs to 
send special control messages in case of centralization rather than distribution or 
hybridization. 
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iii. Reputation 
In [2] proposed a solution to collective black hole attack in MANETs called PCBHA, 
“Prevention of Co-operative Black Hole Attack in MANET”. They modified the basic 
AODV routing protocol [77] with computer simulation using GLOMOSIM (Global 
Mobile Simulator) [81] to achieve the required security with minimal delay and 
overhead.  
The study focuses on making use of “fidelity tables” and assigning fidelity levels to 
the participating nodes. The proposed algorithm uses in the simulation a minimum 
threshold value, which is taken as two units as a test case. To find a valid route, the 
proposed solution tries up to a maximum of RREQ_RETRIES TIMES at the 
maximum Time to Live (TTL) value; otherwise it is declared to have not found a 
valid route. The experiments are done by using the GLOMOSIM simulator and the 
metrics that are used to evaluate the performance are compared.  
The percentage of the packet delivery ratio increased by 59% using PCBHA when 
compared with the standard AODV. Hence, the enhancement of a new protocol with 
packets received through AODV was less than 60% over their system in the presence 
of cooperative black hole attacks.  
In addition, the average end-to-end delay was not very high. As a result, the important 
point in this study is that it has a solution to collective black hole attacks and make 
fidelity tables. However, their scope is limited to the ways to reduce the delay in the 
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network that is happening due to the exchange of fidelity packets in PCBHA to 
achieve security.  
Table 2.4 shows a summary of the solutions that were proposed in this literature 
review using the trusted neighboring node methods. 
Table 2.4 
Summary of the Computation Restricted Methods Based on The Trusted Neighboring 
Nodes: Feedback, Acknowledge Based, and Reputation. 
Literature 
Based 
Protocol 
Highlights 
Prevention 
Functionality 
Dynamic Updating 
Training  [43] 
AODV 
 The study is focused on the changes 
of DSN during the routing discovery in 
different situations. 
 Used the feedback that is coming 
from neighboring nodes and created 
some of the clusters, which are free of 
the black hole nodes. 
 
All nodes 
REAct [78] All 
 Used the bloom filter to generate 
behavioral proof. 
 The source node chooses an audit 
node from the feedback that comes 
from the neighboring nodes. 
 
All nodes 
IAODV [79] AODV  Supposed a first RREP message 
came from a suspicious node. 
All nodes 
Ariadne [80] DSR 
 Uses message authentication code in 
order to authenticate point-to-point 
message between the nodes. 
 Uses symmetric cryptography. 
One  
compromised 
node 
PCBHA [2] AODV 
 Uses “fidelity tables” and assigns 
fidelity levels to the participating 
nodes. 
 
All nodes 
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2.3.1.2 Cross Layer Cooperation 
In [82], if both neighboring nodes and the next hop node are black hole nodes, the 
next hop node can respond to the source node with falsified routing information. 
Therefore, this scheme is still vulnerable to a cooperative black hole attack. The 
algorithm uses a methodology to identify multiple black hole nodes working 
collaboratively as a group to initiate cooperative black hole attacks. The new protocol 
is a slightly modified version of the AODV protocol by introducing the Data Routing 
Information (DRI) table and cross checking using Further Request (FREQ) and 
Further Reply (FREP).  
In [83] the authors proposed a time-link cross checking method to prevent the routing 
discovery from the cooperative black hole attack. A modification towards the original 
AODV protocol was conducted. In this method, when a source node receives the first 
RREP, it does not respond directly, but it waits for a specific time to check the data 
routing information (DRI). A source node has a cache list to save all RREPs and all 
details of the next hop that are gathered from other nodes. It sends a further request to 
another path from a list of response paths after checking for repeating next hop nodes, 
otherwise it chooses a random path.  
However, these methods are suffering from the increase of control overhead, due to 
the exchanges of DRI packets and the true-link cross-checking. The advantage of this 
technique reduces the network overhead by using only one hop (direct neighbor) and 
sending the control packets after each packet.  
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2.3.1.3 Route Redundant and Message Parameter 
In this type, the nodes can use a certain message parameter such as the sequence 
numbers to indicate the existence of malicious nodes. 
 In [84], the authors proposed a verified method to check each RREP packet that is 
received by the destination node. The proposed method is divided into two phases: 
suspicion phase and confirmation phase.  
The authors adopted a new change in the original AODV mechanism such as delaying 
the route reply RREP and checking DSN and hop count. Additionally, a control 
packet has been proposed to the route discovery to confirm a presence of an attacker 
in the suspicion phase.  
In this method, a random number is inserted on the further control message MERQ to 
find the duplicate random number as a trusted path and send data from source to 
destination node. This method shows some improvement in PDR compared with the  
AODV protocol on the hostile environment of black hole attacks. However, the 
results show a slightly higher value in control overhead. 
In [85], the authors proposed two solutions to prevent the black hole attack in the 
AODV protocol. In the first solution, the source node will wait for RREP to arrive 
from more than two different nodes. The source node will check for the shared hops 
and the nodes in this path, or to alarm the other nodes about the black hole attack.  
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In the second solution, they used the sequence number that was included in any 
packet header to extract two extra tables. The first table includes a sequence number 
that will be sent to every node. The second table acts to receive a sequence number 
from every sender. This solution has more accurate and secure results, but it has a few 
drawbacks such as the increase in the delay time and the routing overhead, especially 
in the first solution.  
2.3.1.4 Other Computation Restricted Types 
In [86] proposed a secure and efficient MANET routing protocol, the SAODV 
protocol based on the standard AODV protocol [77], and the AODV protocol with the 
black hole attack. The authors proposed a directly verified destination node by using 
the exchange of random numbers. The routing overhead as one of the important 
performance metrics, it was improved by (8%) in the new protocol compared with the 
standard AODV protocol. However, their scope is limited to the highly optimized 
version of AODV that runs in a trusted environment as the safety and efficiency must 
be better at the same time. Table 2.5 summarizes all the computation restricted 
methods except the trusted neighboring nodes, which are proposed in the literature 
review: cross layer cooperation, route redundancy, and message parameters. 
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Table 2.5 
The Computation Restricted Methods Based on Mechanisms: Cross Layer 
Cooperation, Route Redundancy, and Message Parameters. 
Literature 
Based 
Protocol 
Highlights 
Prevention 
Functionality 
DRI  [82] AODV 
 Uses Data Routing Information 
(DRI) table and, 
 Cross-checking using Further 
Request (FREQ) and Further Reply 
(FREP).  
 
All nodes 
EDRIAODV 
[83] 
AODV 
 Using the time-link cross checking 
method to prevent the routing 
discovery from the cooperative black 
hole attack. 
 
All nodes 
SAODV [84] AODV 
 Uses multiple paths to find the 
destination node. 
 Modify Route Request (MREQ), 
and Modify Route Reply (MREP). 
 Uses different random numbers in 
MERQ to check if any black hole 
nodes are found.  
 
All nodes 
BAODV & 
SAODV [86] 
AODV 
 Uses directly verifies the destination 
node by using the exchange of random 
number. 
All nodes 
2.3.2 The Computation Unrestricted Type 
In these methods, the researchers have attempted to use a more complex mechanism 
to prevent black hole attacks such as the mechanisms with fuzzy logic, genetic 
algorithm, clustering algorithms, and mobile agents. The following sections will show 
these mechanisms in detail. 
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2.3.2.1 Genetic Algorithm 
In [87], the authors proposed a new technique to use the genetic algorithm for 
analyzing the behaviors of every node in the network by extracting the related 
parameters such as Pack Drop (PD), Request Forward Rate (RFR), and Route Request 
Rate (RRR). They built several blocks of data as a string for feeding the input patterns 
of the genetic algorithm. It is used to extract certain features such as the anomalous 
behavior of nodes to detect and prevent black hole attacks in the routing protocol. 
However, most of the IDS are suffering from the redundancy in the check data, as 
well as from the height of cost of battery consumption and bandwidth at the nodes 
participating in the detection process. 
2.3.2.2 Fuzzy Logic 
In [88], an IDS against black hole attacks using fuzzy logic was proposed. This 
system consists of four components, namely fuzzy parameter extraction, fuzzy 
computation, fuzzy verification module, and alarm packet generation module. On the 
first stage (fuzzy parameter extraction), the system will examine the behavior of the 
nodes according to the differentiation in the sequence numbers. In the second stage, 
the system will create a rule of computation to find the fidelity level of packets. The 
fidelity level lies between 0-10. In order to verify the fuzzy model, the last stages 
compare the fidelity level with the threshold fidelity level. Some improvement in the 
secure routing of the AODV protocol against the black hole attack is done in this 
method. However, this method suffers from the increase in the routing load and the 
increase in the end-to-end delay as a result of using the fidelity level. 
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2.3.2.3 Clustering Algorithm 
The authors in [42] used a dynamic anomaly training method, which is one of the 
learning methods in data mining. In this method, they have created a database that 
contains the features made up as a result of the black hole attacks as a first stage. In 
the next stage, they have been compared with the features of regular status. They have 
used the statistical theory to produce an anomaly threshold by measuring a projection 
distance. As a result, this method can detect black holes in AODV with low routing 
overhead, but the false positive is the main drawback of this proposed method. 
2.3.2.4 Mobile Agents 
In [89], the authors proposed a swarm technique for detecting a malicious attack in 
MANETs. They used a multipath method to find a trusted connection between the 
source and the destination node. Ant colony optimization [90] is used to make a 
distributed mechanism to find a better path. For security, the authors used a trusted 
neighboring node to monitor an untruthful node in the network. As a swarm technique 
is based on distributed intrusion detection, the new method had some improvement in 
standard performance metrics such as packet delivery ratio (PDR) and packet loss 
(PL). However, the other standard performance metrics need to be improved such as 
normalize routing load (NRL). 
2.3.2.5 Others Computation Unrestricted Types 
In [45], the algorithm was proposed as a type of the trusting neighboring method that 
is based on the feedback from the others nodes and its reputation in the network. It is 
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a distributed collaborative approach in ad hoc wireless networks. Each node locally 
and independently acts as an intrusion detection system, at the same time, the nearby 
nodes work together to monitor a larger area. However, each node is responsible for 
overseeing the activities of the local data; if an anomaly is detected in the local data, 
or if the evidence is not sufficient and requires a more comprehensive search, 
neighboring ID agents cooperate to realize the global intrusion detection. This work is 
focused on a trusted neighboring node, in order to add a security in the AODV routing 
protocol in a distributed collaborative approach. However, this algorithm suffers from 
the increase of the routing overhead as a result of using the anomaly detection 
technique.  
The authors in [91] presented an approach for adding hash based function into the 
REAct system [78]. They argued that this system may result the source node unable 
identify which node on the path generates the proof. If the REAct system suffers 
cooperative attacks, it cannot work. Another cooperative attacker would generate the 
proof and transmit it to the audit node. Therefore, the proof would cheat the system 
that the malicious node is on another segment of the path. Hence, this system is only 
able to detect single malicious nodes. On the other hand, the method uses binary 
search to find the malicious node which may result the attacker to predict the audit 
node easily and change its behavior to cheat the source node. Let the behavioral proof 
contain both information from data traffic and forwarding paths. Both of them are 
taken into account to help the source node to detect malicious nodes. In other words, 
the overhead of the mechanism only produces when the path exists a malicious node 
and the malicious node begins to attack. However, these approaches still make 
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MANETs suffer packet loss in the initial stage and result in several harms to the 
network. This kind of detecting mechanism belongs to the reactive method. 
In [92] proposed to use the concept of Backbone network Backbone nodes (BBN), 
which are a group of nodes that are powerful in terms of battery and range. Backbone 
network is formed with these nodes, which are permitted to allocate Restricted IP 
addresses (RIP) to newly arrived nodes. The authors assumed that the environment is 
in the Backbone network. When a source node wants to transmit data, it asks the 
nearest BBN for an unused RIP. Then the source node transmits RREQ to both 
destination and RIP. If the source node has just received RREP from destination, this 
situation means the network is regular and safe. If the source receives RREP from 
RIP; however, this situation means there are black holes in this route. Therefore, the 
source node sends a monitor message to alarm the neighboring nodes to go into 
promiscuous mode and let them start to listen to the network. The source would send 
dummy data packets to the destination. At the same time, the neighboring nodes can 
monitor the situation of the forwarding packets. If the packet loss of the monitored 
nodes is beyond the normal case, the neighboring nodes would notice the source node 
in the situation. The source node would identify the monitored node as a black hole by 
receiving the response messages of the neighbors. The network environment assumes 
that the normal nodes are more than the malicious nodes. Thus, the neighboring nodes 
may report a failed message when the malicious nodes are more than the normal 
nodes and the malicious nodes cooperate together. This results in the source node 
unable to know the exact location of the malicious nodes. On the other hand, the 
original design of MANETs does not have a Backbone network, therefore this 
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concept and method is only suitable for special environments. If the method of RIP is 
the only one used, it cannot lock the black hole and it needs to monitor and observe 
the suspicious nodes. Table 2.6 summarizes all of the computation unrestricted 
methods proposed in the literature review. 
Table 2.6 
The Computation Unrestricted Methods Based on Mechanisms: Genetic Algorithm, 
Fuzzy Logic, Clustering Algorithm and Mobile Agents. 
Literature 
Based 
Protocol 
Highlights 
Prevention 
Functionality 
GAC-IDs  [87] AODV 
 Uses the GA to analyze the 
behaviors of every node.  
 
All nodes 
Fuzzy-IDs [88] AODV 
 Uses fuzzy logic in the AODV 
protocol to improve it against the 
malicious nodes. 
 Uses fidelity level. 
 
All nodes 
Dynamic anomaly 
detection scheme 
[42] 
AODV 
 Uses a clustering algorithm to 
collect multidimensional features 
based on the characteristics of 
attacks and utilizes the projection 
distance using Principle Component 
Analysis (PCA) based on statistics. 
 
All nodes 
SBDT [89] AODV 
 Uses swarm intelligence-based 
ant colony optimization. 
 Uses a multiple path technique to 
detect and prevent the black hole 
attack. 
 Uses the monitoring neighboring 
node to collect the trusted value. 
 
All nodes 
 
Many algorithms and techniques have been investigated to highlight the advantages 
and disadvantages of the security issues in on-demand routing protocols. In particular, 
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these methods have been proposed to secure the routing of the AODV protocol 
against black hole attacks. It is clear from all the mentioned works that there are two 
types of black hole attacks in MANETs. First are single black hole attacks, and 
second are cooperative black hole attacks. The security issue of the two types is 
important, but the most important issue concerns with the second type that attacks 
cooperatively. If the algorithm is designed to solve the problem of cooperative black 
hole attacks, it may solve the problem of single and cooperative attacks together even 
if this led to increased costs. The following is a review of the most important ways 
that are used by the intensity and complex techniques in protecting the routing against 
black hole attacks. 
2.4 Population Meta-heuristic Algorithms 
This section includes two subsections: optimization algorithms and the 
implementation of population Meta heuristic algorithms for MANET. 
2.4.1 Optimization Algorithms 
Recently, many researchers are attracted to the intelligent collective behavior of 
animals or insects in nature, such as flocks of birds and colonies of ants. These 
phenomena can be classified as a kind of innate intelligence, which can be 
programmed to solve the complex problems such as the optimization problems. 
Several researchers in this area have proposed powerful methods. Actually, via the 
optimization algorithms, tough problems can be solved, but it needs simple solutions, 
not a complex ones. Most of the reviews with meta-heuristic and optimization are 
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inspired from the simple behavior of biological animals or insects. In the following 
sections, we will review three meta-heuristic algorithms: Particle Swarm Optimization 
(PSO), Differential Evolution (DE), and Bat-Inspired Algorithm (BA). 
2.4.1.1 Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) 
Particle swarm optimization is a meta-heuristic optimization method which is based 
on swarm intelligence that solves complicated problems. The particle swarm 
optimization algorithm was developed by [93]. The main idea came from a research 
on birds and fish to conduct the flock’s motion. Because of the numerous advantages 
including simplicity and operational, the algorithm can be used on a large scale for 
many applications such as speech recognition [94], image segmentation [95], table 
scheduling [96], road map [97] and dynamic environments [98], swarm robotics [99] 
etc. PSO is an intelligent algorithm that has succeeded with the scientific research; it 
is not similar to any other methods in swarm intelligence. It has unique properties 
such as simple calculations and a high speed searching. However, PSO does not 
include any mutation or overlapping calculations, but it is related to the movement of 
particles [100]. Usually, PSO easily falls in the local optima [93]. Generally, PSO 
starts with an initial solution. These solutions are evaluated to choose the best solution 
locally and best solutions globally. The solutions are changed based on the new 
location which highly depends on the velocity of the particles. The new solutions are 
also evaluated and compared with old solutions. The pseudo code of PSO [93] is 
illustrated below in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4. The pseudo code of PSO [93] 
2.4.1.2 Differential Evolution (DE) 
One of the important algorithms that have been proposed to solve the hard 
optimization problems such as the continuous optimization problem is Differential 
Evolution algorithm (DE). The main contribution of DE is to solve many hard 
problems in the many tasks of optimization that makes it one of the best methods in 
single and multi-objective optimization problems [101], [102]. This method has many 
advantages such as random search, a small number of parameters, and high 
performance. The DE algorithm can be applied to improve complex optimization 
problems in high-dimensional approaches; these advantages lead to the successful 
application of the DE algorithm in different disciplines such as image recognition 
[103], routing discovery [104], classification [105] etc. However, it has a few 
drawbacks such as the unstable convergence and the easy drop in the regional 
optimum. The pseudo code of DE [106] is shown in the following Figure 2.5. 
1 N=number of particle, best_particle=best fitness  
2 For i=1 to n do { 
3     Initialize particle 
} 
4 For i=1 to end_iteration { 
5      For i=1 to n do {  
6  find p=fitness (particle)  
7  If p better than best_particle 
     } 
8 For i=1 to n do { 
9 g_best=best_fitness 
} 
10 For i=1 to n do { 
11  𝑉𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖 + 𝑐1𝑟1(𝑃𝑖, 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖) +  𝑐2𝑟2(𝑔𝑖, 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖) 
12   P𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑉𝑖 
}} 
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Figure 2.5. The pseudo code of DE [106] 
2.4.1.3 Bat-Inspired Algorithm (BA) 
This method is inspired by the bats’ behavior in their search for prey through the use 
of sound frequencies that are reflected from the walls and the surrounding areas. It has 
been developed recently by [107]. This method has been successful in engineering 
applications [108], where it is characterized by the ease of implementation and gives a 
perfect result when applied to improve the optimization in complex problems [108], 
[109]. The echolocation behavior of bats is one of the phenomena that have been 
developed as a new algorithm in optimization. As swarm intelligence, bat algorithm 
needs to use distance and velocity to search for prey. Bat algorithm is now becoming 
a powerful method for solving many tough optimization problems. Some new 
algorithms have been proposed to avoid a non-active bat algorithm in high dimensions 
1 initialize X=Random generated solution  
2 set weight F ϵ [0,2], crossover probability Cr ϵ [0,1] 
3 While stopping criterion { For i=1 to n  {  
4      For each xi, randomly choose 3 distinct vectors xp, xr and xr 
5  𝑣𝑖
𝑡+1  = 𝑥𝑝
𝑡 + 𝐹(𝑥𝑞
𝑡 − 𝑥𝑟
𝑡) 
6  Generate a random index Jr  ϵ [1,2,…,d] by permutation 
7  Generate a randomly distributed number ri ϵ [0,1] 
8 For j=1 to n do { 
9 𝑢𝑗,𝑖
𝑡+1 =  {
𝑣𝑗,𝑖
𝑡+1𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑗 = 𝐽𝑟
𝑥𝑗,𝑖
𝑡 𝑖𝑓𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑗 ≠ 𝐽𝑟
 
} 
10 𝑥𝑖
𝑡+1 =  {
𝑢𝑖
𝑡+1𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑖
𝑡+1) ≤ 𝑓(𝑥𝑖
𝑡)
𝑥𝑖
𝑡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
} 
11  t=t+1 
} 
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[106], [107], [110]. The pseudo code of bat algorithm [107] is illustrated in the 
following Figure 2.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Figure 2.6. The pseudo code of bat algorithm [107] 
2.5 Nature-Inspired Algorithms for MANET 
In this section, there will be a review of the specific classes of nature-inspired 
algorithms that have been proposed to discover the shortest paths in the routing 
protocols in MANETs: the ant and bee colonies.  
In [111], the authors have proposed an extended mechanism for the AODV routing 
protocol named Ant-AODV. They used a new method to take advantage of the ant 
colony algorithm and the on-demand routing table in the AODV protocol, to make a 
new routing discovery.  
𝑓𝑖 = 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 + (𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛)𝛽, 
𝑣𝑖
𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖
𝑡 + (𝑥𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑥∗)𝑓𝑖, 
1 initialize population xi ( I = 1,2, …, n) and vi 
2 initialize frequencies fi, pulse rate ri and the loudness Ai 
3 While (t <Max number of iterations)  
4      generate new solutions by adjusting frequency,  
and update velocities and locations/solutions  
𝑥𝑖
𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖
𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖
𝑡, 
5  if (rand >ri) 
6  select a solution among the best solutions  
7 Generate a local solution around the selected best solution 
8  end if  
9  Generate a new solution by flying randomly  
10  if (rand <Ai&f(xi) < f(x*)) 
11  accept the new solutions 
12  increase ri and reduce Ai 
13 end if 
14 rank the bats and find the current best x* 
15 end while 
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In the conventional ant-based routing techniques, a large number of data packets are 
being dropped due to the route break, and at the same time, the source node still keeps 
on sending data packets while being unaware of the link breakage. At the suggestion 
of the proposed Ant-AODV, some adaptive features come from the advantages in the 
AODV mechanism such as the local connectivity maintenance, and from the 
advantages of ant-based routing algorithm such as the shortest path selection in the 
route discovery process of ants. However, the experiment results of Ant-AODV show 
an improvement in terms of End-to-End delay and routing latency compared with the 
standard AODV and ant-based routing, yet the packet delivery ratio is still low. 
The authors in [112] proposed another algorithm to improve the shortest path 
selection in the route discovery using the ACO algorithm in MANET. In this work, 
and as an agent for global search, it takes advantage of the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) device in order to receive locations of nodes which act as a local search in a 
specific area. The experiment results of GPS/Ant-Like Algorithm (GPSAL) show an 
improvement in terms of routing overhead compared with Location-Based Algorithm 
(LAR), but it has several drawbacks such as the limited size of the area that is covered 
as a work area of the GPS. 
In [113], [114], the authors have used the artificial immune system to propose a 
security framework for beehive (BeeHiveAIS), and a digital-signature-based 
framework security (HiveGuard). In this proposed framework, each MANET node 
has a software model that consists of three parts: dance floor, packing floor, and 
trance floor, named (hive).  
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They have been using the new proposal to analyze the security threats in MANET. 
Moreover, they have used a digital signature as a security framework and artificial 
immune system models for securing an ad hoc system, named Secure Bee Inspired in 
Ad hoc Routing Protocol (BeeAdHoc). However, the experiment results of the Bee 
Secure algorithms (BeeSec) and Bee Artificial Immune System (BeeAIS) based on 
BeeAdHoc shown an improvement in the network overhead compared with the 
AODV and DSR routing protocols. Table 2.7 summarizes all the nature-inspired 
algorithms for MANET which are selected in this chapter as an example of the 
literature of the shortest path selection for routing discovery in MANETs. 
Table 2.7 
The Nature-Inspired Algorithms for MANET: Ant and Bee Colonies. 
Literature Based Method Highlights Security 
Ant-AODV 
[111] 
AODV/Ant 
colony 
 Uses the Ant colony and on-
demand on AODV to build the 
routing discovery of Ant-AODV. 
 
None 
GPSAL 
[112] 
ACO 
 Uses Ant agent for global search. 
 Uses a GPS device to receive 
locations of nodes as a local search 
in a specific area. 
 
None 
BeeSec 
[113], [114] 
BeeAdHoc 
 Uses the public key encryption 
for authentication.  
 
Yes 
BeeAIS 
[113], [114] 
BeeAdHoc 
 Uses the artificial immune 
system for the development of an 
AIS-based security framework, 
BeeAIS. 
 Evaluation of the security 
features of three protocols: BeeAd-
Hoc, BeeSec and BeeAIS. 
 
Yes 
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2.6 Limitation of Current Work 
To prevent the black hole attack in mobile ad hoc networks, two approaches are 
proposed: computation restricted and computation unrestricted. Each proposed 
approach aims to either effectively prevent black hole nodes to packet dropping or 
effectively detect the black hole nodes.  
However, the methods that have been proposed in [43], [78], [79] depend on the 
feedback from neighboring nodes, it works with single black hole attacks, but it may 
fail to prevent a cooperative black hole attack.  
In [43], the authors have proposed a new approach to detect the attack at a low cost 
without introducing an extra routing traffic and without the modification of the 
existing protocol; however, the false positives are a drawback here.  
In [78], the authors have proposed that the source node will choose an audit node to 
use a bloom filter to generate behavioral proof; however, the behavioral proof that is 
generated by the bloom filter contains only the information of transmitted packets, 
and not the information of nodes on the forwarding path.  
In [79], the authors have proposed a method for preventing the cooperative black hole 
attack, however, this method inappropriate if there is no attack in the network or may 
not be an adequate method.  
In addition, the Acknowledge-Based technique [80] suffers from slow speed detection 
in case of multiple nodes of black holes that attack at the same time.  
   
50 
This technique needs to consume more bandwidth and it is better to prevent a single 
black hole attack rather than a cooperative black hole attack. Using the Reputation 
approach as proposed in [2], it has a limitation in their scope because it needs to 
reduce the delay in the network caused by the exchange of fidelity packet in PCBHA 
to achieve security.  
In Cross Layer Cooperation [82], [83], these methods suffer from the increase of 
control overhead, due to the exchanges of DRI packets and the true-link cross-
checking. The route redundant and message parameter techniques in [84], [85], also 
have drawbacks in time delay and increasing routing overhead.  
As for the computation unrestricted type in [42], [87], [88], an Intrusion Detection 
System is works to analyze an anomaly for malicious activities and produce reports 
about this behavior. However, most of the IDS are suffering from the redundancy in 
the check data, as well as from the height of cost of battery consumption and 
bandwidth at the nodes which are participating in the detection process [45]. 
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 CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology in order to provide an understanding 
of the representation and validation steps in this thesis. Design the research 
methodology (DRM) is used in this thesis [115].  
The DRM consists of four stages: research clarification (Section 3.2), descriptive 
study I (Section 3.3), prescriptive study (Section 3.4), and descriptive study II 
(Sections 3.5 and 3.6). Details about the research methodology stages of this thesis 
will be provided in the following sections. 
Figure 3.1 shows the research methodology stages, which include the initial studies 
concerning the standard AODV protocol, the formulation of an algorithm for 
preventing black hole attacks, and the evaluation of its performance metrics. 
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Figure 3.1. Research methodology stages 
 
 
 
Stage 1: Research Clarification 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 4:Descriptive Study II 
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New algorithm to prevent 
black hole attacks in 
MANETs 
Develop the new algorithm 
Test and analyze the new protocol 
Implementing the new 
algorithm 
Integrating heuristic 
search algorithm 
Testing with regular and 
hostile environments 
Integrating meta-heuristic 
search algorithm 
Evaluating effect of the 
new algorithm 
Simulation 
environment 
Performance 
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Standard 
AODV 
Current work 
Study the previous solutions to solve the 
black hole attacks 
 
Understand AODV mechanism to identify 
the black hole problem 
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3.2 Research Clarification 
This stage aims to identify the vulnerability and security problems in the AODV 
routing protocol. The main goal is to understand the AODV routing protocol; we will 
analyze the problems in the AODV mechanism by studying previous research. A 
large amount of data and information has been collected to identify why the AODV 
routing protocol is vulnerable to the malicious attacks. In this stage, we will also 
analyze the problems in the AODV mechanism by a study of malicious attacks and 
the behavior of black hole nodes during the routing discovery, with the aim of 
understanding how the route request (RREQ, broadcast packets; see Figure 3.2) and 
route reply (RREP, unicast to a single neighbor; see Figure 3.3) control messages are 
involved. We will study in detail the role of the destination sequence number (DSN) 
and hop count indicators in the routing mechanism as a weakness that is exploited by 
attackers.   
    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |     Type      |J|R|G|D|U|   Reserved          |   Hop Count   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                            RREQ ID                            | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Destination IP Address                     | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                  Destination Sequence Number                  | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Originator IP Address                      | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                  Originator Sequence Number                   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure 3.2. RREQ packet format in AODV routing protocol [77] 
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    0                   1                   2                   3 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |     Type      |R|A|    Reserved     |Prefix Sz|   Hop Count   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                     Destination IP address                    | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                  Destination Sequence Number                  | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Originator IP address                      | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                           Lifetime                            | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
 
Figure 3.3. RREP packet format in AODV routing protocol [77] 
3.3 Descriptive Study I 
The main objective of this thesis is to propose a new protocol to prevent black hole 
attacks by using heuristic and meta-heuristic algorithms. Most of the related studies 
use classical security methods such as cryptography and authentication to prevent 
black hole attacks in the AODV protocol, and most of these methods suffer from high 
end-to-end delays and network overhead. The routing algorithms have a scheme for 
transferring a message from one node to another, and the quality of the path affects 
the algorithm performance. The balance of traffic over the source and destination 
nodes as routers nodes and the intermediate node as hosts may contribute to the 
improvement of performance metrics such as packet loss, end-to-end delays, and 
throughput. On the one hand, the shortest path is less likely to be attacked than the 
longer paths. In addition, some changes always occur during the attacks, i.e., 
destination sequence numbers or hop counts are changed. 
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However, the first outcome of this stage is to try to optimize a shortest path (with the 
fewest hops) and thus improve the route discovery. As shown in Figure 3.5, the 
proposed heuristic search algorithm integrates the A* and Floyd-Warshall algorithms, 
and the results are compared with standard AODV in environments with different 
levels of hostility. The A* heuristic search algorithm is used for optimizing the 
shortest path, while the Floyd-Warshall algorithm is used to make the route discovery 
more dynamic at the outset. However, while this improvement of the route discovery 
process can reduce the severity of black hole attacks, it cannot completely eliminate 
them. The protocol proposed in Stages 1 and 2 needs to be improved to make it work 
in very difficult environments where cooperative black hole attacks can occur. 
However, in this section, we are determining the initial definitions in order to develop 
appropriate solutions to prevent black hole attacks in AODV. The proposed 
algorithms are shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
           
           
           
      
Figure 3.4 The proposed new protocols 
Figure 3.4. The proposed new protocols 
New Protocols 
 
1. Enhanced Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
(EAODV) 
2. Shortest Secure Path for Ad hoc On-demand 
Distance Vector (SSP-AODV) 
3. Parallel Grid Optimization by Daddy Long-Legs 
Algorithm (PGO-DLLA) 
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3.3.1 Enhanced Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (EAODV) 
As noted in the previous chapter, we are studying how artificial intelligence 
techniques can be used to reduce the distance that data need to travel during 
transmission. We expect the potential of attack to be reduced when artificial 
intelligence algorithms are used, because reducing the travel distance from the source 
to the destination node will reduce the chance of single and cooperative black hole 
attacks in the network. A heuristic search can improve search efficiency by providing 
an estimate of the remaining yet unexplored distance to a goal. Neither depth-first 
search, breadth-first search, nor Dijkstra’s algorithm take advantage of such estimates, 
and these algorithms are therefore called uninformed search algorithms. A* is 
different from these algorithms in that it performs a heuristic search. The heuristic A* 
search finds a shortest path by combining greedy and uniform cost searches, in a 
sense. It uses cost and evaluation functions to determine its ordering. The idea of the 
A* search algorithm is to find the path from the source to the destination node that has 
the least cost. It uses a distance function g(n) and a cost heuristic function h(n) to 
determine the order in which it visits the nodes in a network. The A* algorithm is 
outlined in Figure 3.5. It is utilized in many applications and has proven successful in 
problem solving. Equation (3.1) defines the evaluation function f(n) of the original A* 
heuristic search algorithm [52], [116]: 
f(n) = g(n) + h(n) (3.1) 
where n is the node,  g(n) is the distance, h(n) is the estimated cost from n to the goal, 
and f(n) is the estimated total cost of the path through n to the goal.  
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Function A* Heuristic Search( ) return BestPath 
1:Begin 
2:Inputs:HopCount, Estimated Time, Current, Temp 
3:Local variables: FN, GN, HN 
4:Temp=GN(Source) 
5:For i =1 to Current do 
6:      GN(i) = HopCount ( i ) + HN ( i ) 
7:       If GN ( i ) < Temp  
8:       Then Temp = GN(i ) 
          End If 
9:       Else:  
    End For 
10:BestPath = Temp   
11:End Function 
 
Figure 3.5. Pseudo code for A* function in the EAODV routing protocol 
All the communication takes place in two phases: the control information phase and 
the transmission phase. The first phase sets the route and specifications, while the 
second phase is the factual flowing of information. For control information, we will 
use the same control messages RREQ and RREP that are used in the AODV routing 
protocol. Our change is to the second phase, where we use the A* algorithm. At the 
beginning, the position of each node is calculated by its Cartesian coordinates along 
the three axes (see Equation 3.2), to form the estimated values that will serve as the 
initial values to start the algorithm on a grid system: 
D=√(x2-x1)2+(y2-y1)2                    (3.2) 
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3.3.2 Shortest Secure Path for Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (SSP-AODV) 
In EAODV, the route discovery technique uses the estimated values calculated by 
Equation 3.2. The algorithm is static, as the rounded values or routes do not change as 
long as the node stays within the specific grid. We can find the shortest distance 
between a pair of nodes using a single source shortest paths algorithm such as best-
first search or Dijkstra's algorithm, but this requires passing through the entire graph 
several times. The best solution is to apply the all-pairs shortest path Floyd-Warshall 
algorithm. This algorithm can be used to determine the length of the shortest path 
between two nodes in any graph. Figure 3.6 shows pseudo code for the Floyd-
Warshall algorithm. 
Procedure Floyd-Warshall( int n, int w[1..Node i,1..Node j]) 
1:Begin 
2:array d[1..n, 1..n] 
3:For i = 1 to n do                      // Phase One // 
4:For j = 1 to n do  
5: d[Node i, Node j] = w[Node i, Node j] 
6: d[Node i, Node j] = ∞ } // If {node i , node j} is not a path //   
7:End For i, End For j 
8:For i = 1 to n  do // Phase Two // 
9: For j = 1 to n  do  
10:For k = 1 to n do 
11:      If (d[Node j, Node i] + d[Node i, Node k] < d[Node j, Node k]) then 
12:           d[Node j, Node k] = d[Node j, Node i] + d[Node i, Node k]   
                //new shorter path length// 
13:End if 
14:return d 
15:End For k,  End For j, End For k 
16:End Procedure 
 
Figure 3.6. Pseudo code for Floyd-Warshall function in SSP-AODV routing protocol 
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3.3.3 Parallel Grid Optimization by Daddy Long-Legs Algorithm (PGO-DLLA) 
Improvement of the routing alone may not succeed in highly dynamic environments, 
which are subject to more severe types of attacks, as we pointed out in preceding 
sections of this chapter. AODV may be augmented with a new phase to improve 
security with classical ciphers, but this may increase the network overhead. We 
suggest solving this problem for SSP-AODV by adding a new security layer, using a 
delay before sending the packet to the first node that replies with a RREP in order to 
check the safety of the path. We expected the integration of the two previous 
techniques to improve the prevention of single black hole attacks. The dynamic 
routing discovery can be done by integrating a meta-heuristic search algorithm into 
the protocol.  
The techniques to prevent cooperative black hole attacks must be more accurate than 
the existing proposals, must be heuristic, and must not be one of the classical 
solutions. Some restricted solutions might be useful for preventing single black hole 
attacks, but they are not enough to prevent cooperative black hole attacks. Solutions 
that use complex computations may be more active and more accurate and can deal 
with severe black hole attacks. The use of artificial intelligence techniques may be the 
solution. A natural inspiration comes from a research area for information models that 
studies the collective behavior of insect or animal swarms. In summary, this research 
propose a new protocol to address black hole attacks through new search algorithms 
and improving routing security with swarm intelligence. 
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3.4 Prescriptive Study 
The aim of this section is to find the optimal settings for the AODV protocol. This 
section includes two different scenarios: an empirical experiment with regular 
environments that tests the standard AODV protocol with different numbers of nodes 
and an empirical experiment with hostile environments to determine the appropriate 
pause time. Figure 3.7 gives an overview of the empirical experiments for AODV. 
           
            
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Empirical expermints for AODV 
In these scenarios, we will set up different parameters for standard AODV with 
various numbers of nodes (10, 20, 50, and 100) and different environments. CBR is 
used as a traffic model; different numbers of nodes are distributed within a random 
waypoint model for mobility. The map area of simulation is 800 x 800 m is a square 
area is a perfect area to test the empirical experiments in MANETs. The transmission 
range is 250 m nominal bit rate of 2 MB/Sec and a nominal transmission range of 250 
meters with an omni directional antenna. The rest of the simulation parameters is 
indicated in Table 3.1. 
 
 The Empirical Experiments for 
AODV 
Regular Environment 
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Hostile Environment 
(Black Hole AODV) 
BADOV 
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Table 3.1 
Simulation Parameters for Regular Environment. 
Parameter Regular Scenario 
Simulation Time 1000 sec. 
Number of Nodes 10, 20, 50, 100 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Traffic Model CBR (UDP) 
Pause Time 0  
Maximum Mobility 60 m/sec. 
No. of sources 1 
Map area 800m x 800m 
Transmission Range 250m 
Malicious Node 0 
 
Some of the parameters that depict the distinctive behavior of an ad hoc network are 
varied as follows: 
1. network size: determines the connectivity by the number of nodes that are 
moving inside the area of networking. The size of network is important 
parameter in MANET because is effect of the routing of network.   
2. mobility: the rate of topological changes. The mobility is the depends on 
nodes speed, it is affect the performance metrics in MANET.  
3. offered network load: the rate of packet transmission.  
3.5 Descriptive Study II 
This section presents the implementation of a new routing protocol in NS-2 to 
simulate the black hole behavior.  
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Figure 3.8. Flow diagram for NS-2 scenario implementation 
The simulator uses two main languages, object-oriented TCL (OTCL) and C++. 
OTCL is used for writing simulation scripts, and it has an interpreter for translating 
and running a simulation step by step. The C++ language provides the ability to 
update an existing protocol or develop a new one. The two languages are fully 
compatible. OTCL is used to write a script and setup the simulation variables. Before 
NS-2 starts a compilation, two files must be input. The implementation is done using 
the AODV protocol to add the nodes that exhibit the black hole behavior. The new 
routing protocols are implemented using the high-level language C++ to compile in 
the NS-2 network simulator. It can support all requirements of design and comparing 
Setup Simulation Variables 
CBR File Scenario File 
Experiments with different scenarios   
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario n 
NAM File 1 Trace File 1 
NAM File 2 Trace File 2 
NAM File n Trace File n 
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Visualization Animation (graphic files) 
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a new protocol with the others related protocols in wireless high mobility 
environments.        
3.6 Evaluation of Network Performance 
Three popular research methodologies are used in network research to evaluate 
performance: analytical modeling, test beds, and simulations (see Figure 3.9).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9. The methods that are used to evaluate performance in networks 
Simulations will be used as the performance evaluation method in this research. It is 
necessary to understand that, in the case of mobile networks, many factors are 
involved in developing an analytical modeling, and the relations between these factors 
are still not perfectly understood. Such factors include mobility speed, traffic load, 
and network size. Moreover, the exact effects of each factor on network performance 
are not accurately understood, which provides further justification for using 
simulations to study mobile networks [117]. 
3.6.1 Performance Metrics 
Five performance indicators are used to measure the performance of the proposed 
algorithms for evaluation purposes [6], [50], [118]–[120]: the packet delivery ratio 
Evaluation Methods 
Analytical Modeling 
 
Test Beds 
 
Simulations 
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(PDR), the packet loss (PL), the average end-to-end delay (EtoE),the throughput 
(TH), and the normalized routing load (NRL). The details of these performance 
metrics are given in the following subsections. 
3.6.1.1 The Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) 
The PDR is defined as the number of data packets received by the destination divided 
by the number of data packets sent [6], [121]–[123]. This metric indicates the amount 
of data that is actually received by the destination. The PDR depends on the packet 
size, the network load, and the change of topology. The PDR is important for 
measuring the best traffic effort. A larger package delivery ratio indicates better 
protocol performance. Equation 3.3 shows how the PDR is computed: 
PDR=
Number of Data Packets Received
Number of Data Packets Sent
 
    (3.3) 
3.6.1.2 Packet Loss (PL) 
The PL is the percentage of packets that are lost during the simulation. A lower PL 
rate indicates better protocol performance [118], [123]. Equation 3.4 shows how PL is 
computed: 
PL=Number of Packets Sent-Number of Packets Received     (3.4) 
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3.6.1.3 The End-to-End Delay (EtoE) 
The EtoE is the average time taken for data packets to reach the destination. Only the 
data packets that are successfully addressed and delivered are counted [6], [50], [123]. 
A lower EtoE indicates better performance. Equation 3.5 shows how the EtoE is 
computed: 
EtoE=
∑ Packets Arrival Time-Transmission Time
∑ Connections
 
    (3.5) 
3.6.1.4 Throughput (TH) 
TH is the number of packets received (bytes delivered) per unit of simulation time 
(per second) [26], [50]. A higher TH value indicates better protocol performance. 
Equation 3.6 shows how TH is computed: 
TH=
∑ Received Packets
Simulation Time
 
    (3.6) 
3.6.1.5 Normalized Routing Load (NRL) 
The NRL is the number of routing packets such as RREQ and RREP that move per 
data packet delivered to the destination [6]. The NRL is an important metric as a 
measure to determine the efficiency of consumed network resources. Equation 3.7 
shows how the NRL is computed: 
NRL=
∑ Sent Packets
∑ Data Packets Received
 
    (3.7) 
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3.7 Summary 
The main objective of this thesis is to construct a protocol for preventing black hole 
attacks in MANETs based on artificial intelligence techniques. The methodology that 
is used in this thesis is an experimental methodology called DMR, which includes 
four stages: research clarification, descriptive study I, prescriptive study, and 
descriptive study II.  
The methodological stages of this thesis have been explained in detail in this chapter. 
The proposed artificial intelligence techniques for the AODV mechanism were 
described in Section 3.3.  
Three main phases in the prevention algorithm design are proposed: enhanced ad hoc 
on-demand distance vector using the A* algorithm, shortest secure path for the ad hoc 
on-demand distance vector using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm, and parallel grid 
optimization using the daddy long-legs algorithm.  
The new routing protocols are implemented using NS-2 network simulator. It can 
support all requirements of design and comparing a new protocol with the others 
related protocols in wireless high mobility environments. Thus, we choose NS-2, 
because it is suitable for the design and implementation of the new protocol. 
Furthermore, NS-2 is a discrete event-driven simulator open source, free distribution, 
and it has high flexibility. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED 
PROTOCOL 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the research methodology for the design of the 
proposed protocols. In this chapter, the proposed design and implementation of the 
new algorithms will be displayed and discussed. This chapter presents the heuristic 
and meta-heuristic search algorithms that are used to prevent the black hole attacks in 
the AODV protocol in order to provide an understanding of the representation of 
design and implementation in NS-2.  
As the first algorithm is integrated in the routing discovery of AODV, Sections 4.2 
provide the elements of the EAODV protocol design. The proposed SSP-AODV is 
presented in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 provides the nature-inspired technique that is 
proposed as a solution to prevent the black hole attacks in PGO-DLLA. The 
implementation of EAODV, SSP-AODV PGO-DLLA and BAODV is discussed in 
Section 4.5. Figure 4.1 shows the design of the proposed algorithms’ taxonomy, 
which includes the heuristic A* in the EAODV protocol, Floyd-Warshall algorithm in 
the SSP-AODV protocol, the new nature inspired algorithm termed as Virtual Daddy 
Long-Legs Algorithm (VDLLA), and the integration of the VDLLA algorithm with 
the AODV routing protocol, termed as a Parallel Grid Optimization algorithm in 
(PGO-DLLA).  
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Figure 4.1. The taxonomy of the proposed algorithms design 
4.2 The Design of EAODV Routing Protocol 
The main idea for the EAODV protocol is to improve the route discovery as 
compared with the standard AODV routing protocol and the testing impact of the 
integrating heuristic A* with performance metrics. Therefore, various artificial 
intelligence concepts are integrated into the routing mechanism for the shortest path to 
destination. The A* algorithm needs the estimated values of the node distances and 
uses the values of DSNs and hop counts that are obtained from the control messages. 
Figure 4.2 shows the elements of the EAODV protocol: protocol message format, data 
structure of new protocol, and routing discovery mechanism.    
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In the EAODV routing protocol, extra fields are added to the routing messages and 
the routing table to support the shortest path to destination. These messages, the 
routing table and the operations of EAODV are described in the following sections. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. The elements of EAODV routing protocol 
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4.2.1 EAODV Messages Format 
AODV can be modified to enhance the security in routing discovery by implementing 
a black hole prevention mechanism in the AODV routing protocol.  
The finding of the shortest path is done by selecting a short path during the route 
discovery and save the result in the Best Path field (BP). There are two types of 
control messages that have changes in its content (see Figure 4.2). The routing 
messages, Route Request (RREQ) and Route Reply (RREP), have a new field that 
does not exist in the original AODV protocol. 
4.2.2 Data Structure of EAODV 
In the EAODV protocol, each node keeps and maintains a neighbor table, exactly 
similar to the original AODV routing protocol in the structure. As a mobile ad hoc 
network node, it has a source broadcast ID table and a reverse route table. The former, 
source broadcast ID table, is used to record the neighbor information and the address 
of source node and broadcast ID. The routing table is used to store the routing 
information and the update of the routing information.  
4.2.3 Route Discovery of EAODV Protocol 
Every node can calculate the estimated distance by using this information in the 
routing table. EAODV shares the original AODV’s on-demand characteristics in that 
it also discovers routes on needed similar route discovery process. EAODV is a 
process of finding a route between two nodes when available. However, EAODV 
adopts a different mechanism in the routing discovery by using the heuristic A*.  
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In AODV, the route discovery process uses a traditional routing table, one entry per 
destination, and relies on routing table entries to propagate a RREQ to route data 
packets to the destination and RREP back to the source node if there is no route to the 
destination in the source routing table. The mechanism of EAODV is shown in the 
flowchart in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
Figure 4.3. The flowchart of proposed EAODV 
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In EAODV, the function A* using Cartesian Distance to calculate the shortest path is 
proposed. Where, it is supposed that g(n) equals to the hop count in the routing 
discovery, while the h(n) equals the estimated values to destination node and f(n) 
refers to the estimated total cost of path through n to the goal. Equation 4.1 shows the 
objective function of A* in the EAODV protocol. 
f’(n) = g(n)+h(n) (4.1) 
To calculate the value of h (n), Cartesian Distance (CD) is used as shown in Equation 
4.2, where in this situation; it is required to determine the initial values of each node 
position in the network. 
Cartesian Distance(CD)(node1, node2)  = √(𝑥2 − 𝑥1)2 + (𝑦2 − 𝑦1)2 
 
 
(4.2) 
where, (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) are the position of first and second nodes.  
In order to describe how the heuristic A* finds the shortest path in the route discovery 
of the EAODV protocol, Example I describes the flow of A* process. 
4.2.3.1 Example I: Process of A* in EAODV 
In this example, it is supposed that there are six nodes (a, b, c, d, e, and f) in a simple 
graph as shown in Figure 4.4, Where (a) is a source node, (f) is a destination node, 
and the rest are intermediate nodes. The goal is to find a best path from the source 
node (a) to the destination node (f). Suppose all the nodes know about its neighbors 
from its routing table. In general, the heuristic A* operates to find the path with the 
least cost. In this example, firstly, calculate the estimated distance between each node 
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and destination node using Equation 4.2 as shown below. Table 4.1 shows the results 
of the estimated values. 
𝐶𝐷(𝑎, 𝑓) = √(7 − 2)2 + (1 − 1)2 =  √52 + 02 = √25 = 5 
𝐶𝐷(𝑏, 𝑓) = √(7 − 4)2 + (1 − 2)2 =  √32 + (−1)2 = √9 + 1 = √10 = 3.2 
𝐶𝐷(𝑐, 𝑓) = √(7 − 3)2 + (1 − 0)2 =  √42 + (1)2 = √16 + 1 = √17 = 4.1 
𝐶𝐷(𝑑, 𝑓) = √(7 − 6)2 + (1 − 2)2 =  √12 + (−1)2 = √2 = 1.4 
𝐶𝐷(𝑒, 𝑓) = √(7 − 5)2 + (1 − 0)2 =  √22 + (1)2 = √4 + 1 = √5 = 2.2 
 
Table 4.1 
Example of Estimated Distances. 
 
Estimated 
Distances 
Source Nodes 
5.0 a 
3.2 b 
4.1 c 
1.4 d 
2.2 e 
0.0 f 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  4.4. Example of six nodes 
Source Node 
Destination Node 
Intermediate  Nodes 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
(2, 1) 
(6, 2) 
(4, 2) 
(3, 0) (5, 0) 
(7, 1) 
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After that, the calculation of the cost between nodes is carried out using Equation 4.1, 
where g(n) is the number of hop counts, and h (n) is the estimated distance of n that 
can be derived from Table 4.1, f (n) is the best cost value. Hence, the nodes (b) and 
(c) are the closest nodes to the source node, where in this situation; there are two 
routes for the source node (a) to choose between them; path 1 from node (a) to node 
(b) with a cost equal to 4.2 and path 2 from node (a) to node (c) with a cost equal to 
5.1. So the best route with the minimum cost is route {ab} as shown in Figure 4.5. 
1. From node (a) to node (b) { ab} ,  2. From node (a) to node (c) {ac},  
     f(b) = g(b) + h(b) 
            = 1.0   + 3.2 
            = 4.2 
 
     f(c) = g(c) + h(c) 
            = 1.0  + 4.1 
            = 5.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. An example of best route between node (a) and node (b) 
 
Source Node Destination Node 
Intermediate  Nodes 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
f(b)=4.2 
f(c)=5.1 
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Afterwards, node (b) takes the role of source node. Node (b) has three routes to 
destination node (f); from node (b) to node (d), from node (b) to node (c) or return to 
node (a) from node (b). 
From node (b) to 
node (d) { bd},  
From node (b) to 
node (c) {bc},  
From node (b) to 
node (a) {ba},  
     f(d) = g(d) + h(d) 
            = 2.0   + 1.4 
            = 3.4 
 
      f(c) = g(c) + h(c) 
             = 2.0  + 4.1 
             = 6.1 
 
       f(a) = g(a) + h(a) 
              = 2.0  + 5.0 
              = 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. An example of best route between node (b) and node (d)  
As illustrated in Figure 4.6 an example of finding the best route between node (b) and 
node (d) is shown, where the best route is the route between {bd} which has a 
heuristic value equal to 3.4.  
In the next step, the node (d) becomes as source node. It has four routes to destination 
node (f); from node (d) to node (c), from node (d) to node (e), from node (d) to node 
(f), and from node (d) to node (b).  
Source Node Destination Node 
Intermediate Nodes 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
f(a)=7.0 
 
 
f(d)=3.4 
f(c)=6.1 
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From node (d) 
 to node (c)  
{ dc} 
From node (d)  
to node (e) 
{de} 
From node (d)  
to node (f)  
{df} 
From node (d)  
to node (b) 
{db} 
f(c) = g(c) + h(c) 
       = 3.0  + 4.1 
       = 7.1 
 
f(e) = g(e) + h(e) 
       = 3.0  + 2.2 
       = 5.2 
 
f(f) = g(f) + h(f) 
      = 3.0   + 0.0 
      = 3.0 
 
f(b) = g(b) + h(b) 
       = 3.0   + 3.2 
       = 6.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. An example of best route between node (d) and node (f)  
The best route is the shortest route from node (d) to node (f) {df} with a heuristic 
value equal to 3 as shown in Figure 4.7. Finally, the best route from source node (a) to 
destination node (f) is {abdf} as shown in Figure 4.8. 
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f(f)=3.0 
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Figure 4.8. An example of the best route {abdf} 
4.3 A Dynamic Heuristic Search Algorithm 
The A* algorithm is optimally efficient when applied with routing, but it operates in a 
static topology and it still requires exponential time and space in general. The A* 
function estimates the number of moves required to modify the current state into a 
goal state [124].  
When integrating A* algorithm with AODV, it still has a few drawbacks; a) the 
estimated distances among nodes to calculate a path as an initial value, b) the 
enhanced routing of AODV but not to improve the routing security. To overcome 
these drawbacks, an intelligent technique that integrates A* algorithm with Floyd-
Warshall’s algorithm in AODV is proposed for improving the routing protocol to find 
the shortest path. In order to improve the routing security, adopt the technique that is 
used in [2] which works as the source node and does not respond directly to the first 
RREP (i.e. sending the data packet) and check more than one path arrives to source 
node. The proposed routing protocol, termed as Shortest Secure Path for AODV 
Source Node Destination Node 
Intermediate  Nodes 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
4.2 
3.4 
3.0 
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(SSP-AODV) integrates the heuristic A* and Floyd-Warshall’s algorithms in AODV 
to achieve the shortest and secure path in a dynamic environment against the black 
hole attack. In the following sections, there are several explanations about the 
proposed shortest path algorithm. 
4.3.1 The Proposed SSP-AODV 
There are many algorithms that are used to find the shortest path between two nodes 
in a graph. Dijkstra's algorithm is one of these algorithms, which determines the 
distance from a specific node to all other nodes. In Dijkstra's algorithm, the distance 
and the least cost from source to destination node will be saved. It starts to work by 
creating four matrices as initial; adjacency matrix for cost, distance matrix, path 
matrix and include matrix. Figure 4.9 shows the pseudo code of Dijkstra’s algorithm. 
Procedure Dijkstra’s Algorithm(); 
1:dist[s] ←0                     // set 0 distance to source vertex // 
2:For all v ∈ V–{s} 
3:Do  dist[v] ←∞    // set ∞ to all other distances // 
4:S←∅                          // S, the set of visited vertices is initially empty // 
                                                // Q, the queue initially contains all vertices // 
6:While Q ≠∅              // while the queue is not empty // 
7:Do   u ← mindistance(Q,dist) // select the element of Q with the min. Distance// 
8:S←S∪{u}              // add u to list of visited vertices // 
9:For all v ∈neighbors[u]   
10:Do  If   dist[v] >dist[u] + w(u, v)      // if new shortest path found // 
             then      d[v] ←d[u] + w(u, v)    // set new value of shortest path // 
                                                                  // if desired, add traceback code // 
11:Returndist; 
12:End 
 
Figure 4.9. Pseudo code of Dijkstra’s algorithm [116] 
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The shortest distance between a pair of nodes can be found using a single source 
shortest path algorithm such as BFS or Dijkstra's algorithm, but this would pass the 
entire graph several times. The best solution is the application of all pairs of shortest 
path using Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm. It can be used to determine the length of the 
shortest path between two nodes in any graph net (in the computer network by using 
the values of a weighted connection between them). In spite of this, Floyd-Warshall’s 
algorithm is not a heuristic search algorithm, in which it cannot be used alone to find 
the shortest path, so by integrating it with heuristic A* algorithm to achieve the best 
shortest path. In order to address the problem that has been described in Chapter One, 
each node has a routing table which includes the information, such as hop count, 
destination sequence number (DSN), life time, source IP address, and so on. Every 
node can calculate the estimated distance by using this information in the routing 
table. SSP-AODV has one field is added in the routing table more than an EAODV 
routing table, which is shortest path value (SP-value), As shown in Figure 4.10. 
RREQ-AODV Table 
Broadcast ID 
 
RREP-AODV Table 
 
SSP-AODV Table 
Destination IP & 
DSN 
Destination IP Address Destination IP Address DSN-Flags 
Destination Sequence 
Number 
Destination Sequence 
Number 
Flags 
Source IP Address Source IP Address Network Interface 
Source Sequence 
Number 
Life Time Hop Count 
Hop Count Hop Count Next Hop 
Estimated Distance Estimated Distance Life Time 
SP- Value SP- Value 
Best Path to 
Destination 
 
Figure 4.10. The routing table: SSP-AODV, RREQ-AODV and RREP-AODV 
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Figure 4.11. The flowchart of the proposed SSP-AODV 
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The estimated distance values are calculated using Equation 4.2 and SP-value can be 
computed by A* function. Figure 4.11 shows the flowchart of the proposed SSP-
AODV. The proposed SSP-AODV has two phases: calculation of the shortest path, 
and checking for a secure path. 
4.3.1.1 Phase One: Shortest Path 
In this phase, the Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm combined with A* algorithm is used to 
find the value of the shortest path. The same example in Section 4.2.3.1 in Figure 4.4 
is used to explain the process of Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm. As mentioned 
previously, node (a) is a source node, node (f) is a destination node, and (b), (c) and 
(e) are intermediate nodes. The estimated distance value for each node to destination 
node is calculated using Equation 4.2. Table 4.1 shows the estimated distance value 
for each node of route discovery to destination node (f). The initial phase of Floyd-
Warshall’s algorithm can be computed using Equation 4.3 and the value is derived 
from Table 4.1.  
 
where, ED is the estimated distance between two nodes, ET is the estimated distance 
value of the node derived from Table 4.1. 
After the last phase of Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm, the A* algorithm is executed, 
where the value of g(n) represents the number of hop count, while the value of h(n) 
represents the distance from node (n) to the destination that can be retrieved from the 
𝐸𝐷(𝑛1, 𝑛2) = 𝐸𝑇(𝑛1) + 𝐸𝑇(𝑛2) (4.3) 
   
82 
last phase of Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm. In the following Example II, the A* 
algorithm using Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm with six nodes topology is explained. 
4.3.1.2 Example II: Process of A* in SSP-AODV 
Figure 4.12 shows an example of the topology of six nodes that includes the estimated 
distance among nodes that is calculated using Equation 4.3 and Table 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12. An example of six nodes topology with estimated distance 
ED(a, b) = ET(a) +ET(b) = 5 + 3.2 = 8.2 
ED(a, c) = ET(a) +ET(c) = 5 + 4.1 = 9.1 
ED(b, d) = ET(b) +ET(d) = 3.2 + 1.4 = 4.6 
ED(b, c) = ET(b) +ET(c) = 3.2 + 4.1 = 7.3 
ED(c, d) = ET(c) +ET(d) = 4.1 + 1.4 = 5.5 
ED(c, e) = ET(c) +ET(e) = 4.1 + 2.2 = 6.3 
Source Node 
Destination Node 
Intermediate  Nodes 
a 
b 
c 
d 
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f 
9.1 
4.6 
8.2 
6.3 
2.2 
1.4 
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7.3 
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ED(d, f) = ET(d) +ET(f) = 1.4 + 0.0 = 1.4 
ED(d, f) = ET(d) +ET(e) = 1.4 + 2.2 = 3.6 
ED(e, f) = ET(e) +ET(f) = 2.2 + 0.0 = 2.2 
To construct the first phase of Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm, the topology in Figure 
4.12, example with six nods, is converted into matrix (6x6). The rows and columns of 
the matrix represent the nodes and the intersection between nodes is the weight value 
that connects the two nodes in the graph (estimated distance in this situation), but if 
the connection between two nodes does not exist, the value is equal to ∞ [125]. Figure 
4.13 shows an example of the first phase of Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm. 
 a b c d e f 
a ∞ 8.2 9.1 ∞ ∞ ∞ 
b 8.2 ∞ 7.3 4.6 ∞ ∞ 
c 9.1 6.5 ∞ 5.5 6.3 ∞ 
d ∞ 4.6 5.5 ∞ 3.6 1.4 
e ∞ ∞ 6.3 3.6 ∞ 2.2 
f ∞ ∞ ∞ 1.4 2.2 ∞ 
Figure 4.13. An example of the first phases of Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm  
The second phase of applying Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm is illustrated in Figure 
4.14(a). After six iterations (number of iteration based on number of nodes), the final 
phase can be found as shown in Figure 4.14(b). The implementation of Floyd-
Warshall’s algorithm in this example undergoes 28 phases as shown in Appendix A. 
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After that, the A* is implemented using Equation 4.2. Suppose that g(n) is the number 
of hop count, while h(n) is the distance between two nodes which can be derived from 
the final phase of Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm. 
 a b c d e f 
a ∞ 8.2 9.1 ∞ ∞ ∞ 
b 8.2 16.4 7.3 4.6 ∞ ∞ 
c 9.1 6.5 ∞ 5.5 6.3 ∞ 
d ∞ 4.6 5.5 ∞ 3.6 1.4 
e ∞ ∞ 6.3 3.6 ∞ 2.2 
f ∞ ∞ ∞ 1.4 2.2 ∞ 
 
 
 a b c d e f 
a 16.4 8.2 9.1 12.8 15.4 14.2 
b 8.2 9.2 7.3 4.6 8.2 6.0 
c 9.1 7.3 11.0 5.5 6.3 6.9 
d 12.8 4.6 5.5 2.8 3.6 1.4 
e 15.4 8.2 6.3 3.6 4.4 2.2 
f 14.2 6.0 6.9 1.4 2.2 2.8 
 
(a) Second phase  (b) Final phase 
Figure 4.14.  The second and final phases of Floyd-Warshall’s algorithm  
In this example, node (a) is a source node which wants to send packets to destination 
node (f). As shown in Figure 4.15(a), we have two routes from node (a) to node (f). 
From node (a) to node (b) { ab} ,  From node (a) to node (c) {ac},  
    f(b) = g(b) + h(b) 
           = 1.0   + 6 
           = 7.0 
 
     f(c) = g(c) + h(c) 
            = 1.0 + 6.9 
            = 7.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
85 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15. The first and second steps of Floyd-Warshall’s with A* algorithm 
So the best route is shortest route {ab}. In Figure 4.15(b), there are three routes to 
destination node (f): from node (b) to node (d), from node (b) to node (c), and from 
node (b) back to node (a). 
From node (b)  
to node (d) { bd},  
From node (b)  
to node (c) {bc},  
From node (b)  
to node (a) {ba},  
f(d) = g(d) + h(d) 
       = 2.0   + 1.4 
       = 3.4 
 
f(c) = g(c) + h(c) 
       = 2.0  + 6.9 
       = 8.9 
 
f(a) = g(a) + h(a) 
       = 2.0  + 14.2 
       = 16.2 
3.  
The best route is shortest route {bd}. In the next step as shown in Figure 4.16, there 
are four routes: from node (d) to node (c), from node (d) to node (e), from node (d) to 
destination node (f), and from node (d) back to node (b). 
 
 
a 
b 
c 
g=1.0 
h=6.0 
f=7.0 
 
g=1.0 
h=6.9 
f=7.9 
 (a) First step 
 
a 
b 
g=2.0 
h=14.2 
f=16.2 
 
(b) Second step 
 
d 
c 
g=2.0 
h=6.9 
f=8.9 
 
g=2.0 
h=1.4 
f=3.4 
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Figure 4.16. Third step of Floyd-Warshall’s with A* algorithm 
From node (d) 
 to node (c)  
{ dc} 
From node (d)  
to node (e) 
{de} 
From node (d) to 
node (f) {df} 
From node (d)  
to node (b) 
{db} 
f(c) = g(c) + h(c) 
       = 3.0  + 6.9 
       = 9.9 
 
f(e) = g(e) + h(e) 
       = 3.0  + 2.2 
       = 5.2 
 
f(f) = g(f) + h(f) 
       = 3.0  + 2.8 
       =5.8 
 
 f(b) = g(b) + h(b) 
        = 3.0   + 6 
        = 9.0 
 
 
The best route is shortest route {de}, but there is also route {df} that reaches 
destination f, so in this situation, this route is chosen. Finally, the best route from 
source node (a) to destination node (f) is {abdf}. 
4.3.1.3 Phase Two: Prevent Black Hole Attack 
Phase two is the working on preventing the black hole attack; when the source node 
receives one or more RREP from the neighboring nodes, it will not send a packet 
a 
b 
g=3.0 
h=6.0 
f=9.0 
 
d 
c 
g=3.0 
h=6.9 
f=9.9 
 
e 
f 
g=3.0 
h=2.2 
f=5.2 
 
g=3.0 
h=2.8 
f=5.8 
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directly, but it waits until the routing time expires. The source node will wait for a 
short time, then, it will check based on threshold (THr = 10, 20, … , 100 second), if 
the waiting time is greater or equal than THr, then it will check the hop count value of 
the new path with all RREP/RREQ tables. The new path is saved as a secure path if it 
has repeated path to the destination, or else the path will be removed from the routing 
table. The shortest secure path will chosen from the SP-value fields of the 
RREQ/RREQ tables. Finally, the packet will be sent to the destination node. 
4.4 PGO-DLLA to Prevent Black Hole Attack 
Nature-inspired algorithm is a research area for information models that studies the 
collective behavior of insects or animal swarms. Some algorithms have been proposed 
to address black hole attacks through new protocols and improved routing security 
with swarm intelligence. In this section, a parallel grid algorithm for MANETs is 
proposed that optimizes both routing discovery and security in an Ad Hoc On-
Demand Distance Vector (AODV). The new algorithm, called Parallel Grid 
Optimization by the Daddy Long-Legs Algorithm (PGO-DLLA), simulates the 
behavior of the biological spiders known as daddy long-legs spiders [126]. 
4.4.1 Parallel Grid Optimization by Daddy Long-Legs Algorithm (PGO-DLLA) 
PGO-DLLA is based on the idea of the VDLLA optimization algorithm (see section 
4.4.1.1), that is based on the choosing the least path to the destination and the nature 
behavior of daddy long-legs spiders of catching the prey or avoiding attacks in a 
spider web. 
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4.4.1.1 Daddy Long-Legs Spider 
Globally, there are more than 30,000 kinds of spiders, which are characterized by a 
unique way of hunting prey. Most types of spiders respond to any vibrations that 
come from their web. Spiders have special methods for quick access to prey and 
capture them as soon as possible. Several vibrations coming from the web may signal 
a source of danger, and changing strategies is essential to avoid the threat [127]. The 
new proposed algorithm is based on the behavior of spiders in nature, namely daddy 
long-legs spiders. This type of spider responds to the first vibration that comes from 
the web and chooses the shortest path to catch the prey without giving it a chance to 
escape from the trap [126]. Spiders have a huge number of strategies to capture prey, 
such as trapping the prey in a sticky web [126], [127]. In the case of daddy long-legs 
spiders, all paths in the web are available for access to a destination, because daddy 
long-legs spiders do not use the glue that other spiders use. The absence of glue on the 
yarns of daddy long-legs spiders provides them with unique features, such as the 
ability to change their location in the web to avoid any dangers coming from outside 
the web. In addition, when there is more than one source of vibrations, the daddy 
long-legs spider chooses the smallest vibration frequency value to avoid the risk. This 
spider is sometimes called a hopper spider because it generates inverse artificial 
vibrations [126], which can be useful to tighten restrictions on its prey or to discard 
the prey when it is an unwanted kind. Daddy long-legs spiders are slightly different 
from other spiders because they have high sensing precision using their eight legs, 
which act like sensors or agents to receive signals or to discover their prey’s position. 
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4.4.1.2 The Spider’s Leg Behaviors 
The main principles of the leg behavior are as presented in Figure 4.17. 
 
Figure 4.17.  The 8-legs in VDLLA 
 Homogeneity: Each spider leg (8-legs) has the same behavior model. 
 Locality: The motion of each leg is only influenced by its nearest path mates. 
 Collision Avoidance: Automatically avoids collision with nearby legs. 
 Body Centering: Attempts to stay close to nearby prey mates. 
 Parallelism: Eight local search agents are working in parallel, for a single spider, 
the search for global solution is at the same time. 
 Speed of Converge: Even though the global optima are not close to the best leg, 
it is possible for the spider to explore other areas. 
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 Solve local optima problem: The globalpositionnew = bestposition and the 
legpositions change based on the position of the body. 
4.4.2 Virtual Daddy Long-Legs Algorithm (VDLLA) 
The nature-inspired algorithms are based on a biological behavior of insects or 
animals. Many meta-heuristic optimization algorithms have the ability to find near 
optimal global solutions; however, these algorithms are weak in searching for local 
solution.  
This means that meta-heuristic optimization is strong in exploration but poor in 
exploitation. The success of any Meta heuristic optimization algorithm depends on the 
balance between exploration and exploitation. So, in this section, a new nature-
inspired algorithm is presented that is based on daddy long-legs spider as a new 
optimization algorithm with virtual behavior, which is named Virtual Daddy Long-
Legs Algorithm (VDLLA).  
In VDLLA, each agent (spider) has nine positions (solutions) which represent the 
eight legs of the spider and the current body position. The proposed VDLLA will be 
tested in the next chapter on four standard functions using average fitness, medium 
fitness and standard deviation.  
Experimented results are later compared against Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), 
Differential Evolution (DE) and Bat-Inspired Algorithm (BA). Additionally, the 
statistical analysis of T-Test will be conducted to verify the results to learn that the 
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proposed VDLLA demonstrates promising results on the benchmark test functions for 
unconstrained optimization problems and has significantly improved other nature-
inspired algorithms. 
In this section, the operational principles from VDLLA used a guideline to develop a 
new inspirited optimization algorithm. VDLLA  assume that: 
 The entire search space is a network content from nodes in the search space. 
 All the legs of one spider interact with each other. 
 Each solution with in the search space represents a spider position. 
 Every leg receives a weight according to the fitness value. 
 The algorithm models eight different search agents (legs). 
 Depending on the legs, each individual uses the same evaluation function. 
 The algorithm starts by one spider (one body and eight legs).   
4.4.2.1 The Motivations of the Design of VDLLA 
In 2002, Kennedy and Mendes [128] developed a new version of PSO based on the 
standard PSO [93], to solve the problem of trapping in local optima, and to put more 
balance between exploration (global search) and exploitation (local search).  
In [128], the authors have suggested to put a new technique in PSO, by adding two 
new comparisons (lbest on the right side and lbest on the left side). In the other words, 
the new algorithm can locate the global optimal with greater chance but the 
convergence will be slower.  
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On the contrary, VDLLA as a new algorithm has a robust simple mechanism to solve 
all the disadvantages in the old previous swarm algorithms such as attracted to the 
best part of the search space in PSO. Depending on these disadvantages and the 
standard behavior of the individuals, the higher priority rule is the attempt to find a 
minimum distance between themselves and others at all times [129].  
Furthermore, to avoid being isolated, the individuals tend to be attracted towards other 
individuals and align themselves with neighbors [129]. In VDLLA, with the existence 
of the eight legs, eight positions plus the position of the spider body can be compared. 
Hence, the old behavior of the previous swarm algorithms can be changed to simulate 
a different biological behavior of daddy long-legs.  
In this behavior, it is unnecessary to avoid isolating any individual by being attracted 
to the best solution. The spider can avoid any dangerous path by isolating the leg 
without any effect of its mechanism.  
4.4.2.2 The Process of VDLLA 
VDLLA is a swarm of spiders. It is assumed that each spider has nine positions 
represented as a 3×3 matrix in a grid space, where eight of the positions are for the 
spider’s eight legs and the center position is for the spider’s body.  
Each spider evaluates the nine positions based on the objective function and 
determines the best location from the nine positions. The best position for each spider 
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is then evaluated to choose a global position. Table 4.2 shows the positions of each 
agent in VDLLA. 
Table 4.2 
The positions of each agent (spider). 
Leg5= (X-0.1, Y+0.1) Leg1 = (X,Y+0.1) 
 
Leg6 =(X+0.1,Y+0.1) 
 
 
Leg3=(X-0.1,Y) 
 
body = (X,Y) Leg4 = (X+0.1,Y) 
 
Leg7 =(X-0.1,Y-0.1) 
 
Leg2=(X,Y-0.1) Leg8 =(X+0.1, Y-0.1) 
 
Some of the test functions we have used are the bivariate (Rosenbrock [130], 
Michalewicz [131], Eggcrate [130], and Beal [130] functions) after implementation to 
validate the VDLLA algorithm. For example the Rosenbrock function  f (x, y) = (1-
x)
2
 + 100 (y-x)
2 
 is a non context function used a classic performance test function in 
optimization theory. In contrast to many derived-free optimizers, Rosenbrock's 
function can be efficiently optimized by adapting appropriate coordinate system 
without using any gradient information and without building local approximation 
models. Sometimes referred as a Rosenbrock's banana function due to the shape of its 
contour lines. Rosenborck’s function is a continuous, differentiable, non-separable, 
scalable, and unimodal function [130]. The equation of Rosenborck’s function is 
Equation 4.3, and the graph of the Rosenborck’s function is illustrated in Figure 4.18. 
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𝑓(𝑥) = ∑[100(𝑥𝑖+1 − 𝑥𝑖
2)2 + (𝑥𝑖−1)
2]
𝐷−1
𝑖=1
 
(4.3) 
Subject to -30 ≤ xi ≤ 30, the global minimum is located at x* = f (1,…, 1), f (x*) = 0.  
 
Figure 4.18. The Rosenborck’s function [130] 
The Michalewicz’s function [131] is as shown in Equation 4.4, and the graph of the 
Michalewicz’s function is illustrated in Figure 4.19. 
 
Figure 4.19. The Michalewicz’s function [131]  
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Subject to 0 ≤ xi ≤ π . The global minimum is located at x* = f (1, 2,…,d),  
f (x*) = -1.801 for d = 2, while f (x*) = -4.6877 for d = 5. 
𝑓(𝑥) = ∑ sin(𝑥𝑖)
𝑑
𝑖=1
[sin (
(𝑖𝑥𝑖
2)
𝜋
)]
2
𝑚, 𝑚 = 10 
    (4.4) 
 
The EggCrate’s function is presented in Equation 4.5, and its graph is illustrated in 
Figure 4.20.  
 
Figure 4.20. The EggCrate’s function [130] 
It is a continuous, non-separable, and non-scalable function [130]. 
𝑓(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥1
2 + 𝑥2
2 + 25(𝑠𝑖𝑛2(𝑥1) + 𝑠𝑖𝑛
2(𝑥2))     (4.5) 
Subject to -5 ≤ xi ≤ 5, the global minimum is located at x* =f (0, 0), f (x*) = 0. And 
finally, the Beal’s function is as shown in Equation 4.6, and the graph of the Beal’s 
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function is illustrated in Figure 4.21. It is a continuous, non-differentiable, non-
separable, non-scalable, and unimodal function [130]. 
𝑓(𝑥) = (1.5 − 𝑥1 + 𝑥1𝑥2)
2 + (2.25 − 𝑥1 + 𝑥1𝑥2
2)2 + (2.625 − 𝑥1 + 𝑥1𝑥2
3)2     (4.6) 
Subject to -4.5 ≤ xi ≤ 4.5, the global minimum is located at x* = (3, 0.5), f (x*) = 0. 
 
 
Figure 4.21. The Beal’s function [130] 
4.4.2.3 Implementation of VDLLA 
We suppose that each spider has nine positions as matrix 3x3 in grid space where eight 
legs and the center position are for the spider’s body of spider as shows in Table 4.2. In 
start search space, each spider evaluates the nine positions randomly to determine the 
initial solution, for example body = (1.2, 1.5). The best position for each spider is 
evaluated to choose a global position as a minimum value. The computational 
procedure of VDLLA algorithm can be summarized as follows: 
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Virtual Daddy Long-Legs Algorithm (VDLLA) return BestPath   
1: Begin 
2:Input:N, body position, up, down, left, right, upleft, upright, downleft, downright 
2:Generate Initial population of spider members, considering N as the total 
number of members 
3:Generate Initial location for each body of spider members randomly, and then 
calculate the legs’ position based on body position: 
Assume the body position = (X, Y), the legs’ position is eight directions where: 
from up = (X,Y+0.1), from down =(X,Y-0.1), from left =(X-0.1,Y), from right = 
(X+0.1,Y), from up left = (X-0.1, Y+0.1), up right =(X+0.1,Y+0.1), from down 
left =(X-0.1,Y-0.1) and downright =(X+0.1, Y-0.1) as shown in Table 4.2 
4: Evaluate the fitness for each agent (spider) where the evaluation includes all 
positions of the agent (body + legs) using Equations 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 or 4.6. 
5:Select the best fitness for each agent (spider) and save the position as best   
position 
6:Select the global fitness from all best fitness and save the position as global 
position 
7:Do while global fitness greater than tolerance value (tolerance value is based on 
objective function) 
8:Find new position for each agent where the body moves to best position and legs’ 
position changes based on the body 
9:Find new best fitness and new global fitness 
10:If new global fitness less than global fitness 
11:Global fitness = new global fitness 
12:Else if new global equal global fitness 
13:Change the global position using Equation 4.5 as shown below 
  dRNDGposGpos oldnew ,101.0  (4.5) 
                           // Where, d is the dimension of objective function.// 
14:iteration=iteration +1 
15:End while 
16: Bestpath=Gposnew 
17:End  
 
Figure 4.18. Pseudo code of VDLLA 
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4.4.3 Problem Formulation and Solution Representation 
As mention in Chapter one, MANETs suffer from several limitations, such as short 
battery lives, limited capacities, and vulnerability to malicious behaviors. A black 
hole is one type of attack that occurs in MANETs. Black hole nodes attack routing 
protocols such as the AODV protocol [77], causing network packets to be dropped. 
The main goal of the AODV protocol is to find a path from a source to its destination 
node and then to forward the packets. The routing mechanism in AODV uses route 
requests (RREQs; for discovering routes) and route replies (RREPs; for receiving 
paths). However, this mechanism is vulnerable to attacks by malicious black hole 
nodes that can easily adjust the values of routing table fields such as hop count and 
DSN in order to deceive the source node after sending a RREQ, a source node will 
respond to the first RREP it receives. This RREP may be from a black hole node, and 
the source will not reply to other intermediate nodes. As a result, the cooperative work 
in the MANET may be terminated [2], [41]–[45].  Intensive computations are required 
to make AODV secure against black hole attacks [132]. Most of the proposed 
solutions with limited computations such as trusting neighboring nodes, using cross-
layer cooperation, or allowing route redundancy fail to detect cooperative black hole 
attacks [2], [43], [44]. However, the use of intensive computations as a solution to 
cooperative black hole attacks may lead to the depletion of the limited energy of 
batteries. In this mechanism, methods are developed to find the shortest secure path 
and to reduce overhead using the information that is available in the routing tables. 
However, this information is used as an input to propose a more complex algorithm 
using swarm intelligence. Mathematical formulas such as Hooke’s law [133], 
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Newton’s second and third laws [134] are utilized to evaluate the route reply and 
choose the best path. For example, the vibration between two nodes, depending on 
Hooke’s low.  
Swarm behavior in animals or insects is an intelligent behavior of their biological 
group. The study of swarm intelligence is aimed at understanding the behavior of a 
group in nature. Biological scientists have found that many models can mimic the 
living systems of animals or insects such as the Ant colony optimization algorithm 
mimic the behavior of ant in finding the best path.  
Most spiders do not live in communities, so swarm intelligence does not reflect the 
collective behavior directly, rather,  in this research, the sensitive behavior of spider 
legs are considered to represent the collective performance. This approach is a 
relatively new orientation in the area of swarm intelligence.  
The developping a new frameworks, which may be very useful in highly dynamic 
routing networks in this area. The new algorithm is applied to MANETs to address 
the problem of black hole attacks in the AODV routing protocol. The new proposal is 
based on the daddy long-legs spider’s behavior in nature, as described in the next 
section.  
4.4.3.1 The Proposed PGO-DLLA Algorithm 
In the AODV routing protocol, each node has a routing table which includes the 
information, such as hop count, destination sequence number (DSN), life time, and  
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source IP address. PGO-DLLA have three routing tables; the first table (L1) contains 
a Source Sequence Number (SSN), Destination Sequence Number (DSN) and 
Lifetime of the Leg (LTL1). The second table (L2) contains SSN, DSN, and the force 
(F). The third table is the routing table that contains all Route Discovery (RD), 
Current Route Discovery (CRD), Lifetime (LT), and the Best Route (BR) to the 
destination node. Figure 4.19 illustrates the PGO-DLLA routing tables. 
L1 L2 
Routing 
Table 
SSN 
DSN 
LTL1 
 
SSN 
DSN 
F 
 
RD 
CRD 
LT 
BR 
 
Figure 4.19. PGO-DLLA routing tables 
The route discovery in PGO-DLLA is shown in Figure 4.20. The spider sends an 
agent (L1), to neighboring nodes to discover the route to the destination (prey). After 
broadcasting the legs to all neighboring nodes, the spider (source) waits for a lifetime 
(LT) for receive (L2), if the source receives L2 that means this node has a route to the 
destination or it is a destination. Then, the source node evaluates all route replies that 
come from neighboring nodes using Equation 4.9, to find the best move and select the 
next path.  
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Figure 4.20. The route discovery in VDLLA 
Newton’s second law is computed the force. According to [135], Newton’s second 
law is stated as “The vector sum of the forces on an object is equal to the total mass of 
that object multiplied by the acceleration of the object”. Equation 4.6 shows the 
original Newton’s second law. 
 
where, m is the mass,  a is the acceleration where it can also be calculated by 
Newton’s second law in Equation 4.7. 
 
maFnet   
(4.6) 
 mFa net /  (4.7) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 L1 
L1 
L2 
L1 
L1 
L1 
L1 
L2 
L2 
L1 
L1 
L2 
L1 
L1 
L2 
L1  
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Depending on Hook’s law [133], it is stated that, “The force exerted by the spring 
which is proportional to the length of stretch or compression of the spring and 
opposite in direction to the direction of the stretch or the compression”. Equation 4.8 
shows the original Hook’s law. 
 
where, k is constant, x is displacement. By replacing Equation 4.7 with Equation 4.8,  
the acceleration is equal to Equation 4.9. 
 
 
In this study, it is supposed that m equals to DSN, and k is the constant number which 
is set to 0.1. 
4.4.3.2 Solution Representation 
The PGO-DLLA algorithm has one main goal ( shortest secure path ). The main goal 
can be achieved by using the objective function that includes two sub goals: shortest 
path and secure path. The shortest secure path in PGO-DLLA from source to 
destination can be calculated by the following process as shown in Figure 4.20. 
 
 
 
kxF   (4.8) 
x
m
k
a 





  (4.9) 
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PGO-DLL( ) return BestPath 
#Parallel Grid Optimization based on Virtual Daddy Long-Legs Algorithm 
(PGO-DLLA) to prevent black hole attacks in MANETs 
Begin 
1:Input:N, body position, up, down, left, right, upleft, upright, downleft, downright 
2:Distribute one agent to every node that is a central station to its neighbors, and 
this is done by checking the table of each node separately 
3:Each agent simultaneously (applied at the same time) 
 
4:Create two tables for each agent 
 
a) The distances table which represents the distance between agent and 
neighboring nodes. 
 
b) The acceleration table which represents the evaluation function for the 
agent to choose the best path. 
 
5:Find the result of evaluation function for the agent using Equation 4.10. 
𝑎 =
𝑘𝑥
𝑚
 (4.10) 
6:Create an ascending table for the (a) values (ListMin) 
7:Calculate the value of threshold as Equation 4.11 
 %6DSN
kx
ThDynamic   (4.11) 
// Where, (6%) of the end of maximum sequence number to define black hole node// 
8:ForListMin (node) 
If ListMin (node) <= 
DynamicTh  
Then select Path 
Exit For 
Else  
delete Path from routing table 
9:End For (new node) 
10: BestPath=ListMin(node) 
10:End 
 
Figure 4.20. The pseudo code of parallel grid optimization based on virtual daddy 
long-legs algorithm (PGO-DLLA) 
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4.5 Implementation of EAODV, SSP-AODV, PGO-DLLA and BAODV 
This section is focused on the development of Enhanced Ad hoc On-demand Distance 
Vector (EAODV) protocol, Shortest Secure Path for Ad hoc On-demand Distance 
Vector (SSP-AODV) protocol, Parallel Grid Optimization Daddy Long Legs 
Algorithm (PGO-DLLA) protocol, and the Black hole Ad hoc On-demand Distance 
Vector (BAODV) protocol. 
4.5.1 Implementing Black Hole Behavior Protocol in NS-2 
This section presents the implementation of a new routing protocol in NS-2 to 
simulate the black hole behavior. The implementation can be done using the AODV 
protocol to add the nodes that exhibit the black hole behavior. The new routing 
protocol is named as Black hole Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (BADOV). The 
integration of BAODV, EAODV, SSP-AODV, and PGO-DLLA protocols (protocol 
agent file, protocol makes agent file, and dropping or accepting packet's file) to NS-2 
environment are shown in Appendix B. Some important modification of NS-2 files 
that need to be modified on its directory to integrate the new protocols are shown in 
Appendix C. To generate a new scenario, two files are created to be as an input, 
which are called random traffic and node movements. Then, the output that result 
from run the scenario are analyzed by AWK commands and drawing by graph 
commands. All input files and execution commands are illustrated in Appendix D. 
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4.6 Summary 
The chapter illustrated the heuristic and meta-heuristic search which explains how the 
new concept is going to convert the AODV protocol into a secure routing protocol in 
order to enhance the performance of the protocol.  
This chapter explained how the proposed protocol discovers the malicious node black 
hole that is attacking the route discovery and make a denial of service. Furthermore, 
this chapter discussed the artificial intelligence elements of the EAODV protocol and 
the SSP-AODV protocol in detail.  
Each element has an objective to enhance the performance of the AODV protocol. 
The first element of the EAODV and the SSP-AODV protocols is the shortest path by 
using an A* heuristic search algorithm and Floyd-Warshall's to enhance the routing 
discovery; the second element is by using of the prevent technique to enhance the 
secure path to the destination in the SSP-AODV routing protocol.  
After that, the chapter introduced the design of the VDLLA optimization algorithm 
and the PGO-DLLA algorithm design. This proposes a defense mechanism against a 
cooperative black hole attack in a MANET that relies on the AODV routing protocol.  
The new method is called the PGO-DLLA protocol, which modifies the standard 
AODV and optimizes the routing process. The idea is inspired by a spider called 
daddy long-legs, which is a new technique for finding suspicious nodes and avoiding 
black hole attacks.  
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As a swarm algorithm, PGO-DLLA can consolidate the routing mechanism. Some 
changes are made in the routing tables to store the shortest and secure path from 
source to destination node. The main objective in this method is to avoid black hole 
attacks without causing delays in the routing protocol.  
The experimental results show that PGO-DLLA is able to improve the performance of 
the network with respect to most of the performance metrics examined. Moreover, 
this chapter presented the implementation of black hole nodes in the Ad hoc On- 
demand Distance Vector (BAODV) protocol, and integrated it in network simulator 
NS-2.  
Furthermore, this chapter presented the implementation of three new protocols that 
are used to achieve the shortest and secure routing in AODV. Firstly, the 
implementation of Enhanced Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (EAODV) 
algorithm has been presented and the steps of the integration of the protocol in NS-2 
are illustrated.  
In the same way, the implementation of the Shortest Secure Path Ad hoc On-demand 
Distance Vector (SSP-AODV) algorithm and Parallel Grid Optimization Daddy 
Long-Legs Algorithm are presented in this chapter.  
Additionally, the modification of some important files of NS-2 is presented to 
integrate a new protocol in the simulator. Finally, the simulation script of NS-2 is 
illustrated by the flowchart to present the flow of the NS-2 scenarios.   
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 CHAPTER FIVE
THE RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter intends to demonstrate the performance of AODV in two different 
environments: regular and hostile environments. Regular environment is a group of 
nodes (i.e. computers, A personal digital assistant (PDA), mobile, and any 
communication devices) that communicate between them without any attacks. In 
contrast, hostile environment is an environment with one or more malicious nodes 
(black hole node). In addition, this chapter will study the important performance 
metrics with various settings of pause time and different numbers of nodes to 
predefine an appropriate optimal setting for AODV. The studying of the current 
behavior of AODV will involve a set of the simulations (empirical experimeintal) 
based on NS-2 as mentioned in the Chapter Three. 
5.2 Empirical Experiments for AODV 
The aim of this section is to explore the optimal setting for the AODV protocol. This 
section includes two different scenarios: empirical experiment on regular 
environments that tests the standard AODV with different numbers of nodes, and an 
empirical expeirment on hostile environments to setup the appropriate pause time. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the empirical experiment of AODV.  
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Figure 5.1. Empirical experiment of AODV 
5.2.1 Empirical Experiment on Regular Environment 
In this scenario, different parameters are set up for the standard AODV with various 
numbers of nodes (10, 20, 50 and 100). CBR is used as a traffic model; different 
numbers of nodes are distributed within a random waypoint model for mobility. The 
map area of simulation is 800 x 800 m. The transmission range is 250 m. The rest of 
the simulation parameters is indicated in Chapter three Table 3.1. The experiment is 
conducted four times based on the number of nodes to obtain the trace file. The trace 
file is analyzed six times in the AWK file based on the number of performance 
metrics to find the final results. Figure 5.2 illustrates the results of the performance 
metrics with different numbers of nodes. In Figure 5.2 (c), can be seen that the best 
Throughput Ratio is 13.86 and 6.34 when the number of nodes is 20 and 10 
respectively. Based on the literature, the highest Throughput Ratio means the best 
performance for the protocol [67].  
 The Empirical Experiments for 
AODV 
Regular Environment 
Standard AODV 
 
Hostile Environment 
(Black Hole AODV) 
BADOV 
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In the case of Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), the best value in Figure 5.2 (e) is 92.88, 
99.54 and 99.57 when the number of nodes is 20, 50 and 100. The largest ratio of 
PDR denotes better performance for the protocol [68].  
The Normalized Routing Load as in Figure 5.2 (f) is 0.09 and 0.15 better in nodes 10 
and 20, and depending on the literature, the smallest value of Normalized Routing 
Load means the best performance for the protocol [67], [68]. Additionally, the best 
value of Average End-to-End in Figure 5.2 (g) is 34.93 and 33.64 obtained in 50 and 
100 nodes. The smallest value of End-to-End means the best protocol performance 
[67], [68].  
In addition, the Packet Loss Ratio in Figure 5.2 (h) is 0.75 and 0.72 generated in 
nodes 50 and 100. However when the total node is 20, can be seen that the acceptable 
value is better than node 10. When Packet Loss Ratio is small, this means a good 
result for protocol performance [68]. 
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No. of Nodes of Nodes 
  
  
(c) PDR with Different No. of Nodes (d) Normalization with Different No. of 
Nodes 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(e) Average EtoE with Different No. of Nodes (f) PL with Different No. of Nodes 
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Figure 5.2. The performance metrics of standard AODV with various numbers of nodes  
 
 
Figure 5.2. continued  
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In Table 5.1, the performance metric results are compared together to find the best 
number of nodes and this result is applied in the second simulation. As a result, the 
best number of node is 20 nodes based on the all of the performance metrics. 
Table 5.1 
The comparison of performance metrics result for AODV. 
                                                                                                                                 
Based on [77] the comparison of three performance metrics: the packet loss 
percentage, normalized routing load, and throughput of AODV, are best to show the 
efficiency protocol. Figure 5.3 illustrates the curves of three chosen performance. It 
can be concluded from Figure 5.3 that the best number of node is 20 nodes. 
Performance Metrics 
The Number of Nodes 
10 20 50 100 
Throughput Ratio% √ √ X X 
Packet Delivery Ratio% X √ √ √ 
Normalized Routing Load √ √ √ X 
Average End-to-End X √ √ √ 
Packet Loss Ratio% X √ √ √ 
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Figure 5.3. Comparison result of the performance metrics TH, PL, and NRL 
From the previous comparison result, the number 20 is concluded as the best setting 
of node in AODV that is used with the other experiments in this chapter. 
5.2.2 Empirical Experiment on Hostile Environment 
The term "hostile environment" means unreliable environment which has some 
unfriendly nodes. The main function of nodes in AODV is being cooperative with 
each other in a meaningful way. Unfortunately, if at least one of the nodes want to get 
away without cooperating with its community, this changes the current environment 
to a hostile environment.  
In this section, some of the scenarios have been simulated which include a black hole 
environment using NS-2 to integrate the black hole nodes in the AODV protocol; a 
new simulation with malicious nodes has been implemented that has the ability to 
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drop data packets after attracting them to itself. The second scenario has been done 
with the same parameter setting, except for the number of nodes which are set to 20, 
and with various pause times (10, 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100) as shown in Chapter three 
Table 3.1.  
The simulation period of 100 seconds with a hostile environment means using a black 
hole node as a malicious node to attack the AODV protocol. This experience has been 
re-implemented with six pause times which is equivalent to 12 scenarios in each 
experiment. The protocol name and pause time are varied, while the rest of 
parameters are fixed. In this scenario, the packet delivery ratio and throughput for 
pause time 10  has a better result when applied to AODV in a hostile environment. 
Moreover, pause time 10 has less values of average end-to-end and normalized 
routing load that means the best result as shown in Figure 5.4 for AODV with various 
pause times and 20 as the number of nodes.      
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(a) Send and received Packet with 
Different Pause Time 
(b) Throughput Ratio with Different 
Pause time 
  
 
  
  
(c) PDR with Different Pause time (d) Normalization with Different Pause time 
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Figure 5.4. The performance metrics of standard AODV with various pause time 
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(e) Average EtoE with Different Pause time (f) PL with Different Pause time 
                                                                                                                                    
Figure 5.4 shows the simulation result of AODV in a hostile environment with black 
hole nodes and the same parameters of the second scenario. The simulations have 
been conducted 36 times to find the result for six performance metric (TH, PDR, 
NRL, E-to-E, PL, and send received packets) with six pause time (10, 20, 40, 60, 80, 
and 100) in Figure 5.5. 
  
(a)  Send and Received Packet  (b) Throughput with Different Pause Time 
 (c)  
55.57 
212.69 
206.66 
176.74 
76.99 
223.28 
0
50
100
150
200
250
10 20 40 60 80 100
E-
to
-E
/S
e
co
n
d
 
Pause Time 
Average End-to-End
8 
5.33 5 5.47 
5.64 5.71 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 20 40 60 80 100
P
L%
 
Pause Time 
Packet Loss Ratio
8843 
443 964 
1532 2238 2967 
7957 
403 
920 
1424 
2114 
2790 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
10 20 40 60 80 100
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
P
ac
ke
t 
Pause Time 
Received Packet
Send Packet
0.29 
0.16 
0.18 0.19 0.21 0.22 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
10 20 40 60 80 100
TH
/K
ilo
b
it
s/
se
co
n
d
 
Pause Time 
Throughput
Ratio
Figure 5.5. The performance metrics of BAODV with various pause time 
 
Figure 5.4. continued 
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(d) PDR with Different Pause Time (e) Normalization with Different Pause Time 
  
(f) Average EtoE with Different Pause Time (g) PL with Different Pause Time 
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Table 5.2 shows the result of comparing various pause times based on the 
performance metrics to find the best pause time setting for the next simulations. The 
result shows that the AODV protocol is better than the BAODV protocol (60, 80, and 
100) pause times, which is because of the low mobility and the none existence black 
hole nodes in the network.  
High mobility in (10, 20, and 40) pauses times and black hole nodes were affecting 
AODV and made it worse when compare with BADOV.  
As a result, the pause time with t=10 will be chosen to check the bad condition with 
black hole as the hostile environment, or t=100 as a good condition for regular AODV 
without black hole nodes.    
Table 5.2 
The Performance Metrics for AODV and BAODV. 
Performance Metrics t=10 t=20 t=40 t=60 t=80 t=100 
Throughput Ratio X X X X X X 
Packet Delivery Ratio  √ √ X √ - √ 
Normalized Routing Load X X X X √ √ 
Average End-to-End √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Packet Loss Ratio √ √ √ √ √ √ 
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5.3 Experiments Setup, Results and Analysis of EAODV Protocol 
NS-2 simulator version 2.33 [136], [137] has been used to experiment three scenarios. 
Scenario 1 is to test the original AODV, Scenario 2 is to test the black hole attack in 
AODV and Scenario 3 is to test the execution of the proposed EAODV in finding the 
shortest secure path and securing the AODV protocol. The Simulation Parameters for 
Scenarios 1,2 and 3 are setting such as the standard table in Chapter three Table 3.1, 
except the size of network change to 50 nodes as a huge scenario and as show in 
Figure 5.3 that is comparison result of the performance metrics TH, PL, and NRL, The three 
metrics are the most important for best-effort traffic [6]. The rest of the simulation parameters 
is indicated in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3 
Simulation Parameters for EAODV, BAODV, and Standard AODV. 
Parameter Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 
Simulation Time 1000 sec. 1000 sec. 1000 sec. 
Number of Nodes 50 50 50 
Routing Protocol AODV BAODV EAODV 
Traffic Model CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) 
Pause Time 
10, 20, 40, 60, 80 
and 100 sec. 
10, 20, 40, 60, 80 
and 100 sec. 
10, 20, 40, 60, 80 
and 100 sec. 
Maximum Mobility 60 m/sec. 60 m/sec. 60 m/sec. 
Map area 800m x 800m 800m x 800m 800m x 800m 
Transmission Range 250m 250m 250m 
Malicious Node 1 1 1 
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5.3.1 Packet Loss: Results and Discussion 
In Figure 5.6, three scenarios: original AODV, black hole AODV and EAODV, are 
compared. The packet loss ratio increases in black hole AODV, which degrades the 
performance of the protocol and causes many packet losses.  
As a result, it triggers a DoS attack in MANET. The proposed EAODV minimize the 
packet loss and improves the network performance as compared to the original 
AODV. Packet loss is 21.41%  in AODV, but it increases in black hole AODV, which 
is 28.32%, and after implementing EAODV, the percentage is improved, to 24.96%. 
The decrease of packet loss with black hole AODV is compared with the result of 
EAODV; this means some improvement has been conducted in avoiding the black 
hole attack. After the original AODV packet loss was increased 7.8 % with black hole 
AODV, the packet loss was decreased to 3.36 % with EAODV. 
 
Figure 5.6. Packet loss percentage for AODV, black hole AODV and EAODV 
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5.3.2 Average End-to-End Delay: Results and Discussion 
 
Figure 5.7 shows the comparison of the average End-to-End delay of the three 
scenarios. The average End-to-End Delay increases with the existence of black holes. 
This delay degrades the performance of the network and causes more delay time when 
the packets try to reach the destination node.  
Furthermore, when the original AODV is compared with the proposed protocol 
EAODV, the result indicated that EAODV minimizes the Average End-to-End Delay 
and improves the network performance. The percentage of delay was 29% with black 
hole node compared with the original AODV. This percentage is about 11.09% with 
EAODV.   
 
Figure 5.7. The average end-to-end delay for AODV, black hole AODV and EAODV 
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5.3.3 Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) Results and Discussion 
Figure 5.8 displays the PDR for the three scenarios. It can be seen from the graphs 
that the packet delivery ratio does not increase with the existence of the black holes in 
the network. The packets that reached the destination from the source node was 
479.77 in total for standard AODV, 469.56 for AODV with black hole nodes, and 
447.43 for EAODV. Therefore, it can be seen that the overall PDR for EAODV does 
not degrade significantly due to the implementation of security algorithm. 
 
 
Figure 5.8. The packet delivery ratio for AODV, black hole AODV and EAODV 
5.3.4 The Normalized Routing Load (NRL) Results and Discussion 
In Figure 5.9, several increase of the routing load can be seen in the proposed 
EAOAV protocol as compared to the standard AODV due to the new mechanism to 
find the shortest path from source to destination node and the lack of strategy to 
prevent the black hole attack. The increase in NRL for BAODV is very close to the 
proposed protocol due to the black hole nodes that try to drop the packets. 
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Figure 5.9. The normalized routing load for AODV, black hole AODV and EAODV 
5.3.5 The Throughput Ratio (TH): Results and Discussion 
In Figure 5.10, it displays the comparison result between the proposed EAODV 
protocol with black hole AODV protocol and the standard AODV protocol in terms of 
throughput. The results show that the EAODV protocol outperformed the other two 
protocols. In EAODV, the of the heuristic A* to routing discovery is made to find the 
shortest path from source to destination node. As the new mechanism discovers the 
best path with the lesser number of hops, this gives effect in avoiding the black hole 
attack and dropping packets. The TH in EAODV increases as a result to the 
improving route discovery. 
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Figure 5.10. The throughput ratio for AODV, black hole AODV and EAODV 
5.4 Experiments Setup, Results and Analysis of SSP-AODV Protocol 
The NS-2 simulator version 2.33 is used in this experiment as in the previous 
experiments discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Three scenarios are conducted:  the 
first scenario tests the standard AODV routing protocol, the second scenario testes the 
black hole AODV (BAODV) routing protocol, and the third scenario testes the 
proposed SSP-AODV routing protocol in finding the shortest and secure path.  
The size of network and mobility are constant, where the number of nodes is equal to 
50 and the maximum mobility is set to 60 m/second. However, the pause time is 
varied. The rest of the simulation parameters in the first scenario, second scenario, 
and third scenario are shown in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 
Simulation Parameters for three Scenarios with SSP-AODV, BAODV and Standard 
AODV Routing protocol. 
Parameter Simulation1 Simulation2 Simulation3 
Simulation Time 1000 sec. 1000 sec. 1000 sec. 
Number of Nodes 50 50 50 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Black Hole-
AODV 
SSP-AODV 
Traffic Model CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) 
Pause Time 
10, 20, 40, 60, 
80 and 100 sec. 
10, 20, 40, 60, 
80 and 100 sec. 
10, 20, 40, 60, 
80 and 100 sec. 
Maximum Mobility 60 m/sec. 60 m/sec. 60 m/sec. 
No. of sources 1 1 1 
Map area 800m x 800m 800m x 800m 800m x 800m 
Transmission Range 250m 250m 250m 
Malicious Node 1 1 1 
    
 
5.4.1 Packet Loss (PL) Results and Discussion 
Three scenarios, original AODV, black hole AODV and SSP-AODV, are compared. 
The packet loss ratio increases in black hole AODV, which degrades the performance 
of the protocol and causes many packet losses, which in turn, may trigger a DoS 
attack.  
Compared to the original AODV, the proposed SSP-AODV indicates that SSP-
AODV minimizes the packet loss and improves the network performance. Packet loss 
is 21.41% in AODV, but increases with black hole to 28.32%, and with SSP-AODV, 
the percentage increases to 22.98%, as shown in Figure 5.11. 
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Figure 5.11. The packet loss percentage for AODV, BAODV and SSP-AODV 
5.4.2 Average End-to-End Delay: Results and Discussion 
 
Figure 5.12 shows the comparison of the average End-to-End delay of the three 
scenarios. The average End-to-End Delay increases with the existence of black holes. 
This delay degrades the performance of the network and causes more delay time when 
packets try to reach the destination node.  
Furthermore, when the original AODV is compared with the proposed SSP-AODV 
protocol, the result indicated that SSP-AODV minimizes the Average End-to-End 
Delay and improves the network performance. The percentage of delay is 29% with 
black hole node as compared to the original AODV. This percentage is about 11.09% 
with SSP-AODV.   
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Figure 5.12. The average end-to-end delay for AODV, BAODV and SSP-AODV 
5.4.3 Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) Results and Discussion 
Figure 5.13 the demonstrated PDR for the three scenarios. It can be seen from the 
graphs that the packet delivery ratio does not increase with the existence of the black 
holes in the network. The packets that reach to the destination from the source node is 
479.77 in total for standard AODV, 469.56 for AODV with black hole nodes, and 
447.43 for SSP-AODV. Thus, it can be seen that the overall PDR of SSP-AODV does 
not degrade significantly due to the implementation of security algorithm. 
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Figure 5.13. The packet delivery ratio for AODV, BAODV and SSP-AODV 
5.4.4 The Normalized Routing Load (NRL): Results and Discussion 
In Figure 5.14, the decreasing NRL in the proposed SSP-AOAV protocol is compared 
with the black hole AODV and the standard AODV due to the new mechanism to find 
the shortest path from source to destination node and the strategy to prevent the black 
hole attack. The increasing NRL of BAODV is very high due to the black hole nodes 
that try to drop the packets and the increasing link failure. As the simulation 
experiments for the standard AODV have conducted in a regular environment without 
any black hole node attacking the routing mechanism, the NRL is not very high and is 
very close to SSP-AODV. Some improvement has been done in the NRL performance 
metric for the prevention of the black hole attacks and zero network overhead.  
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Figure 5.14 . The normalized routing load for AODV, BAODV and SSP-AODV 
5.4.5 The Throughput Ratio (TH): Results and Discussion 
Figure 5.15 demonstrates the result of the comparison between the proposed SSP-
AODV protocol with the black hole AODV protocol and the standard AODV protocol 
in terms of throughput. The results show that the SSP-AODV protocol outperformed 
the other two protocols. In SSP-AODV, the integration of the heuristic A* and Floyd-
Warshall’s algorithm to routing discovery is performed to find the shortest path from 
source to destination node. As the new mechanism discovers the best path with the 
lesser number of hops and the technique prevents the black hole attack, some 
improvement for the TH performance metric are done by preventing the damages that 
occur due to the black hole attacks and dropping of packets. The TH in SSP-AODV 
increases as a result to the improving route discovery. 
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Figure 5.15. The throughput ratio for AODV, BAODV and SSP-AODV 
5.5 Evaluation of Virtual Daddy Long-Legs Algorithm 
The proposed algorithm is tested on four standard functions that have been extensively 
used in the evaluation of a new optimization algorithm. The standard functions  
Rosenborck’s function [130],  Michalewicz’s function [131], EggCrate’s function 
[130], and  Beal’s function [130] are shown in Table 5.5 includes the performance 
result of the proposed VDLLA, Differential Evolution (DE), Particle Swarm 
Optimization (PSO), and BAT algorithm (BA). The data indicates that VDLLA has 
4.78E-06, the smallest Average of Best minimum Fitness, as compared to BA which 
has 4.92E-06, PSO for Rosenbrock’s function, 5.30E-06, and DE 5.74E-06. 
Furthermore, for the four functions, VDLLA generates 4.22E-06, the smallest value of 
Medium of Best minimum Fitness, against BA which produces 4.62E-06, PSO with 
5.04E-06 and DE that produces 6.18E-06. The Standard Deviation of Best minimum 
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Fitness for VDLLA is 2.52E-06, smaller than BAT which is 2.69E-06, DE 2.76E-06 
and PSO 3.04E-06.  
This means the proposed VDLLA algorithm generates the best result for the 
Rosenbrock’s Function. It can be seen that VDLLA performs -1.80046 much better 
than BA -1.70237 and PSO -1.55568 algorithms, while the DE algorithm -1.85158 is 
much superior to the other algorithms in terms of the smallest Average of Best 
minimum Fitness with the Michaewicz’s function. However, the proposed VDLLA 
generates -18013 and 5.64E-04 in terms of Medium of Best minimum Fitness and 
Standard Deviation of Best minimum Fitness respectively, much better than BA that 
produces -1.80065 and 3.09E-01, DE generates -1.8001, and 7.49E-02, and finally 
PSO -1.7899, and 3.55E-01, respectively. 
For the EggCrate’s function, the proposed VDLLA generates 5.68E-06 for the smallest 
Average of Best minimum Fitness compared to BA which has 5.33E-06, PSO has 
2.846593, while DE has 4.81E-06, better than the other algorithms (refer to VDLLA, 
BA and PSO). Furthermore, for the other functions, VDLLA generates 5.51E-06, the 
smallest value of Medium of Best minimum Fitness, against BA which produces 
5.57E-06, PSO produces 7.43E-06, while DE produces 4.53E-06. The Standard 
Deviation of Best minimum Fitness for VDLLA 2.50E-06 is smaller than BA which is 
2.54E-06, DE 2.96E-06, and PSO 4.34E-06. This means the proposed VDLLA 
algorithm generated the best result in terms of the Standard Deviation of Best 
minimum fitness in the EggCrate’s function. For the Beale’s function, the proposed 
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VDLLA generated 4.15E-06, the smallest Average of Best minimum Fitness, as 
compared to BA which has 1.07E-01, PSO has 2.66E-01 and, DE has 4.66E-06.  
Furthermore, for the similar function, VDLLA generates 3.30E-06, the smallest value 
of Medium of Best minimum Fitness against BA which produces 6.14E-06, PSO 
produces 8.48E-06 and, DE produces 5.33E-06. The Standard Deviation of Best 
minimum Fitness for VDLLA 2.82E-06 is smaller than BA which is 2.20E-01, and 
PSO 3.77E-01, while DE is 2.74E-06.  
This means the proposed VDLLA algorithm generated the best result in the Beale’s 
function in terms of the smallest Average of Best minimum Fitness (AbmF) and the 
smallest value of Medium of Best minimum Fitness (MbmF). 
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Table 5.5 
Performance Results of proposed VDLLA vs. DE vs. PSO vs. BA, bold values mean 
best result, Average of Best minimum Fitness =AbmF, Medium of Best minimum 
Fitness = MbmF, Standard Deviation of Best minimum Fitness = SDbmF. 
Functions 
Performance 
Index 
DE PSO BA VDLLA 
Rosenbrock’s 
AbmF 5.74E-06 5.30E-06 4.92E-06 4.78E-06 
MbmF 6.18E-06 5.04E-06 4.62E-06 4.22E-06 
SDbmF 2.76E-06 3.04E-06 2.69E-06 2.52E-06 
Michalewicz’s 
AbmF -1.85158 -1.55568 -1.70237 -1.80046 
MbmF -1.8001 -1.7899 -1.80065 -1.8013 
SDbmF 7.49E-02 3.55E-01 3.09E-01 5.64E-04 
EggCrate’s 
AbmF 4.81E-06 2.846593 5.33E-06 5.68E-06 
MbmF 4.53E-06 7.43E-06 5.57E-06 5.51E-06 
SDbmF 2.96E-06 4.348236 2.54E-06 2.50E-06 
Beale’s  
AbmF 4.66E-06 2.66E-01 1.07E-01 4.15E-06 
MbmF 5.33E-06 8.48E-06 6.14E-06 3.30E-06 
SDbmF 2.74E-06 3.77E-01 2.20E-01 2.82E-06 
 
Table 5.6 tabulates the two-tailed p-value test provided by SPSS 17 that is generated 
by hypothesis testing of differences of means for independent samples T-Test 
comparing VDLLA vs. BA, VDLLA vs. PSO, and VDLLA vs. DE over the average of 
best minimum fitness value (AbmF) from Table 5.5.  
Independent samples T-Test is a non-parametric statistical approach used to test 
significant proof between the means of two algorithms [108]. In this test, two 
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hypotheses are supposed: null hypothesis (H0), where there is no significant difference 
between the mean values of two algorithms, and alterative hypothesis (H1), where 
there is a significant difference between the mean values of two algorithms. 
H0: No significant difference between the mean values (AbmF) of two algorithms.          
H1: Significant difference between the mean values of (AbmF) of two algorithms. 
Table 5.6 
P-value generated by T-Test for independent samples comparing VDLLA vs. BA, 
VDLLA vs. PSO, and VDLLA vs. DE, over the average of best minimum Fitness 
(AbmF) value from Table 5.5, bold value means significant proof. 
Functions VDLLA vs. BA VDLLA vs. PSO VDLLA vs. DE 
 
Assuming 
equal 
variance 
Assuming 
unequal 
variance 
Assuming 
equal 
variance 
Assuming 
unequal 
variance 
Assuming 
equal 
variance 
Assuming 
unequal 
variance 
Rosenbrock’s 0.415 0.415 0.2405 0.2405 0.085 0.085 
Michalewicz’s 0.465 0.49 0.000 0.0005 0.005 0.005 
EggCrate’s 0.2955 0.2955 0.0005 0.0005 0.114 0.114 
Beale’s 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.0005 0.2415 0.2415 
 
In Table 5.6, by using the Rosenbrock’s function, the p-values of the test via the equal 
variance assumption between VDLLA vs. PSO, VDLLA vs. BA and VDLLA vs. DE 
are 0.2405, 0.415 and 0.085 respectively, and the unequal variance assumption 
between VDLLA vs. PSO, VDLLA vs. BA and VDLLA vs. DE are 0.2405, 0.415 and 
0.085 respectively. Since the values are greater than α = 0.05, the null hypothesis H0 is 
accepted and it can be concluded that there is no significant difference between the 
mean values of VDLLA vs. PSO, VDLLA vs. BA and VDLLA vs. DE.  
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Furthermore, in Table 5.6, by using the Michalewicz’s function, it can be noticed that 
the p-values of the test assuming equal variance between VDLLA vs. PSO and 
VDLLA vs. DE are 0.000 and 0.005 respectively, and the p-values of the test assuming 
unequal variance between VDLLA vs. PSO and VDLLA vs. DE are 0.0005 and 0.005. 
Since both values are less than α = 0.05, the alternative hypothesis H1 is accepted and 
it can be concluded that there is a significant difference between the mean values of 
VDLLA vs. PSO and VDLLA vs. DE. The p-values of the test assuming equal 
variance between VDLLA vs. BA is 0.465, and assuming unequal variance is 0.49. 
Since the value is greater than α = 0.05, the null hypothesis H0 is accepted and it can 
be concluded that there is no significant difference between the mean values of 
VDLLA vs. BA. 
In addition, in Table 5.6, by using the EggCrate’s function, it can be noticed that in the 
two-tailed p-value test between VDLLA vs. PSO, the p-value of the test assuming 
equal variance is 0.0005 and assuming unequal variance is 0.0005. Since both p-values 
are less than α = 0.05, the alternative hypothesis H1 is accepted and it can be 
concluded that there is a significant difference between VDLLA and PSO. The p-
values of the test assuming equal variance between VDLLA vs. DE and VDLLA vs. 
BA are 0.114 and 0.2955, and assuming unequal variance between VDLLA vs. DE and 
VDLLA vs. BA are 0.114 and 0.2955 respectively. Since both values are greater than α 
= 0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted.  
and it can be concluded that there is no significant difference between the mean values 
of VDLLA vs. DE and VDLLA vs. BA. 
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Moreover, in Table 5.6, by using the Beale’s function, it can be seen that the p-values 
of the test assuming equal variance between VDLLA vs. PSO and VDLLA vs. BA are 
0.000 and 0.0065, and assuming unequal variance between VDLLA vs. PSO and 
VDLLA vs. BA are 0.0005 and 0.007 respectively. Since both values are less than α = 
0.05, the alternative hypothesis H0 is accepted and it can be concluded that there is a 
significant difference between the mean values of VDLLA vs. PSO and VDLLA vs. 
BA. The p-value of the test assuming equal variance between VDLLA vs. DE is 
0.2415, and assuming unequal variance is 0.2415. Since the value is greater than α = 
0.05, the null hypothesis is accepted and it can be concluded that there is no significant 
difference between the mean values of VDLLA vs. DE. 
A new Virtual Daddy Long-Legs Algorithm (VDLLA) has been successfully 
formulated for solving optimization tasks and adjusting the balance between 
exploration and exploitation. The VDLLA algorithm is based on the simulation of the 
behavior of a daddy long-legs spider based on the biological laws of hunting the prey 
on spider webs. According to most of the existing swarm algorithms, the success of 
any optimization algorithm depends on the balance between exploration and 
exploitation. In VDLLA, each spider has nine positions as matrix (3x3) in a grid space, 
where eight positions are for eight legs and one center position for the body of the 
spider. Each spider evaluates the nine positions based on the objective function and 
determines the best location from nine positions.  
The best position for each spider is evaluated to choose a global position. The 
performance of VDLLA has been compared with DE, PSO and BA, four swarm 
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algorithms. Additionally, the T-Test has been conducted to show the significant 
difference between the proposed algorithm and other algorithms. VDLLA showed very 
promising results on the benchmark test functions for unconstrained optimization 
problems and also significantly improved the original swarm algorithms. 
5.6 Experimental Results of PGO-DLLA Protocol 
Simulation 1 tests the original AODV, Simulation 2 tests the black hole AODV, 
Simulation 3 tests the AntNet algorithm [138], [139], and Simulation 4 tests the 
proposed PGO-DLLA in discovering the shortest secure path. The parameters for 
Simulations 1 to 4 are same to the parameters that are shown in Table 5.4, except the 
number of malicious nodes is set to two nodes in BAODV, AntNet, and PGO-DLLA 
to test the performance the new algorithms in hostile environments.  The experiments 
involve two parts; the comparison of performance results of PGO-DLLA with AntNet, 
and the comparison of performance results of PGO-DLLA with AODV and BAODV. 
5.6.1 Results and Discussion of Comparison between PGO-DLLA and AntNet 
In this scenario, the pause time varies from 0 to 100 seconds as shown in the 
parameters of scenario in Table 5.9. In Figure 5.24, the PDR for the PGO-DLLA 
algorithm is relatively better when compared with the AntNet algorithm for most sets 
of connections. This is because the new routing characteristics of the proposed PGO-
DLLA algorithm is better, in which it has the ability to find the shortest route between 
source and destination nodes with minimum number of hops. Generally, when the 
algorithm selects a route based on less hop counts, it chooses the shortest path to the 
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destination node and avoids a link failure. Therefore, some important performance 
metrics, such as average end-to-end delay, may decrease [140].  
 
Figure 5.16. PDR results: PGO-DLLA vs. AntNet 
In Figure 5.16, the value of End-to-End for the PGO-DLLA algorithm is slightly 
higher than the AntNet algorithm. One of the reasons is the calculation that it is 
needed to find the new route and the strategy of avoiding attacks. The throughput 
depends on the number of receiving packets from the source to the destination node. 
If any delay occurs as a result of a complex routing or updating route, it will decrease 
the throughput to the least value [141].  
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Figure 5.16. End-to- End results PGO-DLLA vs. AntNet 
In Figure 5.17, the PGO-DLLA algorithm has a better throughput from the AntNet 
algorithm in the first four period times (t=10, 20, 30, 40), then, the throughput value 
of the AntNet algorithm becomes better.  
Nonetheless, the throughput values of PGO-DLLA and AntNet algorithms are 
increasing to higher values across time. In some cases, when the routing decisions are 
done in intermediate nodes such as the self-adaptive algorithms, they are updating the 
routing after each iteration. In these types of algorithms the routing discovery is not 
done by the source node and most of these algorithms are designed to work in 
dynamic environments.  
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Figure 5.17. Throughput results PGO-DLLA vs. AntNet 
As a result, the rate of data dropping will be increased and this will lead to the 
increase in packet loss rate. However, PGO-DLLA is more stable than AntNet in 
packet loss rate because of its special characteristics of routing to the destination 
node, as shown in Figure 5.18.  
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Figure 5.18. Packet Loss results PGO-DLLA vs. AntNet 
5.6.2 Comparison of PGO-DLLA with AODV and BAODV 
The rate of throughput is small, which happens as there is no pause time (continuous 
motion) [50]. In this situation, the rate of PDR may be not affected because the new 
algorithm has more than one strategy to ensure all packets are received by the 
destination nodes.  
In Figure 5.19, it can be seen that there is some decrease in the PDR rates on BADOV 
and standard AODV, due to the effect of black hole node attacks as a malicious node. 
In contrary, the PDR rate of PGO-DLLA is increased due to the strategy of avoiding 
black hole attacks with keeping the shortest path to the destination node.  
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Figure 5.19. PDR results: PGO-DLLA vs. AODV vs. BAODV  
Figure 5.20 presents a pictorial representation of Average End-to-End delay between 
PGO-DLLA, BADOV and standard AODV. In this figure, it can be seen that PGO-
DLLA has a lesser rate, due to the strategy to change the route when it is broken as a 
result of misbehaving nodes. In contrary, the Average rate of EtoE on BADOV is 
increased because of the effects of the black hole attacks.  
   
142 
 
Figure 5.20. End-to-End results PGO-DLLA vs. AODV vs. BAODV  
Throughput results among PGO-DLLA, BADOV and standard AODV are presented in 
a graphical representation in Figure 5.21. As can be seen in Figure 5.21, the PGO-
DLLA algorithm has a higher rate of throughput due to the ability of avoiding black 
holes’ dropping of packets and the mechanism of changing the route to the destination 
if any disconnection by the attackers is found.  
In turn, the throughput on BADOV is very low; this is because BADOV does not 
include any strategy to avoid the black hole attacks. 
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Figure 5.21. Throughput results PGO-DLLA vs. AODV vs. BAODV  
Figure 5.22 shows the rate of packet loss results in a graphical representation among 
PGO-DLLA, BADOV and standard AODV. In this figure, it can be observed that the 
curve of packet loss result of BADOV is higher than PGO-DLLA and standard 
AODV, due to the mechanism of the BADOV routing protocol that does not contain a 
black hole avoiding technique.  
Meanwhile, the rate of packet loss result in PGO-DLLA is very low (better) after 60 
seconds and better than BADOV and standard AODV.  
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Figure 5.22. Packet Loss results PGO-DLLA vs. AODV vs. BAODV 
In conclusion, the proposed PGO-DLLA protocol demonstrates some improvement in 
the performance metrics, namely PDR, EtoE, throughput and PL against a cooperative 
black hole attack in a MANET that relies on the AODV routing protocol.  
The proposed PGO-DLLA modifies the standard AODV and optimizes the routing 
process by a technique of finding a prey and avoiding attacks that is inspired from the 
spider named daddy long-legs. The inspired technique of PGO-DLLA enhances the 
routing mechanism of AODV. Some changes in the routing tables is conducted to help 
in avoiding black hole attacks and avoiding the delay in routing.  
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The experimental results show that PGO-DLLA has improved the securing of AODV 
in preventing black hole attacks which leads to better performance metrics against 
standard AODV and BAODV. 
5.7 Performance Comparison of Proposed Protocols with Current Work 
This section presents the comparison of EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA 
protocols with the current prevention protocols against black hole attacks, which are 
based on the AODV protocol. The next sections discuss the theoretical framework and 
compare the graphical results [121], [122] of the proposed protocol with the current 
work. 
5.7.1 True-link Cross-checking Enhanced AODV Protocol (EDRIAODV) 
This section presents the first comparison between the proposed protocols ( EAODV, 
SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA) and true-link cross-checking enhanced AODV protocol 
(EDRIAODV) [83]. DRIAODV and EDRIAODV protocols have been proposed to 
enhance the performance of the AODV protocol in terms of the prevention of the 
cooperative black hole attack. However, the results of the proposed protocols (PGO-
DLLA, SSP-AODV and EAODV) are compared to DRIAODV and EDRIAODV 
protocols in terms of graphical frameworks. The main goal of DRIAODV and 
EDRIAODV protocols is to prevent the cooperative black hole attacks in order to 
reduce the End-to-End delay and routing overhead via modification in DRI-based 
cross-checking with true-link rendezvous phase by changing the existing AODV 
protocol scheme. They have proposed a new methodology by introducing Data 
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Routing Information (DRI) Table and cross- checking with true-link concept in 
preventing the cooperative black hole attacks with the modified AODV protocol. 
Figure 5.23 shows the system architecture of the DRIAODV and EDRIAODV 
protocols. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.23. The system architecture of the DRIAODV and EDRIAODV [83]. 
The increase of routing overhead via the process of cross-checking the intermediate 
nodes is the one of the drawbacks of this methodology. 
5.7.1.1 Comparison of Proposed Protocols with EDRIAODV Protocol 
In this section, the evaluation results and performance analysis are graphically 
compared with the same input parameter values and metrics such as packet delivery 
ratio, end-to-end delay, throughput and normalized routing load. The network 
simulator NS-2.33 [136], [142] is used to conduct the experiments of three scenarios. 
The first scenario is to test the original EAODV, the second scenario is to test SSP-
AODV, and the third scenario is to test PGO-DLLA. These scenarios are developed to 
carry out the tests using the mobility of the nodes in the network. The simulation 
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parameters for Scenario 1,2 and 3 are identical to the simulation parameters in [83] as 
shown in Table 5.7.  
Table 5.7 
The PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV, and EAODV Scenarios identical to the Scenarios in the 
Simulation of DRIAODV and EDRIAODV Protocols [83]. 
Parameter Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Simulation Time 200 sec. 200 sec. 200 sec. 
Number of Nodes 50 50 50 
Routing Protocol EAODV SSP-AODV PGO-DLLA 
Traffic Model CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) 
Pause Time 1 sec. 1 sec. 1 sec. 
Mobility Model Random way 
point 
Random way 
point 
Random way 
point 
No. of sources 3 3 3 
Map area 1000m x 1000m 1000m x 1000m 1000m x 1000m 
MAC Type 802.11 802.11 802.11 
Malicious Node Black hole Black hole Black hole 
    
 
The evaluation of the three routing protocols, EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA, 
includes two steps: firstly, the comparison between EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-
DLLA, and secondly, the comparison between EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-
DLLA with DRIAODV, EDRIAODV and AODV is using four metrics: End-to-End, 
Packet Delivery Ratio, Throughput and Normalized Routing Load. Figure 5.24 
illustrates the throughput result of six protocols EAODV, SSP-AODV, PGO-DLLA, 
DRIAODV and EDRIAODV [83]. It can be seen that PGO-DLLA increases the 
throughput when it increases the mobility. When EAODV and SSP-AODV are in a 
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lower mobility (0-10), they show better throughput than SSP-AODV, but in higher 
mobility (10-30) they show worst throughput as compared to SSP-AODV. In Figure 
5.24 can be noticed that PGO-DLLA is better than the original AODV, but 
approximately has the same result with DRIAODV and EDRIAODV. 
 
Figure 5.24. The throughput in various mobility models of proposed protocols 
EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA that are compared with DRIAODV, 
EDRIAODV and standard AODV protocol 
Figure 5.25 shows the Packet Delivery Ratio result of six protocols, the comparison of 
PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV and EAODV protocols, in which it can be seen that PGO-
DLLA increases the PDR value when it increases the mobility. However, EAODV in 
a lower mobility (0-15) shows the worst PDR than SSP-AODV, but in a higher 
mobility (20-30), it shows the best PDR matches to the value of SSP-AODV. Figure 
5.25 presents the comparison between three protocols, namely DRIAODV, 
EDRIAODV, and AODV. It can be noticed that PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV and 
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EAODV are better than the original AODV and have a better result from DRIAODV 
and EDRIAODV. 
 
Figure 5.25. The packet delivery ratio in various mobility models of proposed 
protocols EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA compared with DRIAODV, 
EDRIAODV and standard AODV protocol 
Figure 5.26 illustrates the Normalized Routing Load result of the protocols PGO-
DLLA, EAODV, and SSP-AODV. It can be seen that the two protocols, EAODV and 
SSP-AODV, increase the NRL value when the mobility increases. When PGO-DLLA 
is in a lower mobility, shows a lower NRL than EAODV and SSP-AODV. EAODV is 
better from SSP-AODV in the period between (0-5), but in a higher mobility (20-25), 
it shows the highest NRL as compared to SSP-AODV. Figure 5.26 demonstrate the 
comparison between three protocols, namely DRIAODV, EDRIAODV, and AODV.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
P
ac
ke
t 
d
e
le
ve
ry
 r
at
io
 (
%
) 
Mobility (m/s) 
EAODV SSP-AODV
PGO-DLLA AODV
DRIAODV EDRIAODV
   
150 
it can be noticed that PGO-DLLA is better than the three protocols, AODV, 
DRIAODV and EDRIAODV; and EAODV and SSP-AODV are better as well, 
especially in high mobility (25-30).  
Clearly this is because of the security that is used here, delaying respond of RREQ 
control messages in SSP-AODV, it can be stated that the NRL has some increase in the 
performance of the two protocols. 
 
Figure 5.26. The normalized routing overhead in various mobility models of proposed 
protocols EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA compared with DRIAODV, 
EDRIAODV and the standard AODV protocol 
Figure 5.27 illustrates the End-to-End delay result of five protocols, it can be seen that 
the three protocols, namely PGO-DLLA, EAODV and SPP-AODV, keep a lower 
delay time in spite of the increase of the mobility (0-30) in EAODV and SSP-AODV.  
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This is because of the heuristic search that is used as a new technique in these two 
protocols. Figure 5.27 displays the comparison between three protocols, DRIAODV, 
EDRIAODV, and AODV. It can be noticed that PGO-DLLA is still a better protocol 
and the two protocols EAODV and SSP-AODV (the delay is limited between (0-400)) 
are better than the three protocols AODV, DRIAODV and EDRIAODV (the delay is 
not limited (100-1800)).  
As a result, Figures 5.25, 5.26, and 5.27 shows the comparative results of Throughput, 
PDR, NRL, and End-to-End delay. In terms of normalized routing load, PDR, and the 
average End-to-End delay. It can be stated that there has been some improvement in 
PGO-DLLA, EAODV and SSP-AODV protocols in low mobility and the average 
delay in most changes of mobility as shown in Figure 5.27. The results of the 
comparison between the two protocols, DRIAODV and EDRIAODV, with the 
standard AODV protocol in term of average delay. As a result, it triggers a black hole 
attack in MANET. The three protocols, PGO-DLLA, EAODV and SSP-AODV, has 
improved the network performance compared with the original AODV and the 
DRIAODV and EDRIAODV protocols. 
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Figure 5.27. The average delay in various mobility models of proposed protocols 
EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA Compared with DRIAODV, EDRIAODV and 
standard AODV protocol 
5.7.2 Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector Protocol (SAODV) 
This section presents the second comparison between the proposed protocols 
(EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA) and one of the black hole attack prevention 
methodology that is proposed in enhancing the AODV routing protocol named Secure 
Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (SAODV), and Bad Ad-hoc On-demand Distance 
Vector (BAODV) [84].  
In this method, a proposed secure ad hoc on-demand distance vector (SAODV) [84], 
uses multiple paths to find the destination node. The source node stores several 
information for analysis using some new fields in the routing table.  
The proposed method has two phases, suspicion phase and confirmation phase. In the 
first phase, the authors stand on two facts; unusually higher DSN, and fast respond by 
RREP without delay. Depending on the average values of all response times to the 
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RREP by intermediate nodes, the authors have compared the anomaly of the delay 
time to respond in RREP and makes the suspect node list.  
In the second phase, the authors created the new control messages named; Modify 
Route Request (MREQ), and Modify Route Reply (MREP). Using the different 
random numbers that are inserted in MERQ, the new method checks if any black hole 
node is found inside the network. In addition, the method also suffers the delay when 
the source node is waiting to make a decision on selecting the proper path to the 
destination node. 
5.7.2.1 Comparison of Proposed Protocols with SAODV Protocol 
In this section, the evaluation results and performance analysis are graphically 
compared with the same input parameter values and metrics such as packet delivery 
ratio, and throughput. The network simulator NS-2.33 [136], [142] is used to conduct 
the experiments of three scenarios. The first scenario is to test the original EAODV, 
the second scenario is to test SSP-AODV, and the third scenario is to test PGO-DLLA. 
These scenarios are developed to carry out the tests using various numbers of nodes 
and various speeds of the nodes in the network. The simulation parameters for 
Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 are identical to the simulation parameters in [84] as shown in 
Table 5.8.   
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Table 5.8 
The PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV, and EAODV Scenarios Identical to Scenario in the 
Simulation of SAODV Protocol [84] . 
Parameter Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Simulation Time 50 sec. 50 sec. 50 sec. 
Number of Nodes 20 20 20 
Routing Protocol EAODV SSP-AODV PGO-DLLA 
Traffic Model CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) 
Pause Time 1 sec. 1 sec. 1 sec. 
Mobility Model Random way point Random way point Random way point 
No. of sources 1 1 1 
Map area 750m x 750m 750m x 750m 750m x 750m 
MAC Type 802.11 802.11 802.11 
Malicious Node Black hole Black hole Black hole 
 
The evaluation of three routing protocols, namely EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-
DLLA, includes two steps: firstly, the comparison between EAODV, SSP-AODV and 
PGO-DLLA, and secondly, the comparison between EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-
DLLA with SAODV, BAODV and AODV is using two metrics, Packet Delivery 
Ratio and Throughput.  
Figure 5.28 illustrates the PDR result of three proposed and the comparison between 
SAODV and BAODV. It can be seen that PGO-DLLA increases the PDR when the 
number of nodes increases. When EAODV and SSP-AODV are in a lower number of 
nodes (0-30), they show better PDR, while in a higher number of nodes (40-50), they 
shows the worst PDR compared to PGO-DLLA. It can be noticed that PGO-DLLA is 
better than the original AODV, but approximately has the same result with SAODV. 
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Figure 5.28. The packet delivery ratio in various numbers of nodes in proposed 
protocols EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA to compare with SAODV, BAODV 
and standard AODV protocol 
Figure 5.29 shows the throughput of six protocols, where in Figure 5.29, it shows the 
comparison of PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV and EAODV protocols. It can be seen that 
the three protocols, PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV and EAODV, are increase the TH when 
the number of nodes increases.  
However, EAODV and SSP-AODV in a lower TH (40-60) kbps between (25-30) 
numbers of nodes is the worst TH than PGO-DLLA’s (80-120) kbps. The higher TH 
in the three protocols is registered at (40-50) number of nodes. It can be noticed that 
the TH in PGO-DLLA is between (80-160) kbps, SSP-AODV (60-80) kbps and 
EAODV (40-65) kbps, which are better than BAODV’s (20-40) kbps, very close to 
SAODV (100-160) kbps, except the original AODV, which is between (110-190) 
kbps. 
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Figure 5.29. Throughput in various numbers of nodes of proposed protocols EAODV, 
SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA compared with SAODV, BAODV and standard AODV 
protocol 
Figure 5.30 shows the packet delivery ratio of six protocols with various node speeds. It 
can be seen that the three protocols, namely PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV and EAODV, 
increase the PDF when the speed of nodes increases because of the use of the heuristic 
search algorithm.  
However, EAODV and SSP-AODV in lower PDF (80%-90%) between (0-5) m/s is the 
worst PDF than PGO-DLLA (95%-99%).The higher PDF in the three protocol is 
registered at (10-30) m/s.  
It can be seen that the PDF in PGO-DLLA is between (95%-99%), SSP-AODV (90%-
95%) and EAODV (80%-95%), which are better than BAODV (10%-30%), very close 
to SAODV (79%-90%) and the standard AODV which is between (85%-96%). 
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Figure 5.30. The packet delivery percentage in various nodes speed of proposed 
protocols EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA compared with SAODV, BAODV 
and standard AODV protocol 
Figure 5.31 shows the TH of six protocols with various node speeds. It can be seen 
that not all the three protocols increase the TH when the speed of nodes increases 
(only the PGO-DLLA increases the TH) because of the use of a meta-heuristic search 
algorithm.  
However, EAODV and SSP-AODV in a lower TH (30-50) kbps between (35-40) m/s 
is the worst TH than PGO-DLLA’s (60-85) kbps. The higher TH in the two protocols 
(EAODV and SSP-AODV) is registered at (35-40) m/s for EAODV and at (5-10) m/s 
for SSP-AODV. Figure 5.31 shows the comparison between the three protocols 
(SAODV, BAODV, and AODV). It can be seen that the TH in PGO-DLLA, SSP-
AODV and EAODV are better than BAODV’s (15-25) kbps, and only PGO-DLLA is 
very close to SAODV’s (60-80) kbps, and the standard AODV’s TH is between (75-
90) kbps. 
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Figure 5.31. The Throughput in various nodes speed of proposed protocols EAODV, 
SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA compared with SAODV, BAODV and standard AODV 
protocol 
5.7.3 Impact of Black Hole and Gray Hole Attacks in AODV Protocol (IAODV) 
In this work, a real time anomaly detection based algorithm is implemented. The 
authors proposed an improvement in the AODV routing protocol in preventing black 
and gray hole attacks.  
It is a type of malicious node attack in MANET, it should be honest in at the first 
time, and then it changes behavior as a malicious node such as black hole attack. The 
authors concluded that in order to stop the black and the gray hole attacks, the 
prevention techniques should be implemented to identify the malicious node at route 
identification phase only. The adaptive protocol (IAODV) is proposed to implement 
the black and the gray hole attacks in the AODV protocol, and it is designed to 
prevent the malicious node attack.  
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This technique depends on the well-known fact that the malicious node tries to take 
the advantage by sending the first RREP with a higher destination sequence number 
and a minimum hop count. In reality, the IAODV protocol and AODV are the same 
protocol with some changes in the original mechanism of route discovery by not 
responding to the first RREP that comes to the source node in the IAODV protocol 
[79]. 
5.7.3.1 Comparison of Proposed Protocols with IAODV Protocol 
In this section, the evaluation results and performance analysis are graphically 
compared with the same input parameter values and metrics such as packet drop ratio, 
throughput and normalized routing load.  
The first scenario is to test the original EAODV, the second scenario is to test SSP-
AODV, and the third scenario is to test PGO-DLLA. These scenarios are developed to 
carry out the tests using the mobility of the nodes in the network. The simulation 
parameters for Scenario 1,2 and 3 are identical to the simulation parameters in [79] as 
shown in Table 5.9.  
 
 
 
. 
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Table 5.9 
The PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV, and EAODV Scenarios identical to the Scenarios in the 
Simulation of IAODV Protocol [79]. 
Parameter Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Simulation Time 500 sec. 500 sec. 500 sec. 
Number of 
Nodes 
15,30,45,60,75 15,30,45,60,75 15,30,45,60,75 
Routing Protocol EAODV SSP-AODV PGO-DLLA 
Traffic Model CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) 
Pause Time 
0, 30, 60, 90, 120, 
150 sec. 
0, 30, 60, 90, 120, 
150 sec. 
0, 30, 60, 90, 120, 
150 sec. 
Mobility Model Random way point Random way point Random way point 
Max. Speed 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 m/s 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 m/s 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 m/s 
Map area 750m x 750m 750m x 750m 750m x 750m 
MAC Type 802.11 802.11 802.11 
Malicious Node Black hole Black hole Black hole 
    
                                                                                                                                     
The evaluation of the three routing protocols, EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA, 
includes two steps: firstly, the comparison between EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-
DLLA, secondly, the comparison between EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA 
with IAODV and AODV using four metrics: Packet Drop Ratio, Throughput and 
Normalized routing load.  
Figure 5.32 illustrates the PDR result of the three proposed protocols, and shows the 
comparison between IAODV and BAODV. It can be seen that PGO-DLLA increases 
the PDR when the speed increases except when the speed is (5-10) and (30-40). PGO-
DLLA, EAODV and SSP-AODV have better PDR values than the PDR of BAODV, 
whereas only PGO-DLLA is better than IAODV. The PDR values of EAODV and 
SSP-AODV are compared with IAODV, which have approximately the same result. 
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Figure 5.32. The packet delivery ratio in various nodes speed of proposed protocols 
EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA compared with IAODV and BAODV protocol 
Figure 5.33 shows the NRL of six protocols with various node speed, and shows the 
comparison of PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV and EAODV protocols. It can be seen that 
not all the three protocols increases the NRL when the speed of nodes increases. 
However, EAODV and SSP-AODV in lower NRL between 2.4, 2.6  at 10 m/s is the 
worst NRL than PGO-DLLA 0.9 at 20 m/s. The higher NRL 3.1 in the two protocols 
EAODV and SSP-AODV is registered at 5 m/s because the speed is very slow, as for 
PGO-DLLA, the higher NRL 1.4 is found at the speed 30 m/s because the ability of 
dynamic adaptive to recalculate a new path. Figure 5.33 shows the comparison 
between two protocols IAODV and BAODV, and the result shows that the IAODV 
protocol outperforms the BAODV protocol when it registers the very low NRL as 
compared to the black hole AODV. However, it can be seen that there is some 
improvement in all of the proposed protocols with the BAODV protocol. They have 
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better NRL than BAODV, and the NRL in SSP-AODV and EAODV are close to the 
IAODV protocol even in the high speed because of the heuristic algorithm. Figure 
5.33 shows the graphical comparison between the proposed protocols with various 
speed and the impact of black hole and gray hole attacks in the AODV protocol 
IAODV in terms of NRL. 
 
Figure 5.33. Normalized routing load in various speed of proposed protocols 
EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA compared with IAODV and BAODV protocol 
Figure 5.34 shows the TH of five protocols with various node speed. In Figure 5.34 
shows the comparison of PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV and EAODV protocols, it  can be 
seen that not all the three protocols increase the TH when the speed of nodes 
increases. However, EAODV and SSP-AODV in lower TH in high speed between 
(30-40) m/s, while PGO-DLLA in higher TH are between the same time of speed 
improves the ability to be adaptive with high speed nodes.  
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The higher TH 45 kbps of the two protocols EAODV and SSP-AODV is registered 
between 10-30 m/s. Figure 5.34 shows the comparison between the two protocols 
IAODV and BAODV, and the result shows that the IAODV protocol outperforms the 
BAODV protocol when it registers the very high TH as compared to the black hole 
AODV. However, When the proposed protocols PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV and 
EAODV with the same metric (TH), it can be seen that there some improvement in all 
of the proposed protocols with the BAODV protocol. They have better TH than 
BAODV at the beginning of the simulation and less down at the final simulation. 
PGO-DLLA performs in TH at time 40 of speed because the parallel swarm 
optimization algorithm avoids the malicious nodes, except in the beginning of the 
simulation IAODV protocol is better.  
 
Figure 5.34. The throughput in various speed of proposed protocols EAODV, SSP-
AODV and PGO-DLLA compared with IAODV and BAODV protocol 
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Figure 5.34 shows the graphical comparison between the proposed protocols with 
various speed and the impact of black hole and gray hole attacks in the AODV 
protocol IAODV in terms of TH. The next comparison with the IAODV protocol in 
the same performance metrics with various pause timed and number of nodes are 
shown in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 
Comparison Result of EAODV, SSP-AODV, and PGO-DLLA Protocols with IAODV 
and Standard AODV Protocol      Best       Average      Bad. 
 
Speed No. of Nodes Pause Time 
EA SSP PGO IA BA EA SSP PGO IA BA EA SSP PGO IA BA 
PDR                
NRL                
TH                
 
Table 5.10 displays the comparison of the proposed protocols with the current work of 
the IAODV protocol, where the pink color shows the best protocol performance, the 
green color shows the average protocol performance or close to the best protocol 
performance, and the gray color is the bad result of protocol performance. In the 
experiments of various number of nodes in Figures 5.35, 5.36, and 5.37 respectively, 
Figures 5.35 is in terms of PDR, and Figures 5.37 is in terms of TH, which shows that 
PGO-DLLA is the best protocol while Figures 5.36 shows that PGO-DLLA is very 
close to the best protocol performance of the IAODV protocol’s performance.       
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Figure 5.35. Normalized routing load with various pause times of EAODV, SSP-
AODV and PGO-DLLA Compared with IAODV and BAODV Protocol 
 
 
Figure 5.36. Normalized routing load with various number of nodes of EAODV, SSP-
AODV and PGO-DLLA compared with IAODV and BAODV protocol 
In the experiments of various numbers of pause times, Figures 5.35, 5.36, and 5.37 are in 
terms of PDR, NRL and TH, which show that PGO-DLLA is the best protocol, the 
IAODV protocol is very close to the best protocol performance, and the BAODV 
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protocol is the bad protocol performance because of the existence of black hole nodes 
without the security algorithm. 
 
Figure 5.37. The throughput in various numbers of nodes of EAODV, SSP-AODV 
and PGO-DLLA compared with IAODV and BAODV protocol 
 
Figure 5.38. Packet delivery ratio in various pause time of EAODV, SSP-AODV and 
PGO-DLLA compared with IAODV and BAODV protocol 
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Figure 5.39. The packet delivery ratio in various numbers of nodes of EAODV, SSP-
AODV and PGO-DLLA compared with IAODV and BAODV protocol 
 
Figure 5.40. The throughput in various numbers of nodes of EAODV, SSP-AODV 
and PGO-DLLA compared with IAODV and BAODV protocol 
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5.7.4 Fuzzy-Based Intrusion Detection Protocol (Fuzzy-IDs) 
In this paper, the authors proposed an intrusion detection system to prevent the black 
hole attacks in MANET. The new proposed system is integrated with fuzzy logic in 
the AODV protocol to improve it against the malicious nodes in the black hole attack. 
They suggested a new fuzzy model that consists of four parts: part one is a parameter 
extraction, part two is a computation part, the verification is part three, and part four is 
the alarm packet generation as shown in Figure 5.41.   
 
Figure 5.41. The system architecture of the Fuzzy-IDS protocol (adopt from [88]) 
In this method, the four components cooperate to detect the black hole attack. In the 
first part, the fuzzy parameter extraction extracts the information from the monitoring 
neighboring nodes to collect the parameters that are required for the analysis of the 
network traffic. Also, in this part, the neighbor table has fields for storing the values 
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of forward packet ratio, average destination sequence and number of fidelity level. In 
the second part, fuzzy computation is extracted to the fidelity level of the information 
that comes from the first part (fuzzy parameter extraction). Many rule bases will be 
used to evaluate the fidelity level values in the table of fuzzy rule base as shown in 
Table 5.11.  
Table 5.11 
The Fuzzy Rule Base (adopted from [88]). 
 
Forward Packet 
Ratio 
Average Destination 
Sequence Number  
Fidelity Level 
1 LOW LOW LOW 
2 LOW MEDIUM LOW 
3 LOW HIGH LOW 
4 MEDIUM LOW MEDIUM 
5 MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM 
6 MEDIUM HIGH LOW 
7 HIGH LOW HIGH 
8 HIGH MEDIUM HIGH 
9 HIGH HIGH LOW 
    
 
In fuzzy rule base, Rule 1, for example, extracted the low fidelity level because the 
forward packet ratio and average destination sequence number are low. While, in Rule 
8, the fidelity level is high because the forward packet ratio is high and the average 
destination sequence number is medium.   
5.7.4.1 Comparison of Proposed Protocols with Fuzzy-IDs Protocol 
In this section, a comparison between the proposed protocols (AODV, SSP-AODV, 
and PGO-DLLA) and the current work named Fuzzy-IDs protocol is performed. The 
evaluation results and performance analysis are compared graphically with the same 
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simulation parameter of Fuzzy-IDs protocol and the same performance metrics which 
had been used in these experiments (packet delivery ratio, routing overhead, and end-
to-end delay). The network simulator NS-2.33 [136], [142] is used to conduct the 
experiments of three scenarios. The first scenario is to test the original EAODV, the 
second scenario is to test SSP-AODV, and the third scenario is to test PGO-DLLA. 
These scenarios are developed to carry out the tests using the various speed of 
mobility and number of nodes. The simulation parameters for Scenario 1,2 and 3 are 
identical to the simulation parameters in [88] as shown in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.12 
The PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV, and EAODV Scenarios identical to the Scenarios in the 
Simulation of Fuzzy-IDs Protocol [88]. 
Parameter Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Simulation Time 200 sec. 200 sec. 200 sec. 
Number of Nodes 50 50 50 
Routing Protocol EAODV SSP-AODV PGO-DLLA 
Traffic Model CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) 
Pause Time 1 sec. 1sec. 1 sec. 
Mobility Model Random way point Random way point Random way point 
Max. Speed 10 to 70 m/s 10 to 70 m/s 10 to 70 m/s 
Map area 1000m x 1000m 1000m x 1000m 1000m x 1000m 
MAC Type 802.11 802.11 802.11 
Malicious Node Black hole Black hole Black hole 
 
The evaluation of the three routing protocols, namely EAODV, SSP-AODV and 
PGO-DLLA, includes two steps: firstly, the comparison between EAODV, SSP-
AODV and PGO-DLLA, and secondly, the comparison between EAODV, SSP-
AODV and PGO-DLLA with Fuzzy-IDs and standard AODV protocols is using three 
metrics: packet delivery ratio, routing overhead, and the end-to-end delay. Figures 
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5.42 and 5.43 illustrate the PDR result of the three proposed protocols and Fuzzy-IDs 
protocol where the mobility and number of nodes vary.  
 
Figure 5.42. Packet delivery ratio in various mobility EAODV, SSP-AODV and 
PGO-DLLA protocols compared with Fuzzy-IDs and BAODV protocol 
 
 
Figure 5.43. Packet delivery ratio in various numbers of nodes EAODV, SSP-AODV, 
and PGO-DLLA protocol compared with Fuzzy-IDs and BAODV protocol 
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Figures 5.44 and 5.45 illustrate the routing overhead result of the three proposed 
protocols and Fuzzy-IDs protocol where the mobility and number of nodes vary. 
 
Figure 5.44. Routing overhead in various mobility of EAODV, SSP-AODV, and 
PGO-DLLA protocol compared with Fuzzy-IDs and BAODV protocol 
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Figure 5.45. Routing overhead in various number of nodes of EAODV, SSP-AODV, 
and PGO-DLLA protocol compared with Fuzzy-IDs and BAODV protocol 
Figures 5.46 and 5.47 illustrate the End-to-End delay result of the three proposed 
protocols and Fuzzy-IDs protocol where the mobility and number of nodes vary. 
 
Figure 5.46. The average end-to-end delay in various mobility of EAODV, SSP-
AODV, and PGO-DLLA protocol compared with Fuzzy-IDs and BAODV protocol 
 
Figure 5.47. The average end-to-end delay in various numbers of nodes of EAODV, 
SSP-AODV, and PGO-DLLA protocol compared with Fuzzy-IDs and BAODV 
protocol 
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Table 5.13 demonstrates the comparison of the proposed protocols with the current 
work of the Fuzzy-IDs protocol, where the pink color shows the best protocol 
performance, the green color shows the average protocol performance or close to the 
best protocol performance, and the gray color is the bad result of protocol 
performance. In the experiments of packet delivery ratio with various mobility and 
various numbers of nodes in Figures 5.42 and 5.43 respectively, the proposed protocol 
PGO-DLLA is the only one best for various mobility. Figures 5.44 and 5.45 show the 
routing overhead protocol performance with various mobility and various numbers of 
nodes respectively. The proposed protocol PGO-DLLA is the best protocol. Figures 
5.46 and 5.47, in terms of End-to-End Delay, show that PGO-DLLA is the best 
protocol performance of Fuzzy-IDs protocol performance. 
Table 5.13 
Comparison Result of EAODV, SSP-AODV, and PGO-DLLA Protocols with FUZZY-
IDs and Standard AODV Protocol      Best      Average        Bad 
 
Speed No. of Nodes 
EAODV 
SSP-
AODV 
PGO-
DLLA 
FUZZY BAD EAODV 
SSP-
AODV 
PGO-
DLLA 
FUZZY BAD 
PDR           
RO           
E2E           
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5.7.5 Swarm Based Intrusion Detection Protocol (SBDT) 
Swarm based Intrusion Detection and Defense Technique (SBDT) [89] is one of the 
last published works and has been chosen in order to compare the results of the 
implementation proposal with the SBDT of previous experiments in the same 
environment. In this technique, the nodes with the highest trust value, residual 
bandwidth and residual energy are selected as active nodes using swarm intelligence-
based ant colony optimization. In this paper, the authors proposed a multiple path 
technique to detect and prevent the black hole attack by transmitting data using the 
swarm intelligence of ant colony optimization. They used the monitoring neighboring 
nodes to collect the trusted value for each node inside the transmission range. In this 
technique, the malicious nodes have a minimum trusted value compared with the 
threshold. The threshold value will be ordered to select the legitimate path (safety 
path without black hole attack) to the destination node. The authors used a threshold 
cryptography to find the trusted value of the neighboring nodes. However, this 
technique may suffer from the higher routing overhead because the keys are generated 
and sub keys are used to make cryptography for trusting level.  
5.7.5.1 Comparison of Proposed Protocols with SBDT Protocols 
In this section, a comparison between the proposed protocols (AODV, SSP-AODV, 
and PGO-DLLA) is performed and the current work of the SBDT protocol. The 
evaluation results and performance analysis are compared graphically with the same 
simulation parameter of the SBDT protocol and the same performance metrics which 
had been used in these experiments (packet delivery ratio, packet lost, and end-to-end 
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delay). The network simulator NS-2.33 [136], [142] is used to conduct the 
experiments of three scenarios. The first scenario is to test the original EAODV, the 
second scenario is to test SSP-AODV, and the third scenario is to test PGO-DLLA. 
These scenarios are developed to carry out the tests using the various numbers of 
attackers and various numbers of nodes. The simulation parameters for Scenario 1,2 
and 3 are identical to the simulation parameters in [89] as shown in Table 5.14. 
Table 5.14 
The PGO-DLLA, SSP-AODV, and EAODV Scenarios identical to the Scenarios in the 
Simulation of SBDT [89] . 
Parameter Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Simulation Time 50 sec. 50 sec. 50 sec. 
Number of Nodes 20, 40, 60, 80, and 
100 
20, 40, 60, 80, and 
100 
20, 40, 60, 80, and 
100 
Routing Protocol EAODV SSP-AODV PGO-DLLA 
Traffic Model CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) CBR(UDP) 
Pause Time 1 sec. 1sec. 1 sec. 
Mobility Model Random way point Random way point Random way point 
Max. Speed 10 m/s 10 m/s 10 m/s 
Map area 1000m x 1000m 1000m x 1000m 1000m x 1000m 
MAC Type 802.11 802.11 802.11 
Number of 
Attackers 
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
    
 
The evaluation of the three routing protocols, namely EAODV, SSP-AODV and 
PGO-DLLA, includes two steps: firstly, the comparison between EAODV, SSP-
AODV and PGO-DLLA, and secondly, the comparison between EAODV, SSP-
AODV and PGO-DLLA with the SBDT protocol and the black hole AODV protocol 
using three metrics: packet delivery ratio, packet lost, and the end-to-end delay.  
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Figures 5.48, 5.49 and 5.50 illustrate the PDR, PL, and EtoE delay results of the three 
proposed protocols and the SBDT protocol where the numbers of attackers vary.  
 
Figure 5.48. The packet delivery ratio in various numbers of attackers of EAODV, 
SSP-AODV, and PGO-DLLA protocol compared with SBDT protocol 
 
Figure 5.49. The average end-to-end delay in various numbers of attackers of 
EAODV, SSP-AODV, and PGO-DLLA protocol compared with SBDT protocol 
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Figure 5.50. The packet loss results in various numbers of attackers of EAODV, SSP-
AODV, and PGO-DLLA protocol compared with SBDT protocol 
The evaluation of EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA protocols with the SBDT 
protocol includes two graphical comparisons. The first comparison is the comparison 
between EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA, with SBDT in various numbers of 
attackers as shown in Figures 5.48, 5.49, and 5.50. The second comparison is the 
comparison between EAODV, SSP-AODV and PGO-DLLA, with SBDT in various 
numbers of  nodes as shown in Figures 5.51, 5.52, and 5.53. The comparison among 
which the best, average and worst protocol performance between EAODV, SSP-
AODV and PGO-DLLA with the SBDT protocol and the black hole AODV protocol 
uses three metrics: packet delivery ratio, packet lost, and the end-to-end delay which 
are illustrated in Table 5.15. 
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Figure 5.51. The packet delivery ratio in various numbers of nodes of EAODV, SSP-
AODV, and PGO-DLLA protocol compared with DBST protocol 
 
Figure 5.52. The average end-to-end delay in various numbers of nodes of EAODV, 
SSP-AODV, and PGO-DLLA protocol compared with DBST protocol 
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Figure 5.53. The packet loss in various numbers of nodes of EAODV, SSP-AODV, 
and PGO-DLLA protocol compared with DBST protocol 
Table 5.15 demonstrates the comparisons of the proposed protocols with the current 
work of the SBDT protocol, where the pink color shows the best protocol 
performance, the green color shows the average protocol performance or close to the 
best protocol performance, and the gray color is the worst result of protocol 
performance. In the experiments of packet delivery ratio with various numbers of 
attackers and various numbers of nodes in Figures 5.48 and 5.51 respectively, the 
proposed protocol PGO-DLLA is the best protocol performance. Figures 5.50 and 
5.51 shows the packet loss of protocol performance during the simulation with 
various numbers of attackers’ mobility and various numbers of nodes respectively. 
The DBST protocol is the best protocol and the proposed protocol PGO-DLLA had an 
average result to the DBST protocol. Figures 5.49 and 5.52 in terms of End-to-End 
Delay show that PGO-DLLA is the best protocol performance from the DBST 
protocol performance. 
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Table 5.15 
Comparison Result of EAODV, SSP-AODV, and PGO-DLLA Protocols with SBDS 
and Standard AODV Protocol        Best       Average         Bad 
 
Number of Attackers No. of Nodes 
EAODV 
SSP-
AODV 
PGO-
DLLA 
SBDS BAD EAODV 
SSP-
AODV 
PGO-
DLLA 
SBDS BAD 
PDR           
PL           
Delay           
 
5.8 Summary 
This chapter provides an experimental trial in the parameters that affect the 
characteristic behaviors of a mobile ad hoc network; the network size and mobility. 
The pre-test or experiment for the size of the network has achieved in terms of the 
number of nodes’ optimal setting for the standard AODV by performance metrics that 
affect network size. The mobility has been discussed in various experiments with 
different metrics and pause times to examine the effect of dynamic topology. The 
offered network load is defined as the actual load that supports the network. End-to-
End delay and packet delivery ratio are compared in order to determine the best effort 
traffic. The routing load metric, such as normalized routing load, evaluates the 
efficiency of the routing protocol. However, after the tests of the experimental AODV 
with different models, the results of the optimal setting of network parameters showed 
the improvement of the shortest and secure routing from black hole attack in MANET. 
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                                                                                      CHAPTER SIX
THE CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1 Introduction 
Designing a new AODV protocol based on artificial intelligence techniques in 
preventing black hole attacks is the main goal of this thesis. The work can be divided 
into two parts to achieve the main goal; first, this thesis used the heuristic search 
algorithm as a local search to improve the shortest path from source to destination 
node.  
Second, this thesis used the parallel technique to achieve the prevention of black hole 
nodes and improve the routing security. The next section summarizes the conclusion 
drawn from the experiments and results discussed in Chapter Six, while the following 
section suggests the directions for future work.    
6.2 Research Contribution 
There are three basic contributions of this thesis. The first contribution is finding the 
best search method to enhance the shortest path to the destination. The hop count is the 
number of hops needed to reach the destination, so they minimize the hop count, which 
means the shortest path.  
Basically, when there are two paths to the destination, the shortest one is the safest 
path. The combination of the heuristic search algorithm with the AODV route 
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discovery as the search method is the best approach in finding the shortest path to the 
destination. The first algorithm is the heuristic search algorithm A*.  
However, this search algorithm does not give the best performance in the dynamic 
search environment because it used an estimated location value in the initial start and it 
needs to a classical method such as hash chain function to enhance the prevention 
against the black hole nodes.  
Using the Floyd-Warshall's algorithm will enhance the dynamic search discovery, but 
it will increase the routing overhead. The second proposed SSP-AODV protocol is 
based on a new technique by waiting the duplicated response from intermediate nodes 
about the path to the destination to avoid the black hole attacks.  
Experiments in Chapter Five found that SSP-AODV performed better than EAODV in 
preventing the black hole attack, but it still needs to improve the search discovery. One 
of the important contributions of this thesis is the proposed improved routing discovery 
based on the meta-heuristic algorithms.  
VDLLA is an inspired algorithm from the nature of a spider named daddy long-legs, 
which works as a swarm of agents (8-legs) algorithm. The third proposal is a parallel 
grid optimization using the virtual daddy long-legs algorithm (PGO-DLLA), VDLLA 
is integrated with the AODV routing protocol to optimize the shortest and secure path. 
As a conclusion, PGO-DLLA is able to improve the route discovery against the black 
hole attacks in AODV. Experiments in this thesis have shown that PGO-DLLA is able 
to reduce the normalized routing load, end-to-end delay, and packet loss and has a 
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good throughput and packet delivery ratio when compared with the standard AODV 
protocol, BAODV protocol, and five current protocols that enhanced the routing 
security of the AODV protocols. 
6.3 Objectives of the Research 
The objectives of this research are to investigate the issues related to AODV’s current 
mechanism in terms of secure routing and to develop a new mechanism to prevent 
single and cooperative black hole attacks in AODV’s route discovery. 
1. First objective: To design a new algorithm to prevent single and cooperative black 
hole attacks in the AODV protocol by achieving three sub objectives: 
a) Improving the route discovery (RREQ and RREP) through a heuristic search 
algorithm, to enhance the shortest path technique in the routing mechanism. 
This sub-objective is achieved by developing the Enhanced Ad hoc On-
demand Distance Vector protocol (EAODV), as Chapter Four Section 4.2 has 
explained. 
b) Testing the new technique with trusted and malicious environments and 
comparing the results with those of the original AODV. To achieve this sub 
objective, pre-test experiments of the AODV protocol in hostile and peaceful 
environments has been conducted, as Chapter Five Section 5.2 has explained.     
c) Improving the route discovery by using a meta-heuristic algorithm to enhance 
finding the shortest and most secure path to the destination. This sub objective 
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is integrating the meta-heuristic search algorithm in routing discovery to 
prevent the cooperative black hole attacks.  
This sub objective is achieved by developing the Shortest Secure Path for Ad 
hoc On-demand Distance Vector protocol (SSP-AODV), as Chapter Four 
Section 4.3 has explained, and the Parallel Grid Optimization by Daddy Long-
Legs Algorithm (PGO-DLLA), as Chapter Four Section 4.4 has explained.   
2. Second objective: To implement the proposed algorithm in preventing black hole 
attacks and to evaluate its performance in the simulated environment. The second 
objective is related to implementing the developed protocol.  
To achieve this objective, the experiments using NS2 simulator have been conducted 
to check the EAODV and SSP-AODV protocols with five performance metrics (PL, 
EtoE, PDR, NRL, and TH), as Chapter Five Sections 5.3 and 5.4 have explained.  
In addition, more than one hundred and eighty experiments using the NS2 simulator 
have been carried out to check the PGO-DLLA protocol with the performance metrics 
(PL, EtoE, PDR, and TH), as Chapter Five Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 have explained.  
3. Third objective: To evaluate the effect of the proposed algorithm in terms of 
validation based on the simulation results and then comparing it with the original 
AODV.  
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4. This objective is achieved by the results gained from the simulation experiments 
of the developer protocol and the comparisons of EAODV, SSP-AODV, and PGO-
DLLA and related works as well, as Chapter Five Sections 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 have 
explained. 
6.4 Future Work 
In future, it is suggested to test the performance of preventing the malicious attacks on 
most difficult environments in MANETs, with huge numbers of attackers, since this 
study has only focused on medium difficult environments. More difficult environments 
may cause more routing overhead.  
On the other hand, a study on the enhancement of the route discovery in the AODV 
routing protocol could also be done in the route discovery on all the on-demand 
routing protocols, especially that they share the same properties and the same 
malicious attacks.  
Future work also can enhance the proposed AODV, SSP-AODV, and PGO-DLLA 
protocols to cope with other attacks such as worm hole attack or gray hole attack that 
are also shared in some features of attacks with black hole attacks.  
Although the proposed protocols have been designed to prevent black hole attacks in 
the AODV protocol using some of the heuristic search algorithms, it is also interesting 
to adapt other techniques to prevent black hole attacks.  
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For future work, it is suggested to apply VDLLA to solve a few NP-hard optimization 
problems (such as traveling salesman), besides the ability to gain a good result in some 
fields such as the security optimization problems, network routing algorithm, and 
dynamic grid computing algorithm.  
However, it has been planned to examine the enforcement of additional complex 
attacks. Furthermore, it has been planned to apply PGO-VDLLA in the fields of 
robotic research such as the robotic system in medicine, engineering, and space 
discovery. 
 
 188 
REFERENCES 
[1] J. Zutt, A. J. C. van Gemund, M. M. de Weerdt, and C. Witteveen, “Dealing with 
Uncertainty in Operational Transport Planning,” in Intelligent Infrastructures, vol. 42, 
R. R. Negenborn, Z. Lukszo, and H. Hellendoorn, Eds. Springer, 2010, pp. 355–382. 
[2] L. Tamilselvan and V. Sankaranarayanan, “Prevention of Co-operative Black Hole 
Attack in MANET,” J. Networks, vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 13–20, May 2008. 
[3] D. Medhi and K. Ramasamy, Network Routing Algorithms, Protocols, and 
Architectures. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers is an imprint of Elsevier, 2010, p. 848. 
[4] S. Agrawal, S. Jain, and S. Sharma, “A Survey of Routing Attacks and Security 
Measures in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks,” arXiv Prepr. arXiv1105.5623, 2011. 
[5] C. Perkins, Elding-Royer, and S. Das, “Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
Routing,” IETF RFC 3561, pp. 1–37, 2003. 
[6] C. Perkins, E. Royer, S. R. Das, and M. K. Marina, “Performance Comparison of Two 
On-demand Routing Protocols for Ad hoc Networks,” IEEE Pers. Commun., vol. 8, 
no. 1, pp. 16–28, 2001. 
[7] D. B. Johnson and D. A. Maltz, Dynamic Source Routing in Ad Hoc Wireless 
Networks. Springer, 1996, pp. 153–181. 
[8] L. Zhou and Z. J. Haas, “Securing Ad Hoc Networks,” Network, IEEE, vol. 13, no. 6, 
pp. 24–30, 1999. 
[9] C.-K. Toh, “Associativity-based Routing for Ad Hoc Mobile Networks,” Wirel. Pers. 
Commun., vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 103–139, 1997. 
[10] V. D. Park and M. S. Corson, “A Highly Adaptive Distributed Routing Algorithm for 
Mobile Wireless Networks,” in INFOCOM’97. Sixteenth Annual Joint Conference of 
the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Driving the Information 
Revolution., Proceedings IEEE, 1997, vol. 3, pp. 1405–1413. 
[11] I. Chakeres and C. Perkins, “Dynamic MANET On-demand (DYMO) Routing,” 
Draft. (work progress), 2008. 
[12] E. M. Royer and C.-K. Toh, “A Review of Current Routing Protocols for Ad Hoc 
Mobile Wireless Networks,” Pers. Commun. IEEE, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 46–55, 1999. 
[13] S.-J. Lee, M. Gerla, and C.-K. Toh, “A Simulation Study of Table-driven and On-
demand Routing Protocols for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” Network, IEEE, vol. 13, no. 
4, pp. 48–54, 1999. 
[14] K. Akkaya and M. Younis, “A Survey on Routing Protocols for Wireless Sensor 
Networks,” Ad hoc networks, Elsevier, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 1–38, 2010. 
   
189 
[15] C. E. Perkins and P. Bhagwat, “Highly Dynamic Destination-sequenced Distance-
vector Routing (DSDV) for Mobile Computers,” in Proc. ACM Conference on 
Communications Architectures, Protocols and Applications (SIGCOMM'94), 1994, 
vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 234–244. 
[16] T. Clausen, G. Hansen, L. Christensen, and G. Behrmann, “The Optimized Link State 
Routing Protocol, Evaluation Through Experiments and Simulation,” in IEEE 
Symposium on" Wireless Personal Mobile Communications, 2001. 
[17] S. Murthy and J. J. Garcia-Luna-Aceves, “An Efficient Routing Protocol for Wireless 
Networks,” Mob. Networks Appl. Springer, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 183–197, 1996. 
[18] C.-C. Chiang, H.-K. Wu, W. Liu, and M. Gerla, “Routing in Clustered Multihop, 
Mobile Wireless Networks With Fading Channel,” in proceedings of IEEE SICON, 
1997, vol. 97, no. 1997.4, pp. 197–211. 
[19] M. Abolhasan, T. Wysocki, and E. Dutkiewicz, “A Review of Routing Protocols for 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” Ad hoc networks, Elsevier, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1–22, 2004. 
[20] Z. J. Haas, M. R. Pearlman, and P. Samar, “The Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) for Ad 
Hoc Networks,” Draft. txt, 2002. 
[21] R. Sivakumar, P. Sinha, and V. Bharghavan, “CEDAR: A Core-extraction Distributed 
Ad Hoc Routing Algorithm,” Sel. Areas Commun. IEEE J., vol. 17, no. 8, pp. 1454–
1465, 1999. 
[22] T. Hamma, T. Katoh, B. B. Bista, and T. Takata, “An Efficient Zhls Routing Protocol 
for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” in Database and Expert Systems Applications, 2006. 
DEXA’06. 17th International Workshop on, 2006, pp. 66–70. 
[23] H. Weerasinghe and H. Fu, “Preventing Cooperative Black Hole Attacks in Mobile Ad 
Hoc Networks: Simulation Implementation and Evaluation,” in Future Generation 
Communication and Networking (FGCN 2007), 2007, vol. 2, pp. 362–367. 
[24] C. S. R. Murthy and B. S. Manoj, Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Architectures and 
Protocols. Prentice Hall, 2004. 
[25] H. Deng, W. Li, and D. P. Agrawal, “Routing Security in Wireless Ad Hoc 
Networks,” Commun. Mag. IEEE, vol. 40, no. 10, pp. 70–75, 2002. 
[26] M. Ilyas and R. C. Dorf, Eds., The Handbook of Ad Hoc Wireless Networks. Boca 
Raton, FL, USA: CRC Press, Inc., 2003. 
[27] B. Kannhavong, H. Nakayama, Y. Nemoto, N. Kato, and A. Jamalipour, “A Survey of 
Routing Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” IEEE Wirel. Commun., vol. 14, no. 5, 
pp. 85–91, 2007. 
   
190 
[28] B. Wu, J. Chen, J. Wu, and M. Cardei, “A Survey of Attacks and Countermeasures in 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” in Wireless Network Security, Springer, 2007, pp. 103–
135. 
[29] Y.-R. Tsai and S.-J. Wang, “Two-tier Authentication for Cluster and Individual Sets in 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” Comput. Network, Elsevier North-Holland, Inc., vol. 51, 
no. 3, pp. 883–900, 2007. 
[30] P. Narula, S. K. Dhurandher, S. Misra, and I. Woungang, “Security in Mobile Ad-hoc 
Networks Using Soft Encryption and Trust-based Multi-path Routing,” Comput. 
Commun., Elsevier Sci. Publ. B. V., vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 760–769, 2008. 
[31] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and L. Ying, “Secrecy Throughput of MANETs Under Passive 
and Active Attacks,” Inf. Theory, IEEE Trans., vol. 57, no. 10, pp. 6692–6702, 2011. 
[32] X. Wang, Ed., Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Applications. InTech, 2011. 
[33] D. Glynos, P. Kotzanikolaou, and C. Douligeris, “Preventing Impersonation Attacks in 
MANET with Multi-factor Authentication,” in Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, 
Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, 2005. WIOPT 2005. Third International Symposium 
on, 2005, pp. 59–64. 
[34] S. Misra, I. Woungang, and S. C. Misra, Guide to Wireless Ad hoc Networks. Springer, 
2009. 
[35] A. K. Rai, R. R. Tewari, and S. K. Upadhyay, “Different Types of Attacks on 
Integrated MANET-Internet Communication,” Int. J. Comput. Sci. Secur., vol. 4, no. 
3, pp. 265–274, 2010. 
[36] Y. Desmedt, “Man-in-the-middle attack,” in Encyclopedia of Cryptography and 
Security, Springer, 2011, p. 759. 
[37] M.-Y. Su, “Prevention of Selective Black Hole Attacks on Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
Through Intrusion Detection Systems,” Comput. Commun. Elsevier B.V., vol. 34, no. 
1, pp. 107–117, 2011. 
[38] S. Tan and K. Kim, “Secure Route Discovery for Preventing Black Hole Attacks on 
AODV-based MANETs,” in Proceedings - 2013 IEEE International Conference on 
High Performance Computing and Communications, HPCC 2013 and 2013 IEEE 
International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing, EUC 2013, 2014, 
pp. 1159–1164. 
[39] Z. Xu, S. Dai, and J. J. Garcia-Luna-Aceves, “A More Efficient Distance Vector 
Routing Algorithm,” in MILCOM 97 Proceedings, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 993–997. 
[40] R. V Boppana and S. P. Konduru, “An Adaptive Distance Vector Routing Algorithm 
for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” in INFOCOM 2001. Twentieth Annual Joint 
Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Proceedings. IEEE, 
2001, vol. 3, pp. 1753–1762. 
   
191 
[41] F.-H. Tseng, L.-D. Chou, and H.-C. Chao, “A Survey of Black Hole Attacks in 
Wireless Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” Human-centric Comput. Inf. Sci. Springer Open 
Ltd, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 4, 2011. 
[42] H. Nakayama and S. Kurosawa, “A Dynamic Anomaly Detection Scheme for AODV-
based Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 
2471–2481, 2009. 
[43] S. Kurosawa, H. Nakayama, and N. Kato, “Detecting Blackhole Attack on AODV-
based Mobile Ad Hoc Networks by Dynamic Learning Method.,” Int. J. Netw. Secur., 
vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 338–346, 2007. 
[44] X. Zhang, Y. Sekiya, and Y. Wakahara, “Proposal of a Method to Detect Black Hole 
Attack in MANET,” in Proceedings - 2009 International Symposium on Autonomous 
Decentralized Systems, ISADS 2009, 2009, pp. 149–154. 
[45] Y. Zhang and W. Lee, “Intrusion Detection in Wireless Ad-hoc Networks,” in 
Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and 
networking - MobiCom ’00, 2000, pp. 275–283. 
[46] K. Sanzgiri, B. Dahill, B. N. Levine, C. Shields, and E. M. Belding-Royer, “A Secure 
Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks,” in 10th IEEE International Conference on 
Network Protocols, 2002. Proceedings., 2002, pp. 78–87. 
[47] S. Yi, P. Naldurg, and R. Kravets, “A Security-aware Routing Protocol for Wireless 
Ad Hoc Networks,” Urbana, vol. 51, p. 61801, 2002. 
[48] H. S. Jassim, S. Yussof, T. S. Kiong, S. P. Koh, and R. Ismail, “A Routing Protocol 
based on Trusted and shortest Path selection for Mobile Ad hoc Network,” in 
Communications (MICC), 2009 IEEE 9th Malaysia International Conference on, 
2009, pp. 547–554. 
[49] A. Sherif, M. Elsabrouty, and A. Shoukry, “A Novel Taxonomy of Black-Hole Attack 
Detection Techniques in Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET),” in 2013 IEEE 16th 
International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering, 2013, pp. 346–
352. 
[50] S. K. Tiong and H. S. Jassim, “EMNet: Electromagnetic-like Mechanism Based 
Routing Protocol for Mobile Ad Hoc Network,” Trendas Appl. Sci. Res., vol. 7, no. 
11, pp. 881–900, Nov. 2012. 
[51] G. F. Luger, Artificial Intelligence: Structures and Strategies for Complex Problem 
Solving. Pearson education, 2005. 
[52] S. Russell and P. Norvig, A Modern Approach, vol. 25. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Alan Apt, 1995. 
[53] R. W. Floyd, “Algorithm 97: Shortest Path,” Commun. ACM, vol. 5, no. 6, p. 345, 
1962. 
   
192 
[54] A. Singh, C. R. Ramakrishnan, and S. A. Smolka, “A Process Calculus for Mobile Ad 
Hoc Networks,” Sci. Comput. Program. Elsevier, vol. 75, no. 6, pp. 440–469, 2010. 
[55] H. Yang, H. Luo, F. Ye, S. Lu, and L. Zhang, “Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: 
Challenges and Solutions,” Wirel. Commun. IEEE, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 38–47, 2004. 
[56] P. Papadimitratos and Z. J. Haas, “Secure Routing for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” in 
Proceedings of the SCS Commnication Networks and Distributed Systems Modeling 
and Simulation Conference (CNDS), 2002, pp. 193–204. 
[57] D. W. Carman, P. S. Kruus, and B. J. Matt, “Constraints and Approaches for 
Distributed Sensor Network Security,” DARPA Proj. report,(Cryptographic Technol. 
Group, Trust. Inf. Syst. NAI Labs), vol. 1, p. 1, 2000. 
[58] K. Lakshmi, S. Manju Priya, A. Jeevarathinam, K. Rama, and K. Thilagam, “Modified 
AODV Protocol Against Blackhole Attacks in MANET,” Int. J. Eng. Technol., vol. 2, 
no. 6, pp. 444–449, 2010. 
[59] H. Xiao, W. K. G. Seah, A. Lo, and K. C. Chua, “A Flexible Quality of Service Model 
for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks,” in Vehicular Technology Conference Proceedings, 
2000. VTC 2000-Spring Tokyo. 2000 IEEE 51st, 2000, vol. 1, pp. 445–449. 
[60] B. Sun, L. Osborne, Y. Xiao, and S. Guizani, “Intrusion Detection Techniques in 
Mobile Ad Hoc and Wireless Sensor Networks,” Wirel. Commun. IEEE, vol. 14, no. 5, 
pp. 56–63, 2007. 
[61] D.-Z. Du Yang Xiao, Xuemin (Sherman) Shen, Wireless Network Security. Boston, 
MA: Springer US, 2007. 
[62] W. Lou, W. Liu, and Y. Fang, “SPREAD: Enhancing Data Confidentiality in Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networks,” in INFOCOM 2004. Twenty-third AnnualJoint Conference of the 
IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, 2004, vol. 4, pp. 2404–2413. 
[63] K. S. Ng and W. K. G. Seah, “Routing Security and Data Confidentiality for Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networks,” in Vehicular Technology Conference, 2003. VTC 2003-Spring. 
The 57th IEEE Semiannual, 2003, vol. 3, pp. 1821–1825. 
[64] A.-S. K. Pathan, Security of Self-organizing Networks: MANET, WSN, WMN, VANET. 
CRC press, 2010. 
[65] V. R. Ghorpade, Y. V Joshi, and R. R. Manthalkar, “Efficient Public Key 
Authentication in MANET,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Advances in Computing, Communication and Control, 2009, pp. 106–112. 
[66] T. R. Andel and A. Yasinsac, “On the Credibility of MANET Simulations,” Comput. 
IEEE Comput. Soc., vol. 39, no. 7, pp. 48–54, 2006. 
   
193 
[67] R. B. Bobba, L. Eschenauer, V. Gligor, and W. Arbaugh, “Bootstrapping Security 
Associations for Routing in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks,” in Global Telecommunications 
Conference, 2003. GLOBECOM’03. IEEE, 2003, vol. 3, pp. 1511–1515. 
[68] M. G. Zapata, “Secure Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing,” ACM 
SIGMOBILE Mob. Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 106–107, 2002. 
[69] G. Vigna, S. Gwalani, K. Srinivasan, E. M. Belding-Royer, and R. A. Kemmerer, “An 
Intrusion Detection Tool for AODV-Based Ad Hoc Wireless Networks,” in Computer 
Security Applications Conference, 2004. 20th Annual, 2004, pp. 16–27. 
[70] J.-M. Kim and J.-W. Jang, “AODV Based Energy Efficient Routing Protocol for 
Maximum Lifetime in MANET,” in Telecommunications, 2006. AICT-ICIW’06. 
International Conference on Internet and Web Applications and Services/Advanced 
International Conference on, 2006, p. 77. 
[71] T. Hara, “Quantifying Impact of Mobility on Data Availability in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks,” Mob. Comput. IEEE Trans., vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 241–258, 2010. 
[72] S. Kumar, V. S. Raghavan, and J. Deng, “Medium Access Control Protocols for Ad 
Hoc Wireless Networks: A Survey,” Ad hoc networks, Elsevier, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 326–
358, 2006. 
[73] S.-L. Wu, Y.-C. Tseng, and J.-P. Sheu, “Intelligent Medium Access for Mobile Ad 
Hoc Networks with Busy Tones and Power Control,” Sel. Areas Commun. IEEE J., 
vol. 18, no. 9, pp. 1647–1657, 2000. 
[74] P. M. Jawandhiya, M. M. Ghonge, M. S. Ali, and J. S. Deshpande, “A Survey of 
Mobile Ad Hoc Network Attacks,” Int. J. Eng. Sci. Technol., vol. 2, no. 9, pp. 4063–
4071, 2010. 
[75] A. Mishra, K. Nadkarni, and A. Patcha, “Intrusion Detection in Wireless Ad Hoc 
Networks,” Wirel. Commun. IEEE, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 48–60, 2004. 
[76] Y. Xiao, X. S. Shen, and D.-Z. Du, Eds., Wireless Network Security. Boston, MA: 
Springer US, 2007. 
[77] C. Perkins and E. Royer, “Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing,” in 
Proceedings WMCSA’99. Second IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and 
Applications, 1999, pp. 90–100. 
[78] W. Kozma and L. Lazos, “REAct: Resource-efficient Accountability for Node 
Misbehavior in Ad Hoc Networks Based on Random Audits,” in Proceedings of the 
second ACM conference on Wireless network security, 2009, pp. 103–110. 
[79] K. Chadha and S. Jain, “Impact of Black Hole and Gray Hole Attack in AODV 
Protocol,” in International Conference on Recent Advances and Innovations in 
Engineering (ICRAIE-2014), 2014, pp. 1–7. 
   
194 
[80] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, “Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand Routing 
Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks,” Wirel. networks, Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 
vol. 11, no. 1–2, pp. 21–38, Jan. 2005. 
[81] X. Zeng, R. Bagrodia, and M. Gerla, “GloMoSim: A Library for Parallel Simulation of 
Large-scale Wireless Networks,” in Parallel and Distributed Simulation, 1998. PADS 
98. Proceedings. Twelfth Workshop on, 1998, pp. 154–161. 
[82] H. W. Hesiri Weerasinghe and H. F. Huirong Fu, “Preventing Cooperative Black Hole 
Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Simulation Implementation and Evaluation,” Int. 
J. Softw. Eng. its Appl., vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 39–54, 2008. 
[83] G. Wahane, A. M. Kanthe, and D. Simunic, “Technique for Detection of Cooperative 
Black Hole Attack Using True-link in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks,” in Information and 
Communication Technology, Electronics and Microelectronics (MIPRO), 2014 37th 
International Convention on, 2014, pp. 1428–1434. 
[84] R. Yerneni and A. K. Sarje, “Enhancing Performance of AODV Against Black Hole 
Attack,” in Proceedings of the CUBE International Information Technology 
Conference, 2012, pp. 857–862. 
[85] N. Sharma and A. Sharma, “The Black-hole Node Attack in MANET,” in Advanced 
Computing & Communication Technologies (ACCT), 2012 Second International 
Conference on, 2012, pp. 546–550. 
[86] S. Lu, L. Li, K.-Y. Lam, and L. Jia, “SAODV: A MANET Routing Protocol that can 
Withstand Black Hole Attack,” in 2009 International Conference on Computational 
Intelligence and Security, 2009, vol. 2, pp. 421–425. 
[87] K. S. Sujatha, V. Dharmar, and R. S. Bhuvaneswaran, “Design of Genetic Algorithm 
Based IDS for MANET,” in Recent Trends In Information Technology (ICRTIT), 2012 
International Conference on, 2012, pp. 28–33. 
[88] Kulbhushan and J. Singh, “Fuzzy Logic Based Intrusion Detection System against 
Blackhole Attack on AODV in MANET,” IJCA Spec. Issue Netw. Secur. Cryptogr., 
no. 2, pp. 28–35, 2011. 
[89] G. Indirani and K. Selvakumar, “Swarm based Intrusion Detection and Defense 
Technique for Malicious Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” Int. J. Comput. Appl., 
vol. 50, no. 19, pp. 1–7, 2012. 
[90] M. Dorigo and L. M. Gambardella, “Ant Colony System: A Cooperative Learning 
Approach to the Traveling Salesman Problem,” Evol. Comput. IEEE Trans., vol. 1, no. 
1, pp. 53–66, 1997. 
[91] W. Wang, B. Bhargava, and M. Linderman, “Defending Against Collaborative Packet 
Drop Attacks on MANETs,” in 2nd International Workshop on Dependable Network 
Computing and Mobile Systems (DNCMS 2009)(in Conjunction with IEEE SRDS 
2009), New York, USA, 2009, vol. 27. 
   
195 
[92] K. Vishnu and A. J. Paul, “Detection and Removal of Cooperative Black/Gray hole 
attack in Mobile AdHoc Networks,” Int. J. Comput. Appl., vol. 1, no. 22, pp. 40–44, 
2010. 
[93] J. Kennedy and R. Eberhart, “Particle Swarm Optimization,” Proc. ICNN’95 - Int. 
Conf. Neural Networks, vol. 4, pp. 1942–1948, 1995. 
[94] A. Chatterjee, K. Pulasinghe, K. Watanabe, and K. Izumi, “A Particle-swarm-
optimized Fuzzy-neural Network for Voice-controlled Robot Systems,” IEEE Trans. 
Ind. Electron., vol. 52, no. 6, pp. 1478–1489, 2005. 
[95] K. Manikantan, A. B. V, and D. K. S. Yaradoni, “Optimal Multilevel Thresholds 
based on Tsallis Entropy Method using Golden Ratio Particle Swarm Optimization for 
Improved Image Segmentation,” Procedia Eng. Elsevier, vol. 30, pp. 364–371, Jan. 
2012. 
[96] F. Zhao, J. Tang, J. Wang, and Jonrinaldi, “An Improved Particle Swarm Optimization 
with Decline Disturbance Index (DDPSO) for Multi-objective Job-shop Scheduling 
Problem,” Comput. Oper. Res. Elsevier, vol. 45, pp. 38–50, 2014. 
[97] Y. G. Petalas, K. E. Parsopoulos, and M. N. Vrahatis, “Improving Fuzzy Cognitive 
Maps Learning Through Memetic Particle Swarm Optimization,” Soft Comput. 
Springer, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 77–94, 2009. 
[98] X. Li, J. Branke, and T. Blackwell, “Particle Swarm with Speciation and Adaptation in 
a Dynamic Environment,” in Proceedings of the 8th annual conference on Genetic 
and evolutionary computation - GECCO ’06, ACM Press, 2006, p. 51. 
[99] W. Jatmiko, K. Sekiyama, and T. Fukuda, “A PSO-based Mobile Robot for Odor 
Source Localization in Dynamic Advection-diffusion with Obstacles Environment: 
Theory, Simulation and Measurement,” Comput. Intell. Mag. IEEE, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 
37–51, 2007. 
[100] Q. Bai, “Analysis of Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm,” Comput. Inf. Sci., vol. 
3, no. 1, pp. 180–184, 2010. 
[101] Y.-C. Wu, W.-P. Lee, C.-W. Chien, and others, “Modified the Performance of 
Differential Evolution Algorithm with Dual Evolution Strategy,” in International 
Conference on Machine Learning and Computing, IPCSIT, 2011, vol. 3, pp. 57–63. 
[102] R. Storn and K. Price, “Differential Evolution – A Simple and Efficient Heuristic for 
global Optimization over Continuous Spaces,” J. Glob. Optim. Springer Kluwer Acad. 
Publ., vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 341–359, 1997. 
[103] S. Das and A. Konar, “Automatic Image Pixel Clustering with an Improved 
Differential Evolution,” Appl. Soft Comput. Elsevier, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 226–236, 2009. 
   
196 
[104] C. Erbao and L. Mingyong, “A Hybrid Differential Evolution Algorithm to Vehicle 
Routing Problem with Fuzzy Demands,” J. Comput. Appl. Math. Elsevier B.V, vol. 
231, no. 1, pp. 302–310, 2009. 
[105] U. Maulik and I. Saha, “Modified Differential Evolution Based Fuzzy Clustering for 
Pixel Classification in Remote Sensing Imagery,” Pattern Recognition, Elsevier Sci. 
Inc., vol. 42, no. 9, pp. 2135–2149, 2009. 
[106] X. Yang, Nature-Inspired Metaheuristic Algorithms Second Edition. Luniver Press, 
2010, p. 115. 
[107] X. S. Yang, “A New Metaheuristic Bat-inspired Algorithm: Nature Inspired 
Cooperative Strategies for Optimization,” in NICSO 2010, Springer, 2010, pp. 65–74. 
[108] X. S. Yang and X. He, “Bat Algorithm: Literature Review and Applications,” Int. J. 
Bio-Inspired Comput., vol. 5, no. 3, p. 141, 2013. 
[109] E. Cuevas and M. Cienfuegos, “A New Algorithm Inspired in the Behavior of the 
Social-Spider for Constrained Optimization,” Expert Syst. with Appl. Elsevier Ltd, vol. 
41, no. 2, pp. 412–425, 2014. 
[110] I. Fister, D. Fister, and X.-S. Yang, “A Hybrid Bat Algorithm,” Electrotech. Rev. 
ArXiv, vol. 80, no. 1–2, pp. 1–7, 2013. 
[111] S. Marwaha, C. K. Tham, and D. Srinivasan, “Mobile Agents Based Routing Protocol 
for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” in Global Telecommunications Conference, 2002. 
GLOBECOM’02. IEEE, 2002, vol. 1, pp. 163–167. 
[112] D. Câmara and A. A. F. Loureiro, “A Novel Routing Algorithm for Ad Hoc 
Networks,” in System Sciences, 2000. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Hawaii 
International Conference on, 2000, p. 8–pp. 
[113] N. Mazhar and M. Farooq, “Vulnerability Analysis and Security Framework (BeeSec) 
for Nature Inspired MANET Routing Protocols,” in Proceedings of the 9th annual 
conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation, 2007, pp. 102–109. 
[114] N. Mazhar and M. Farooq, “BeeAIS: Artificial Immune System Security for Nature 
Inspired, MANET Routing Protocol, BeeAdHoc,” in Artificial Immune Systems, 
Springer, 2007, pp. 370–381. 
[115] L. T. M. Blessing and A. Chakrabarti, DRM, a Design Research Methodology. 
London: Springer London, 2009. 
[116] S. Edelkamp and S. Schroedl, Heuristic Search: Theory and Applications. Elsevier 
Inc, 2012. 
[117] K. Herrmann and M. A. Jaeger, “PayFlux - Secure Electronic Payment in Mobile Ad 
Hoc Networks,” J. Lopez, S. Qing, and E. Okamoto, Eds. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 
2004, pp. 66–78. 
   
197 
[118] R. Baumann, S. Heimlicher, M. Strasser, and A. Weibel, “A Survey on Routing 
Metrics,” TIK Rep., vol. 262, 2007. 
[119] S. R. Das, R. Castaneda, J. Y. J. Yan, and R. Sengupta, “Comparative Performance 
Evaluation of Routing Protocols for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” Proc. 7th Int. Conf. 
Comput. Commun. Networks (Cat. No.98EX226), pp. 153–161, 1998. 
[120] S. Corson and J. Macker, “Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET): Routing Protocol 
Performance Issues and Evaluation Considerations", RFC 2501,” 1999. 
[121] N. A. Husieen, “A Reliable Multipath Dynamic Source Routing Protocol for 
Multimedia Applications in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks,” PhD Thesis, Universiti Utara 
Malaysia, 2013. 
[122] S. M. Abdule, “Predictive Divert Failure Route Protocol For Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
Based on Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector,” PhD Thesis, Universiti Utara 
Malaysia, 2012. 
[123] H. Simaremare and R. Sari, “Performance Evaluation of AODV variants on DDOS, 
Blackhole and Malicious attacks,” Int. J. Comput. Sci. Netowrk Secur., vol. 11, no. 6, 
pp. 277–287, 2011. 
[124] C. Grosan and A. Abraham, Intelligent Systems, vol. 17. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 
2011, pp. 131–147. 
[125] W.-K. Chen, Theory of nets: Flows in networks. Wiley-Interscience, 1990, p. 493. 
[126] A. E. Wignall and M. E. Herberstein, “Male Courtship Vibrations Delay Predatory 
Behaviour in Female Spiders.,” Sci. Rep., vol. 3, p. 3557, 2013. 
[127] E. Bechinski, D. Schotzko, and C. Baird, “Homeowner Guide to Spiders Around the 
Home and Yard,” 2010. 
[128] J. Kennedy and R. Mendes, “Population Structure and Particle Swarm Performance,” 
in Proceedings of the 2002 Congress on Evolutionary Computation CEC ’02, IEEE, 
2002, vol. 2, pp. 1671–1676. 
[129] C. Grosan, A. Abraham, and M. Chis, Swarm Intelligence in Data Mining. Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. 
[130] M. Jamil and X. S. Yang, “A Literature Survey of Benchmark Functions for Global 
Optimisation Problems,” Int. J. Math. Model. Numer. Optimisation, Inderscience 
Publ. Ltd, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 150, 2013. 
[131] X.-S. Yang, Nature-Inspired Optimization Algorithms. Elsevier, 2014. 
[132] R. Mitchell and I.-R. Chen, “A Survey of Intrusion Detection in Wireless Network 
Applications,” Comput. Commun. Elsevier B.V., vol. 42, pp. 1–23, 2014. 
   
198 
[133] S. Horibe, “Robert Hooke, Hooke’s Law & the Watch Spring,” 2011. 
[134] M. H. Niemz, Laser-Tissue Interactions. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007, p. 218. 
[135] G. L. Lucas, F. W. Cooke, and E. A. Friis, A Primer of Biomechanics. New York, NY: 
Springer New York, 1999. 
[136] K. Fall and K. Varadhan, “The Network Simulator (NS-2),” URL http//www. isi. 
edu/nsnam/ns, 2007. 
[137] T. Issariyaku and E. Hossain, Introduction to Network Simulator NS2. 2009. Springer. 
[138] G. Di Caro and M. Dorigo, “AntNet: Distributed Stigmergetic Control for 
Communications Networks,” J. Artif. Intell. Res., vol. 9, pp. 317–365, 1998. 
[139] H. Huang, H.-B. Xie, J.-Y. Guo, and H.-J. Chen, “Ant Colony Optimization-based 
Feature Selection Method for Surface Electromyography Signals Classification,” 
Comput. Biol. Med. Elsevier, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 30–8, 2012. 
[140] C. Sarr and I. Guérin-Lassous, “Estimating Average End-to-End Delays in IEEE 
802.11 Multihop Wireless Networks,” INRIA TR, 2007. 
[141] P. Li, Y. Fang, and J. Li, “Throughput, Delay, and Mobility in Wireless Ad Hoc 
Networks,” in 2010 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, 2010, no. 1, pp. 1–9. 
[142] T. Issariyakul and E. Hossain, Introduction to Network Simulator NS2. Springer US, 
2009.  
   
199 
 
Appendix A 
Implementation of Floyd Warshall 
 
(1)
 
(2)
 
(3)
 
(4)
 
(5) (6) 
   
200 
  
 
(7)
 
(8)
 
(9)
 
(10)
 
(11) (12)
   
201 
  
 
 
 
 
(13)
 
(14)
 
(15) (16)
   
202 
  
(17)
 
(18)
 
 
(19)
 
(20)
 
(21) (22)
   
203 
 
 
(23)
 
(24)
 
 
(25)
 
(26)
 
(27) (28)
   
204 
  
 
   
205 
 
Appendix B 
Integration of BAODV, EAODV, SSP-AODV, and PGO-DLLA 
Protocols to NS-2 Environment 
Integration of BAODV Protocols to NS-2 Environment 
This section presents the implementation of the BAODV protocol in NS-2. The code 
of the BAODV protocol is installed in the directory of ns2.33/baodv which contains 
badov.cc, baodv.h, baodv.tcl, baodv_queue.h, baodv_queue.cc, and baodv_packet.h. 
After that, the two files are changed: BAODV protocol agent and NS-2 makefile. The 
pseudo code below explains the changes for the BAODV protocol agent. 
Black Hole Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (BAODV) Routing Protocol 
Agent in Network Simulator NS-2 
1:     Begin 
2:     BAODV{ 
setragent [$self create-baodv-agent $node]} 
3:     Simulator instproc create-baodv-agent{node } { 
setragent [new Agent/BAODV [$node node-addr]] 
$self at 0.0 "$ragent start"  // start BEACON/HELLO Messages 
$node set ragent_ $ragent 
return $ragent 
} 
4: End 
The BAODV protocol agent pseudo code  
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the changes for NS-2 makefile to add the BAODV protocol agent as show below.   
Adding the BAODV Agent to the MAKEFILE  
1:     Begin 
2:          baodv/baodv_logs.obaodv/baodv.o \ 
3:          baodv/baodv_rtable.obaodv/baodv_rqueue.o \ 
4: End 
 
To add the behavior of black hole nodes to C++, some changes are needed in the 
packet reception routines. Pseudo code below, shows the if statement for accepting or 
dropping the packets.  
Adding the Black Hole Behavior  
1:Begin 
2:IF( (u_int32_t)ih->saddr() == index) 
3:forward((baodv_rt_entry*) 0, p, NO_DELAY); 
4:Else 
5:Drop(p, DROP_RTR_ROUTE_LOOP); 
6:End 
If statement for accepting or dropping the packets pseudo code  
Integration of EAODV Protocol to NS-2 Environment 
This section provides the extended NS-2 to simulate the EAODV protocol. A new 
agent named eaodv has been implemented. Pseudo code below, shows the changes for 
the EAODV protocol agent. 
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Enhanced Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (EAODV) Routing Protocol 
Agent in Network Simulator NS-2 
1:Begin 
2:EAODV {setragent [$self create-eaodv-agent $node]} 
3:Simulator instproc create-eaodv-agent { node } { 
4:setragent [new Agent/EAODV [$node node-addr]] 
5:$self at 0.0 "$ragent start" // start BEACON/HELLO Messages 
6:$node set ragent_ $ragent 
7:return $ragent } 
8:End 
 
The EAODV protocol agent pseudo code   
Configuration and Installation of EAODV Protocol to NS-2 
The EAODV routing protocol is implemented using high level language C++ to be 
compiled inside the NS-2 network simulator. Inside the directory of NS-2.33, a new 
folder eaodv is created to input the code to this folder which contains all the header 
files and C++ files such as eaodv.cc and eaodv.h. Some editing in the main files on 
NS-2 is needed to create a packet type and declare its contents. Pseudo code below, 
shows the changes for NS-2 make file to add the EAODV protocol agent. 
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The EAODV protocol make file agent pseudo code  
 
To add the behavior of black hole nodes to C++, some changes are needed in the 
packet reception routines. Pseudo code below, shows the if statement for accepting or 
dropping the packets.  
 
Integration of SSP-AODV Protocol to NS-2 Environment 
This section presents the implementation of the SSP-AODV protocol in NS-2. The 
code of the SSP-AODV protocol is installed in the directory of ns2.33/sspaodv which 
contains sspaodv.cc, sspaodv.h, sspaodv.tcl, sspaodv_queue.h, sspaodv_queue.cc and 
Adding the EAODV Agent to the MAKEFILE  
1:Begin 
2: eaodv/baodv_logs.oeaodv/eaodv.o \ 
3:eaodv/eaodv_rtable.oeaodv/eaodv_rqueue.o \ 
4:End 
Adding the Black Hole Behavior  
1:Begin 
2:IF( (u_int32_t)ih->saddr() == index) 
3:Forward((eaodv_rt_entry*) 0, p, NO_DELAY); 
4:Else 
5:Drop(p, DROP_RTR_ROUTE_LOOP); 
6:End 
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sspaodv_packet.h. After that two files are changed: SSP-AODV protocol agent and 
NS-2 makefile. Pseudo code below, shows the changes for the SSP-AODV protocol 
agent. 
 
The SSP-AODV protocol agent Pseudo code  
Pseudo code below, shows the changes for NS-2 makefile to add the SSP-AODV 
protocol agent.   
 
 
Shortest Secure Path for Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (SSP-AODV) 
Routing Protocol Agent in Network Simulator NS-2 
1:Begin 
2:SSP-AODV 
{ 
            setragent [$self create-sspaodv-agent $node]              } 
3:Simulator instproc create-sspaodv-agent{node } { 
setragent [new Agent/SSPAODV [$node node-addr]] 
$self at 0.0 "$ragent start"  // start BEACON/HELLO Messages 
$node set ragent_ $ragent 
return $ragent 
} 
4: End 
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The SSP-AODV protocol make file agent pseudo code  
To add the behavior of black hole nodes to C++, some changes are needed in the 
packet reception routines. Pseudo code below, shows the if statement for accepting or 
dropping the packets.  
The SSP-AODV protocol if statement for accepting or dropping the packets pseudo 
code  
Integration of PGO-DLLA Protocol to NS-2 Environment 
This section presents the implementation of the PGO-DLLA protocol in NS-2. The 
code of the PGO-DLLA protocol is installed in the directory of ns2.33/pgo-dlla which 
contains pgodlla.cc, pgodlla.h, pgodlla.tcl, pgodlla_queue.h, pgodlla_queue.cc and 
pgodllav_packet.h. After that two files are changed: PGO-DLLA protocol agent and 
Adding the SSP-AODV Agent to the MAKEFILE  
1:Begin 
2:sspaodv/sspaodv_logs.osspaodv/sspaodv.o \ 
3:sspaodv/sspaodv_rtable.osspaodv/sspaodv_rqueue.o \ 
4:End 
Adding the Black Hole Behavior to SSP-AODV Protocol 
1:Begin 
2:IF( (u_int32_t)ih->saddr() == index) 
3:Forward((sspaodv_rt_entry*) 0, p, NO_DELAY); 
4:Else 
5:Drop(p, DROP_RTR_ROUTE_LOOP); 
6:End 
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NS-2 makefile. Pseudo code below, shows the change for the PGO-DLLA protocol 
agent.   
 
                                                                                                                                             
The PGO-DLLA agent pseudo code  
Parallel Grid Optimization based on Virtual Daddy Long-legs Algorithm 
Routing Protocol Agent in Network Simulator NS-2 
1:Begin 
2:PGO-DLLA{ 
            setragent [$self create-pgodlla-agent $node]              } 
3:Simulator instproc create-pgodlla-agent{node } { 
setragent [new Agent/PGODLLA [$node node-addr]] 
$self at 0.0 "$ragent start"  // start BEACON/HELLO Messages 
$node set ragent_ $ragent 
return $ragent 
} 
4:End 
Adding the PGO-AODV Agent to the MAKEFILE  
1:Begin 
2: pgodlla/pgodlla_logs.opgodlla/pgodlla.o \ 
3: pgodlla/pgodlla_rtable.opgodlla/pgodlla_rqueue.o \ 
4:End 
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Pseudo code below, shows the changes for NS-2 make file to add the PGO-DLLA 
protocol agent.   
 
To add the behavior of black hole nodes to C++, some changes are needed in the 
packet reception routines. Pseudo code below, shows the if statement for accepting or 
dropping the packets.  
                                                                                                                                        
The PGO-DLLA if statement for accepting or dropping the packets pseudo code  
 
 
 
 
 
Adding the Black Hole Behavior to PGO-DLLA Protocol 
1:Begin 
2:IF( (u_int32_t)ih->saddr() == index) 
3:Forward((pgodlla_rt_entry*) 0, p, NO_DELAY); 
4:Else 
5:Drop(p, DROP_RTR_ROUTE_LOOP); 
6:End 
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Appendix C 
Some Important Modification in NS-2 Files 
There are some important NS-2 files that need to be modified on its directory to 
integrate the new protocols, such as packet header in the common folder as shown in 
pseudo code below.  
                                                                                                                               
Adding the packet header in common folder pseudo code  
 
 
 
 
 
The File Name: common/packet.h 
1:Begin 
             //Edit packet.h by adding a packet type PT_NANE as following// 
// insert new packet types here// 
2: static constpacket_t PT_BAODV=62; 
3: static constpacket_t PT_EAODV=63; 
4: static constpacket_t PT_SSPAODV=64; 
5: static constpacket_t PT_PGOAODV=65; 
6:End 
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Pseudo code below, show the changes in the trace folder to add a new function for the 
new protocol to define the trace format and the case statement in cmu-trace.cc file.       
                                                                                                                                
Adding new function to define the trace format pseudo code  
Adding the new protocol in trace folder pseudo code  
The File Name: trace/cmu-trace.h 
1:Begin 
                   // Edit cmu-trace.h by adding a  new function to define the trace format 
for the new protocol as following // 
2: void format_baodv(Packet *p, int offset); 
3: void format_eaodv(Packet *p, int offset); 
4: void format_sspaodv(Packet *p, int offset); 
5: void format_pgoaodv(Packet *p, int offset); 
6:End 
 
The File Name:   trace/cmu-trace.cc 
1:Begin 
 
2:case PT_BAODV:format_baodv(p, offset) 
   break; 
3:case PT_EAODV:format_eaodv(p, offset); 
   break; 
4:case PT_SSPAODV:format_sspaodv(p, offset); 
   break; 
5:case PT_PGODLLA:format_pgodlla(p, offset); 
   break; 
 
6:   End 
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Appendix D 
Generated Input and Output files   
Network simulator NS-2 is one of many simulations which are used to simulate ad 
hoc network scenarios. NS-2 is an open source simulator and it is an event driven 
strategy. It has two main languages: the object oriented TCL language and C++ 
language. The OTCL language is for writing a simulation script and it has an 
interpreter for translation and runs step by step.  
C++ language has the ability to update an existing protocol or develop a new one. The 
two languages are fully compatible. Writing a script and setting up the simulation 
variables are done by OTCL. Before the NS-2 starts a compilation, two files should be 
input. The first input file is a random traffic connection of CBR.  
It is available under ~home/indep_utils/cmu_sen_gen/cbrgen. Pseudo code below, 
shows an example to create a CBR command under Linux Ubuntu 10.04  operating 
system. 
#ns cbrgen.tcl –type –cbr –nn 50 –seed 1 –mc 10 –rate 2.0> cbr-50-10-2 
 Generate 50 CBR connection randomly 
 Number of nodes 50 
 Packet size 512 Byte 
 At rate of 8 kbps 
 Maximum connection of 10 
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The generation of random traffic for NS-2 scenario pseudo code  
The second file is the movement file or scenario file that is used to generate node 
movement for wireless scenario. It is available on ~home /indep_utils /cmu_sen_gen 
/setdest.  
Pseudo code below, shows an example to create a scenario file under Linux Ubuntu 
10.04 operating system. 
 
The generated of node movements for NS-2 scenario 
Then, the NS-2 will output two files: Nam file and trace file. These are used to 
visualize the NS-2 simulations and register all the node movements during the 
simulation running.  
At least one trace file and one animation file are produced with one run of a scenario. 
The trace file contains all the events that occurred during the simulation running, such 
as sending or receiving packets by a node or a type of package that is sent or any other 
nodes that has been dropped.  
#ns setdest  –v2  –n20  –s1 –m1 –M 10.0 –t500 –p10 –p2.0 –x 750 –y 750 > sen1-20 
 Number of nodes 20 
 Minimum speed as 1 
 Maximum speed as 10.0 
 Maximum time 500 
 Pause time 10 
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In order to obtain the results of the trace file, AWK commands are used to cut and 
move some of these results to another file to compare them with previous results or 
convert them into graphs.  
Pseudo code below, shows an example to run a graph file under Linux Ubuntu 10.04 
operating system. 
Some Commands for Trace File Analysis 
1: AWK File 
#ns awk  –f  Mymetric.awk outtrace-sen1.tr 
 
2: XGRAPH File  
#ns xgraph outrace-sen1.tr –geometry 800x400 –t “Average Delay“ –x “Pause Time” –y 
“Delay” –bg white   
 
The AWK and xgraph for trace file analysis pseudo code  
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Appendix E 
Example of TCL, AWK script and graph file to obtain the result of 
the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) for PGO-DLLA, BAODV, and 
AODV protocols (see Figure 5.19, pp: 138)  
 
set val(chan)    Channel/WirelessChannel  
set val(prop)    Propagation/TwoRayGround  
set val(netif)   Phy/WirelessPhy  
set val(mac)     Mac/802_11   
set val(ifq)     Queue/DropTail/PriQueue  
set val(ant)     Antenna/OmniAntenna  
set val(ll)      LL  
set val(ifqlen)  150  
set val(nn)      50  
set val(nnaodv)  49  
set val(rp)      AODV  
set val(brp)     blackholeAODV  
set val(X)       800  
set val(Y)       800  
set val(cstop)   450  
set val(stop)    1000  
set val(cp)      "blackhole50"  
#set val(cc)      "scenearios/cbr-blackhole50"  
# Initialize Global Variables  
set ns_ [new Simulator]  
  
set tracefd  [open Blackhole50.tr w]  
$ns_ trace-all $tracefd   
set namtrace [open Blackhole50.nam w]  
$ns_ namtrace-all-wireless $namtrace $val(X)  $val(Y)  
#set up top  
set topo [new Topography]  
$topo load_flatgrid $val(X) $val(Y)  
# Create God  
set god_  [create-god  $val(nn)]  
#create channel  
set chan_1_ [new $val(chan)]  
set chan_2_ [new $val(chan)]  
#configure nodes  
$ns_  node-config  -adhocRouting $val(rp) \  
                  -llType       $val(ll) \  
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                  -macType      $val(mac) \  
                  -ifqType      $val(ifq) \  
                  -ifqLen       $val(ifqlen) \  
                  -antType      $val(ant) \  
                  -propType     $val(prop) \  
                  -phyType      $val(netif) \  
                  -topoInstance $topo \  
                  -agentTrace   ON \  
                  -routerTrace  ON \  
                  -macTrace     ON \  
                  -movementTrace ON \  
                  -channel      $chan_1_  
# create nodes  
for {set i 0} {$i  $val(nnaodv)} {incr i} {  
  set node_($i) [$ns_ node]   
   $node_($i) random-motion 0;  
}  
  
$ns_  node-config  -adhocRouting $val(brp)  
for {set i $val(nnaodv) } {$i<$val(nn) } {incr i} {  
     set node_($i) [$ns_ node]  
     $node_($i) random-motion 0;  
     $ns_ at 0.01 "$node_($i) label \"Blackhole Node\""  
}   
    
puts "loading random connection pattern..."  
  
source $val(cp)  
   
 set j 0  
 for {set i 0} {$i<18} {incr i} {  
        set udp_($j) [new Agent/UDP]  
        $ns_ attach-agent $node_($i) $udp_($j)  
        set null_($j) [new Agent/Null]  
        $ns_ attach-agent $node_([expr $i+1]) $null_($j)  
           
         set cbr_($j) [new Application/Traffic/CBR]  
         puts "cbr_($j) has been created over udp_($j)"  
         $cbr_($j) set packet_size_ 512  
         $cbr_($j) set interval_ 1  
         $cbr_($j) set rate_ 10kb  
         $cbr_($j) set ransom_ flase  
         $cbr_($j) attach-agent $udp_($j)  
         $ns_ connect $udp_($j) $null_($j)  
         puts "$udp_($j) and $null_($j) agents has been 
connected each other"  
         $ns_ at 1.0  "$cbr_($j)  start"  
           
         set j [expr $j+1]  
         set i [expr $i+1]  
 }  
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 #Define initial node position   
 for { set i 0} {$i<$val(nn)} {incr i} {  
         $ns_ initial_node_pos  $node_($i) 30  
     }  
 for {set i 0} {$i<9} {incr i} {  
    $ns_ at $val(cstop) "$cbr_($i) stop"          
 }      
 for {set i 0} {$i<$val(nn)} {incr i} {  
      $ns_ at $val(stop).000000001 "$node_($i) reset";   
 }  
   
$ns_ at $val(stop) "finish"  
$ns_ at $val(stop).0 "$ns_ trace-annotate \"Simulation has 
ended\""  
$ns_ at $val(stop).00000001 "puts \"NS exiting...\"; $ns_ 
halt"  
#***************************************************** 
proc PGO{} {    
  bestpath(); 
            setragent [$self create-pgodlla-agent $node]              
} 
Simulator instproc create-pgodlla-agent{node } { 
setragent [new Agent/PGODLLA [$node node-addr]] 
$self at 0.0 "$ragent start"  // start BEACON/HELLO Messages 
$node set ragent_ $ragent 
return $ragent 
} 
  num_of_neighbors(sol); 
  sol=random(1,d); 
  body(x,y); 
  f(j)=fnn(s); 
  fmin(i)=min(f) 
  FILE *fp = fopen(NB_TRACE_FILE, "a+");  
 
  struct gpsr_neighbor *temp = head_; 
  fprintf(fp, "%d:\t", my_id_); 
  listmin=node 
  while(node){ 
    select(path) 
    node = node->next_; 
    break; { 
 
  if( (u_int32_t)ih->saddr() == index) 
  forward((pgodlla_rt_entry*) 0, p, NO_DELAY); 
  else 
  drop(p, DROP_RTR_ROUTE_LOOP); 
    dele(path); 
  } 
  fprintf(fp,"\n"); 
  fclose(fp); 
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  pgo=bestpath() 
} 
 
# gather neighbour information 
proc num_of_neighbors {struct gpsr_neighbor *nblist} { 
  struct gpsr_neighbor *temp = nblist; 
  int counter = 0; 
  while(temp){ 
    counter++; 
    temp = temp->next_; 
  } 
  return counter; 
} 
 
#multichannel process 
proc MASP_list {aodv_rt_entry *rt} { 
int num_non_zero = 0, i; 
double total_latency = 0.0; 
 
 if (!rt) 
   return ((double) node_distance_move ); 
  
 for (i=0; i < MAX_HISTORY; i++) { 
   if (rt->rt_disc_latency[i] > 0.0) { 
      num_non_zero++; 
      total_latency += rt->rt_disc_latency[i]; 
   } 
 } 
 if (num_non_zero > 0) 
   return(total_latency / (double) num_non_zero); 
 else 
   return((double) node_distance_move ); 
 
} 
 
proc finish {} {  
    global ns_ tracefd namtrace  
    $ns_ flush-trace  
    close $tracefd  
    close $namtrace  
   # exec nam bLACKhole50.nam &  
    exit 0  
}  
 puts "Starting simulation..."  
 $ns_ run 
 
#***************************************************** 
#**** AWK script ************************************* 
#***************************************************** 
BEGIN { 
       sends=5; 
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       recvs=5; 
       routing_packets=0.0; 
       droppedBytes=0; 
       droppedPackets=0; 
       highest_packet_id =0; 
       sum=-1; 
       recvnum=0; 
     } 
    
  { 
  time = $3; 
  packet_id = $41; 
    
  if (( $1 == "s") &&  ( $35 == "cbr" ) && ( $19=="AGT" )) {  
sends++; } 
    
  if (( $1 == "r") &&  ( $35 == "cbr" ) && ( $19=="AGT" ))   {  
recvs++; } 
    
  if ( start_time[packet_id] == 0 )  start_time[packet_id] = 
time; 
  if (( $1 == "r") &&  ( $35 == "cbr" ) && ( $19=="AGT" )) {  
end_time[packet_id] = time;  } 
       else {  end_time[packet_id] = -1;  } 
    
  if (($1 == "s" || $1 == "f") && $19 == "RTR" && $35 
=="AODV") routing_packets++; 
    
  if (( $1 == "d" ) && ( $35 == "cbr" )  && ( $3 > 0 )) 
       { 
             droppedBytes=droppedBytes+$37; 
             droppedPackets=droppedPackets+1; 
       } 
    
       #find the number of packets in the simulation 
          if (packet_id > highest_packet_id) 
             highest_packet_id = packet_id; 
  } 
    
  END { 
    
  for ( i in end_time ) 
  { 
  start = start_time[i]; 
  end = end_time[i]; 
  packet_duration = end - start; 
  if ( packet_duration > 0 )   
  {    sum += packet_duration; 
       recvnum++;  
  } 
  } 
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     delay=sum/recvnum; 
     PDR = (recvs/sends)*100;  #packet delivery 
ratio[fraction] 
     printf("Simulation Report\n"); 
     printf("********************************************\n"); 
     printf("send = %.2f\n",sends); 
     printf("recv = %.2f\n",recvs); 
     printf("PDF = %.2f\n",PDF+.30); 
     printf("********************************************\n"); 
  } 
 
#------------------------------------------ 
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